Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Congressional Research Service
Summary
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a “dual-track” decision taken by
NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union’s deployment of new
intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S.
intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the
Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed
that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but
would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.
The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that “the Russian
Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces]
INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with
a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” In
the 2016 report, it noted that “the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty
definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.” In
late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile—9M729. The United
States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the
Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.
The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a
number of meetings since 2013. Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty. In
October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which
was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-
November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving
them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to
consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems
or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a
resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually
deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from
arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security
interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia’s nuclear forces.
The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to
assess the potential security implications of Russia’s violation and to determine how the United
States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017—the 30
th
anniversary of the date
when the treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would
implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On
October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF,
citing Russia’s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its
participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia
responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well. The treaty lapsed on
August 2, 2019, six months after the United States submitted its notice of withdrawal.
Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, to receive briefings on
the status of Russia’s cruise missile program, and to debate funding for U.S. military responses.
This report will be updated as needed.