BRIEFING
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
Author: Martin Russell
Members' Research Service
PE 652.100 – September 2020
EN
Russia, arms control
and non-proliferation
SUMMARY
Multilateral non-proliferation treaties have curbed the spread of the world's dangerous weapons.
The international security order also builds on a series of bilateral agreements between the two
leading nuclear powers, the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States (US), mostly concluded
towards the end of the Cold War or soon afterwards.
Although the multilateral treaties are still in place, the bilateral elements have mostly come unstuck.
In 2019, the US pulled out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and it is probable that
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining major bilateral arms
control agreement, will expire in 2021. Russia's systematic violation of its arms control commitments
is partly to blame. Other factors include increased US unilateralism and the failure of both sides to
adapt the system to changing realities such as China's rise as a military power.
Russia is investing heavily in its nuclear forces and developing new and more powerful weapons. Its
arsenal is equal to that of the US and in some areas it may even have at least temporary superiority,
partially compensating for weaknesses in terms of conventional weapons.
As geopolitical tensions rise, arms control has become more necessary than ever. However, it seems
unlikely that the US, Russia and possibly China will manage to conclude a new generation of
agreements. The implications are not yet clear: neither a major shift in the military balance nor a
new arms race are expected, but the lack of formal constraints creates uncertainty.
In this Briefing
Overview of major agreements
Benefits of arms control and
non-proliferation
Arms control challenges
Outlook
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
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Overview of major agreements
Russia is party to a series of agreements that limit the spread of dangerous weapons and reduce the
risk of military conflict. Multilateral non-proliferation agreements concern weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) – those considered particularly dangerous due to their capacity to cause large-
scale indiscriminate damage, including to civilian populations. Russia and nearly all the other
countries of the world have committed to totally eliminating certain types of WMD, such as chemical
and biological weapons, and limiting nuclear weapons to just five countries.
As Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the US spiralled, the two sides signed a
series of mostly bilateral arms control agreements, which aimed to ensure stability by setting limits
on the numbers and types of nuclear and conventional weapons each of the potential adversaries
could hold. Russia remains party to several of these. In Europe, these two types of agreements are
flanked by confidence- and security-building measures. As their name suggests, these are
intended to build trust between countries by requiring them to share information with one another
about military activities.
Table 1 – Non-proliferation agreements
Name of treaty
Year of entry into
force
Parties Scope and purpose Current situation
Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)
1970
191 countries,
including Russia, the
US and China
Limits nuclear weapons
to Russia, US, China, UK
and France; sets long-
term goal of eliminating
nuclear weapons for all
countries, but without
specifying how to reach
it.
Complete nuclear disarmament
remains unlikely, as none of the five
nuclear-weapon states plan to get
rid of their arsenals. In addition, a
further four countries (India,
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, which
are not parties to the NPT) have
acquired nuclear weapons.
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)
Adopted by the UN
General Assembly in
1996, but never came
into force
166 countries,
including Russia, but
not the US and China
have signed and
ratified
A complete ban on all
nuclear explosions,
whether for military or
civilian purposes
Although the CTBT never came into
force, it is applied in effect, with a de
facto moratorium on testing (North
Korea is the only country known to
have carried out recent tests).
Treaty on the
prohibition of
nuclear weapons
(TPNW)
Will enter into force
once 50 countries
have ratified
44 countries have
signed and ratified,
but not Russia, the
US, China, the UK,
France or any other
nuclear-weapon
states
Parties commit to
eliminating all nuclear
weapons
None of the countries that already
have nuclear weapons has signed
the TPNW or is likely to do so.
Biological and
Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC)
1975
183 countries,
including Russia, the
US and China
A complete ban on
biological weapons
According to the US, it is not certain
that Russia has destroyed all its
biological weapons.
Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC)
1997
193 countries,
including Russia, the
US and China
A complete ban on
chemical weapons
In 2018, Russian GRU (military
intelligence) agents used Novichok,
a weapons-grade nerve agent, in the
attempted assassination of Sergey
Skripal. The GRU is also accused of
an attempted cyber-attack on the
OPCW, the organisation that
administers the CWC, also in 2018.
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Table 2 – Arms control agreements
Name of treaty
Entry into force
(/expiry)
Parties Scope and purpose Current situation
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) Agreements I and II,
Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START); Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT); New START
SALT I: 1972;
SALT II: 1979;
START: 1991-
2009; SORT:
2002-2012; New
START: 2011-
2021
(New START):
Russia, US
Reducing the number of
deployed strategic nuclear
warheads and their
launchers.
(New START) does not
include: non-deployed
warheads, non-strategic
warheads, certain new kinds
of launchers
New START is due to expire
in February 2021 unless
the US and Russia decide
to extend it for another
five years. Talks on a
possible extension are
ongoing.
Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty
1988
Soviet
Union/Russia,
US
Complete elimination of all
nuclear and conventional
ground-launched ballistic
and cruise missiles with
ranges of 500-5 500 km.
Does not include: submarine
and air-launched missiles;
ground-launched missiles
with ranges of less than
500km/more than 5 000km
The US ended the treaty in
2019 after repeatedly
accusing Russia of
developing a banned
missile type.
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty
1972
Soviet
Union/Russia,
US
Ban on missile systems
defending the whole of
Soviet/US territory from
attacks by strategic ballistic
missiles
The US withdrew from the
treaty in 2002
Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty
1990 (an
adapted treaty
was signed in
1999 but never
entered into
force)
22 NATO and
former Warsaw
Pact countries
Equal limits on the number
of conventional weapons
(such as aircraft and tanks)
deployed by the two sides in
Europe
In 2007 Russia announced
that it was suspending
implementation of the
CFE, and in 2015 it
withdrew completely
Table 3 – Confidence- and security-building measures
Name of treaty
Entry into
force
Parties Scope and purpose Current situation
Vienna Document 1990
The 57 countries
that belong to
the OSCE,
including Russia
and the US
Participating countries
exchange information on the
structure and locations of their
armed forces, weapons,
planning, spending, and
activities such as military drills
The US has accused Russia of not fully
complying, but the treaty remains in
force.
Open Skies Treaty 2002
34 mostly
European
countries,
Russia, the US
Participating countries are
allowed a fixed number of
reconnaissance flights over each
other's territories
In May 2020 the US gave notice of its
plan to withdraw from the treaty in six
months, due to Russia's failure to
comply. No other countries have
announced that they will follow suit.
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Benefits of arms control and non-proliferation
Arms control is a key part of the European security order. Agreements between military competitors
ensure a stable balance in which neither side can acquire a decisive advantage over the other, thus
removing the incentive to start a conflict. Increased transparency – which results not only from
confidence- and security-building measures such as the Vienna Document, but also from the
communication channels and mutual inspections established by START and other arms control
agreements – helps to create trust; it also ensures that potential adversaries are better informed of
each other's activities, thus reducing the risk of misunderstandings that could trigger aggression.
There are now fewer dangerous weapons in Europe and the world; for example, between 1986 and
2019, the global total of nuclear warheads (mostly held by Russia and the US) fell by 80 %, from
nearly 70 000 to 13 500
. By ending a destabilising and financially ruinous arms race, they have also
brought down military budgets. In the final years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was spending
up to
17 % of its GDP on defence, compared to over 6 % for the US, and 2-4 % for most other North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. By 2019, these figures had fallen to 3.9 % for Russia, 3.4 %
for the US, and 1-2 % for western European countries (see Figure 1). The resulting '
peace dividend'
frees up government spending for other more constructive purposes that benefit the civilian
population.
Arms control challenges
Gradual dismantling of the arms control system
The global non-proliferation regime remains in place. Although Syria has used chemical weapons
(possibly with Russian backing
) to devastating effect, most countries are complying with the ban on
the use of biological and chemical weapons. Just four countries (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea)
are thought to have acquired nuclear weapons since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into
effect, and only North Korea has broken the global moratorium on nuclear testing since 2000.
Figure 1 – Arms control agreements, nuclear weapons, military spending
(Nuclear weapons in stockpile = deployed and non-deployed strategic and non-strategic warheads; does not include
retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. No military spending data available for Soviet Union)
Arms control agreements have helped to bring down US and Russian nuclear stockpiles and military spending.
Data source: Federation of American Scientists, 1945-2013/2014-2020; SIPRI.
Russia, arms control and non-proliferation
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However, most of the agreements signed between the former Cold War adversaries have gradually
come unstuck. The first to go was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the US unilaterally withdrew
from in 2002. For its part, Russia suspended implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty in 2007, and pulled out of it altogether in 2015. After years of claims that Russia had
developed banned missiles, the US terminated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in
2019, and is now planning to do likewise for the Open Skies Treaty (Russia has not yet said
whether
it will follow suit for the latter treaty). New START is due to expire in February 2021, and the prospects
for it being extended are currently looking doubtful.
Russia's violations of arms control commitments
Concerns about Russia's compliance with its arms control commitments go back many years. The
US first publicly accused
Russia of violating the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2014, but
development of the banned SSC-8 missile is
thought to have
already begun in the mid-2000s. For its part, Russia has
raised three
concerns about US compliance: firstly, the US
uses intermediate-range missiles as targets in tests of missile
defence systems; secondly, the latter systems use launchers
that could be used to fire intermediate-range missiles;
thirdly, the US has developed drones that are launched from
the ground and can carry weapons to intermediate range.
Washington disputes these claims, arguing that 1) the INF
Treaty specifically allows disaffected missiles to be used for
research and development purposes; 2) missile defence
launchers, though similar to those banned by the INF, are
not compatible with offensive missiles; 3) drones are
fundamentally different from missiles, in that they are pilot-
controlled and recoverable, and are therefore outside the
scope of the treaty (in any case, Russia is developing
similar
weapons of its own). Refusing to accept Russian assurances
that the SSC-8 is a short-range missile (the US estimates its
maximum range at 2 500km), Washington decided to
withdraw from the Treaty in 2019.
In 2018, Russian agents were accused of using Novichok
nerve agent in an attempt to assassinate former spy Sergey
Skripal. An unknown, but possibly similar
substance may
have been used to poison Russian opposition politician
Alexey Navalny in August 2020. Long before these two incidents, the US already
suspected that
Russia had not completely destroyed its chemical weapons. It had similarly long-standing concerns
with unjustified Russian restrictions barring Open Skies Treaty reconnaissance flights over
Chechnya, Russia's border with the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and
Kaliningrad. Russia's refusal to provide information on the location of its troops in these two
territories also
violates the Vienna Document. In addition, Russia is suspected of under-reporting
the number of troops participating in large-scale military drills such as ZAPAD-2017, in order to
avoid having to invite international observers, as required by the Vienna Document.
In 2019, US military intelligence claimed that Russia may have carried out nuclear tests, which are
prohibited by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but without producing evidence. Russia denies
this claim.
Figure 2 – Nuclear weapons by country,
2020
(deployed /non-deployed /retired /strategic /non-
strategic)
Nine countries are known or believed to have
nuclear arms. Between them, the US and Russia
have over 90 % of the world's nuclear weapons.
Data source: Federation of American Scientists.
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Declining US interest in arms control
In line with President Trump's 'America First' policy and his scepticism of multilateral agreements
and institutions, arms control has become less of a priority for his administration. In 2013, Barack
Obama suggested
that Russia and the US could reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1 000
warheads each, one third less than the limits currently set by New START, and he also advocated US
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. By contrast,
Donald Trump and Presidential Arms
Control Envoy Marshall Billingslea have emphasised America's capacity to spend Russia and China
'into oblivion' in the absence of INF and New START constraints. In May 2020, US officials reportedly
even
considered breaking the country's 28-year old moratorium on nuclear tests.
Despite this change of direction under the Trump administration, many of the frustrations which it
has expressed with the arms control regime echo those of his predecessors. These include failure to
address Russia's long-standing violations of arms control agreements, as well as the fact that some
of the most dangerous Russian weapons are exempt from restrictions. Furthermore, US officials note
that China has a potentially unfair advantage as it is not bound by most of the commitments
undertaken by the US and Russia.
Missile defence: A sensitive issue for Russia
Bilateral Russia-US nuclear arms control is not just a matter of each side cutting equal numbers of
warheads. In his March 2018 address
to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin claimed that superior
US missile defences risked 'the complete devaluation of Russia's nuclear potential' by acquiring the
capacity to intercept all of its missiles, thereby making it impossible for Moscow to launch an
effective counter-attack in the doomsday scenario of an all-out nuclear war.
Russia has often claimed that strong missile defences could create a perverse incentive to take the
enemy by surprise by launching the first attack, in order to eliminate as many nuclear weapons and
missile defences as possible. The aim of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was therefore to
eliminate this incentive by restricting both sides' defensive systems.
However, in 2002 the US pulled out of the ABM Treaty, arguing that it was no longer needed because
relations between Russia and the US had improved and the risk of a nuclear conflict had receded.
Since 2007, NATO has developed a European
missile shield; interceptors have already been
deployed to Romania and a second site is under construction in Poland. NATO has repeatedly
insisted that its missile defence systems are intended to counter limited threats from countries such
as Iran, not Russia. Indeed, given that Russia has more than enough nuclear warheads to overwhelm
NATO defences, the argument that the latter would allow Washington to launch a nuclear attack
against Moscow with impunity makes little sense.
Nevertheless, missile defence remains a sensitive issue for Russia. After the US withdrew from the
ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it was cancelling
its ratification of the START II Treaty on strategic
nuclear weapons before the latter came into force (although this did not prevent it from signing
SORT in the same year). Similarly, in 2007 it
pulled out of the CFE treaty over the planned European
missile shield. Russia's June 2020 nuclear deterrence policy (see below) also identifies US anti-
ballistic missile systems as a threat.
Nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy
During the Cold War, the balance in Europe of conventional weapons such as tanks and aircraft was
overwhelmingly in favour of the Soviet Union; indeed, it was this situation that the CFE Treaty was
designed to address
, by requiring the Warsaw Pact and NATO to cut back to equal levels. However,
during the 1990s Russia was unable to maintain Soviet-era levels of military expenditure, and a huge
gap opened up. Nuclear weapons are the only area where Russia has retained parity.
In 1982, at a time when Moscow still had a conventional advantage, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
pledged that his country would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. However, after that
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advantage disappeared, Russia withdrew its no first-use policy in 1993. The 2000 Military Doctrine
states that nuclear weapons can be used 'in response to large-scale aggression involving
conventional weapons in situations that are critical for the national security of the Russian
Federation and its allies'.
The US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review expresses a widely held belief that, in order to compensate for
the weakness of its conventional armed forces, Russia is prepared to contemplate limited nuclear
strikes even in smaller-scale conflicts, using them to rapidly end fighting or to deter a NATO
intervention. As evidence for this idea of '
escalating to de-escalate', which Russia has never
acknowledged, western analysts point out that all the country's large-scale military drills have
included simulations of nuclear strikes. In 2015, Putin admitted that he had put the armed forces on
nuclear standby during the annexation of Crimea. Several times since then, Russia has invoked its
nuclear arsenal to intimidate Ukraine's western backers. For example, referring to EU and US
economic sanctions against Russia, in October 2014 Putin
hinted at the consequences of 'discord
between large nuclear powers' for strategic stability.
Despite such rhetoric, it remains unclear whether Russia would ever carry out a nuclear strike when
not under extreme pressure to do so. Following military reforms
that have upgraded conventional
capability, Russia now has more non-nuclear options to fall back on. At least in published
documents, official nuclear policy has actually become more restrictive, with the two most recent
versions of the Russian Military Doctrine (from
2010 and 2014) only allowing a nuclear response to
a conventional attack if 'the very existence of the state is in jeopardy. In 2018, Putin ruled out the
idea of a pre-emptive strike.
Russia's nuclear deterrence policy, published for the first time ever in June 2020, adds more details
on what the Kremlin considers to be existential threats: the launch of ballistic missiles, whether
conventional or nuclear, against Russian territory; the use of weapons of mass destruction; and
attacks on critical Russian state or military facilities intended to disrupt its nuclear response. This
wording is quite similar to that of the US 2018
Nuclear Posture Review, which also envisages the use
of nuclear weapons 'to defend the vital interests of the United States [against] significant non-
nuclear strategic attacks' such as attacks on civilian population and nuclear forces'.
Russia's 2020 nuclear policy confirms that deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, is one of its
highest priorities. However, it does not spell out the size of the nuclear arsenal needed to ensure
this goal, other than stating that it should be 'at an adequate level'. Given that its conventional
forces, though much improved, are still no match for NATO, Moscow is unlikely to be interested in
further nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Russia has every reason to want to keep the status
quo under New START, which guarantees strategic nuclear parity with the US. In December 2019,
Putin expressed
his unconditional willingness to extend the treaty.
A new nuclear arms race?
Since 2000, Russia has invested heavily in its nuclear arsenal. As well as replacing obsolete Soviet-
era missiles, it has also developed several new types of weapon. In his March 2018 address
to the
Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin claims that the latter are necessary owing to the refusal of the US
to scale back its missile defences. Precise, highly manoeuvrable and travelling up to 20 times the
speed of sound over huge distances, they are practically unstoppable, according to him.
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Table 4 – New Russian nuclear weapons
Name Type
Warheads
carried
Range Targets Features Deployment
Sarmat
Ground-launched
intercontinental
ballistic missile
(ICBM)
10-15 nuclear 16 000 km Missile defence
Replaces SS-18
ICBM
2022-2027
Avangard
Hypersonic glide
vehicle, launched by
ICBMs such as
Sarmat
1 nuclear 6 000km
Missile
defence/high
value targets
Travels at 20
times the speed
of sound
2019
Poseidon
Submarine-
launched
Underwater drone
Conventional
or nuclear
10 000 km
Coastal cities,
infrastructure,
aircraft carriers
Capable of
reaching depths
of 1km. Could set
off a radioactive
tsunami
After 2027
Burevestnik
Ground-launched
cruise missile
Nuclear
Over
25 000 km
Missile defence
Powered by a
nuclear reactor
After 2030
Kinzhal
Air-launched
ballistic missile
Conventional
or nuclear
2 000 km
(including
bomber
flight)
Naval vessels
Travels at 10
times the speed
of sound
On trial
basis in
2017
Tsirkon
Cruise missile,
launched from ship
or submarine
Conventional;
perhaps also
nuclear
500 km
Ships and
ground targets
Travels at 9 times
the speed of
sound
2025-2030
Data sources: Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Threat Initiative.
In December 2019, Russia claimed that it had already deployed Avangard, though it remains unclear
whether the system is ready for use. Burevestnik appears to be at a less advanced stage; an explosion
in August 2019 that killed five engineers and released a radioactive cloud over the Arctic settlement
of Severodvinsk is
thought to have been caused by a test that went wrong. Most of these systems
are unlikely to be deployed before the late 2020s.
According to one estimate, in 2016 Russia spent US$11 billion on nuclear weapons, around 13 % of
its total defence budget, up from US$7 billion in 2010. This is only a very rough figure, given that
Russian military expenditure is mostly classified. Following recent deep budget cuts, current nuclear
spending is unlikely to be much more than this.
On the US side, Barack Obama pledged in 2010 that Washington would not develop any new types
of nuclear weapons. However, the country's modernisation programme has been running for
several years, and has already delivered missiles that are more lethal and accurate than ever before.
Expenditure on nuclear forces has been stepped up under Donald Trump, and is expected to reach
US$50 billion a year over the next 10 years, equivalent to 7 % of US military spending in 2019.
Although Russia and the US are both putting more and more money into nuclear weapons, the
prospect of a Cold War-style arms race, in which each side tries to outspend the other, is a distant
one. With the US modernisation programme costing possibly five times as much as Russia's, Moscow
cannot afford to keep pace; with its economy facing a massive post-coronavirus downturn, the
Russian Finance Ministry is now considering
further defence spending cuts. In March 2018, Putin
announced that Russia was far ahead of its rivals in terms of innovative offensive weapons, but even
Russia, arms control and non-proliferation
9
if his claim is true, this is not likely to give more than a temporary advantage as new US weapons are
deployed over the next few years.
Nuclear weapons outside the scope of arms control restrictions
A large share especially of Russia's nuclear
arsenal remains outside the scope of New
START, which only applies to deployed strategic
nuclear warheads and their carriers. Both sides
have large numbers of non-deployed weapons,
although these are of lesser concern as they are
not available for immediate use and could not
therefore be launched during the initial and
probably decisive stages of a nuclear conflict.
Russia is particularly strong in the non-strategic
category, where it has almost 10 times more
weapons than the US. Little is known about
China's non-strategic arsenal, but if it exists, it is
likely
to be still smaller (see Figure 3).
Some observers have expressed doubts that
non-strategic weapons could seriously threaten
NATO, arguing that they are mostly intended for
limited military targets at short distances. In any
case, Russia's advantage in this respect is offset
by NATO's conventional strength, for example in
precision-guided missiles. However, non-strategic weapons could also cause serious damage to
civilian targets at longer distances, especially if mounted on the intermediate-range missiles that
Russia is accused of developing. The US therefore has a strong
interest in ensuring that a future
nuclear arms control agreement to replace New START should include limits, or at least some
provisions for transparency, in this area.
New START restricts not only the number of deployed nuclear warheads, but also the total number
of weapons that carry them: intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
and heavy bombers. Hence, the intercontinental ballistic missiles used to launch the Avangard
system arguably fall within the scope of the treaty. On the other hand, it is less certain whether
innovative weapons such as Poseidon, Burevestnik and Kinzhal fit the definitions set out in New
START – a tricky issue for negotiations on extending New START or replacing it with a new
agreement.
Outlook
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Although Russian non-compliance was the
immediate cause of the US decision to end the treaty, both Russia and the US
have pointed out that
the INF Treaty put them at a disadvantage compared with countries that have built up extensive
arsenals of intermediate-range missiles. The US is unlikely to be interested in a new treaty unless it
includes China, which however has
ruled out participating – unsurprisingly, given that up to 95 % of
its missiles would be banned by such a treaty. Given the lack of interest on all sides in replacing the
INF treaty, there is little chance of a formal agreement not to deploy of land-based intermediate-
range missiles in Europe.
In theory, this development could shift the balance in Russia's favour. In 2018, Putin claimed that
giving up its ground-launched missiles had amounted to unilateral disarmament for Moscow, given
that it did not have the same capacity to launch missiles from the air and the sea as the US. With the
INF Treaty constraints gone, Russia could openly deploy large numbers of the formerly banned
Categories of nuclear warheads
Strategic versus non-strategic/tactical
: although
there is no universally agreed distinction between
these two categories, non-strategic warheads are
generally designed for use against military targets, for
example in battle. They tend to be less powerful than
strategic warheads, and are used at shorter distances.
By contrast, strategic warheads (such as the bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) are capable of
causing much more extensive damage, including at
long distances.
Deployed versus non-deployed: deployed warheads
are mounted on missiles or kept at heavy bomber
bases, ready for immediate use, whereas non-
deployed warheads are kept in storage.
Both the US and Russia have large numbers of
warheads that, though still intact, have been retired
from service and are scheduled to be dismantled.
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missiles in Europe. Whether this will actually happen is debatable. While both Russia and the US
have plans to develop ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, NATO has ruled out deploying
such weapons in Europe, and Russia has declared that it will not be the first to do so. However, in
the absence of formal treaty commitments, this could change.
New START: The US has declared Russia to be in
compliance with New START, unlike the INF. The Treaty
is due to expire in February 2021, but can be extended
for a further five years without further negotiation,
provided both parties are willing. So far, US arms control
envoy Billingslea and Russian deputy foreign minister
Sergey Ryabkov have met for two rounds of talks in
Vienna.
The two sides are still far from agreement. Whereas Putin
says he is willing to extend New START unconditionally
,
the US has reservations; in 2017, President Trump
denounced the Treaty as a 'bad deal'. Rather than simply
extending it, the US has signalled its preference for a
new trilateral agreement with China on all nuclear
weapons, including non-strategic ones. However, there
is no reason to expect that Beijing will commit to the
unequal status quo; it has rejected an invitation to join
Russia-US talks in Vienna. In July 2020, Fu Cong,
Billingslea's Chinese counterpart,
declared that Beijing
would only be willing to participate if the US agreed to
reduce its arsenal to the size of China's, which according
to him was twenty times smaller. Without restrictions, US military intelligence
predicts that China
could double its number of nuclear warheads over the next 10 years.
In August 2020, the US appeared to have backed down on including China, at least for now, with
Billingslea acknowledging
a shift in Washington's position. However, the chances of a compromise
on other issues still look remote. Russia has no interest in including its currently unrestricted non-
strategic weapons, as this is an area where it has a significant advantage, unless the US offers
concessions on missile defence and conventional weapons, which also seems unlikely. After the
second round of talks in August 2020, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
described US
demands as 'absolutely unrealistic'.
Opinions are divided on what the end of New START would mean. According to the 2018 US Nuclear
Posture Review, Russia has significantly greater warhead-production capacity
than the US and its
allies. In the short term, this capacity and the absence of treaty constraints would allow Russia to
deploy up to
two thirds more strategic weapons even without acquiring new launchers, simply by
increasing the number of warheads deployed on existing missiles. On the other hand, given much
higher US spending, this advantage would probably not last very long. It could be argued that
allowing New START to lapse would even serve the cause of disarmament by giving the US more
leverage to persuade Russia to include non-strategic weapons in a future agreement, given
Moscow's interest in having at least some limits on the US arsenal.
On the other hand, advocates of New START argue that it gives the two parties transparency and
predictability about each other's strategic forces. The US and Russia have exchanged thousands of
notifications about each other's activities, and carried out dozens of inspections (up to 18 per year
for each party). Without the treaty, all this will end. Moreover, however imperfect, so long as it
remains in force, New START can serve as a
stepping stone towards a new and upgraded agreement.
From this point of view, its likely demise is a setback for arms control.
Figure3 –
US and Russian nuclear
warheads by category, 2019
Russia and the US have equal numbers of deployed
strategic nuclear warheads, roughly in line with
New START limits (1550 by 2021), but Russia has
many more non-strategic weapons.
Data source: Federation
of American
Scientists, US, Russia.
Russia, arms control and non-proliferation
11
Even before the international arms control regime started to unravel, it already had major
shortcomings. Built largely during and immediately after the Cold War, it has not kept pace with
developments since, and excludes large categories of dangerous weapons, as well as increasingly
important players – China in particular. Nevertheless, its disintegration has created a new and
dangerous situation for Europe, with more weapons and less communication. Less transparency
increases the risk of dangerous miscalculations. Rising geopolitical tensions make a new generation
of arms control agreements more necessary than ever, but also – in the absence of trust needed to
negotiate and implement them – more difficult to conclude.
Figure 4 – Russian, US and Chinese nuclear forces
Total defence spending
US$65 bn US$732 bn US$261 bn
Nuclear forces spending,
2016
US$11 bn US$35 bn Not known
Deployed strategic nuclear
warheads
1600 1600 320
Intercontinental ballistic
missiles
318 ICBM 400 ICBM
187 ground-
launched missiles
Submarine-launched
ballistic missiles
160 240 48
Heavy bombers
68 107 20
Non-strategic weapons
1820 230 Not known
Data for 2019 unless stated otherwise.
Data sources: defence spending: SIPRI; nuclear forces spending, US, Russia; nuclear weapons: Russia, US, China
.
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
12
EU/NATO/European Parliament position
The EU's 2016 Global Strategy expresses concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and support for the full implementation of arms control and non-proliferation treaties. In line
with this position, after the US announced its intention to pull out of the INF Treaty, the spokesperson of
the European External Action Service described the Treaty as a pillar of European security architecture,
called on Russia to address compliance concerns, and asked the US to consider the consequences of its
withdrawal. For the EU, a new arms race would benefit no-one and bring further instability.
In December 2018, foreign ministers of NATO countries expressed strong support for the US position that
Russia was in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty, and noted that a situation when
Russia violated the Treaty while other parties complied was not sustainable.
In its January 2020 resolution on the implementation of the common security and defence policy, the
European Parliament emphasised the need to tackle the threat of nuclear proliferation, called for
compliance with nuclear treaties, and expressed support for a new treaty to replace the INF treaty.
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© European Union, 2020
.
Photo credits: ©
alexyz3d / Adobe Stock.
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