NORTH KOREA

A GROWING REGIONAL and GLOBAL THREAT

MILITARY POWER

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PREFACE

In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency

to produce an unclassied overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to

provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a comprehensive and

accurate view of the threat. The result: the rst edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over

250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages

and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of

Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the rst time. DIA also produced

similar documents describing North Korean military strength in 1991 and 1995.

In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassied Defense Intelligence overviews of major foreign

military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on North Korea’s defense

and military goals, strategy, plans and intentions; the organization, structure, and capabilities of its

military to supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This product

and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, leaders and troops, the national

security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

North Korea is one of the most militarized countries in the world and remains a critical security challenge

for the United States, our Northeast Asian allies, and the international community. The Kim regime has

seen itself as free to take destabilizing actions to advance its political goals, including attacks on South

Korea, development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, proliferation of weapons, and cyberattacks

against civilian infrastructure worldwide. Compounding this challenge, the closed nature of the regime

makes gathering facts about North Korea's military extremely difcult.

Just over twenty years ago, North Korea appeared to be on the brink of national collapse. Economic

assistance from former patrons in the Soviet Union disappeared; society was confronted with the death in

1994 of regime founder Kim Il Sung—revered as a deity by his people—and a 3-year famine killed almost

a million people. Many experts in academia and the Intelligence Community predicted that North Korea

would never see the 21st century. Yet today, North Korea not only endures under a third-generation Kim

family leader, it has become a growing menace to the United States and our allies in the region.

Kim Jong Un has pressed his nation down the path to develop nuclear weapons and combine them with

ballistic missiles that can reach South Korea, Japan, and the United States. He has implemented a

rapid, ambitious missile development and ight-testing program to rene these capabilities and improve

their reliability. His vision of a North Korea that can directly hold the United States at risk, and thereby

deter Washington and compel it into policy decisions benecial to Pyongyang, is clear and is plainly

articulated as a goal in authoritative North Korean rhetoric.

Equally dangerous, North Korea continues to maintain one of the world’s largest conventional militaries

that directly threatens South Korea. The North can launch a high-intensity, short-duration attack on the

South with thousands of artillery and rocket systems. This option could cause thousands of casualties

and massive disruption to a regional economic hub. Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on improving military

training and investment in new weapon systems highlights the overriding priority the regime puts on

its military capabilities.

In 2018, at the historic rst summit between Kim Jong Un and the President of the United States, North

Korea pledged to work with the United States to accomplish what it described as “the denuclearization

of the Korean Peninsula”, and committed to other measures to reduce tensions and achieve “a lasting

and stable peace regime.” In the following years, North Korea tested multiple new missiles that threaten

South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there, displayed a new potentially more capable ICBM and new

weapons for its conventional force. Additionally, there continues to be activity at North Korea’s nuclear

sites. These actions indicate that North Korea will continue to be a challenge for the United States in

the coming years. This report, is a baseline examination of North Korea and its core military capabilities,

and is intended to help us better understand the current threat Pyongyang poses to the United States

and its allies.

From North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un's Remarks at the 8th Workers’ Party

Congress, Released 9 January 2021

“Building the national nuclear force was a strategic and predominant goal. The status of our state

as a nuclear weapons state…enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for

coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield. New, cutting edge weapons systems

were [also] developed one after another … making our state’s superiority in military technology

irreversible and putting its war deterrent and capability of ghting war on the highest level.”

Scott D. Berrier

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

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NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VII

CONTENTS

Introduction and Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Origins and Combat History of the Korean People's Army (KPA), 1948–1953 . . . . . .2

The Post–Korean War KPA, 1953–1991

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Shift to Asymmetric Capabilities, 1991–Present

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

National Military Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

National Security Strategy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Political Stability

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

External Relations

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Defense Budget

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Military Doctrine and Strategy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Perceptions of Modern Conict

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Military and Security Leadership

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

National Military Command and Control

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Nuclear Command and Control

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Core North Korean Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Program History and Pathway to Weapon Development

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ballistic Missile Force

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Biological and Chemical Weapons

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Offensive Conventional Systems

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

National Defense

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Underground Facilities

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Air Defense

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Coastal Defense

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Electronic Warfare

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

VIII

Space/Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Cyberspace

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Computer Network Attack and Intimidation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Cyber-Enabled Propaganda

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Intelligence Collection

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Currency Generation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Denial and Deception

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Logistics and Sustainment

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Human Capital

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Outlook: Targeted Investments in Select Military

Capabilities

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Appendix A: Strategic Force

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Appendix B: Ground Forces

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Appendix C: Air and Air Defense Forces

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Appendix D: Navy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

Appendix E: Special Operations Forces

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Appendix F: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces

. . . . . . . . . . 55

Appendix G: Intelligence Services

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Appendix H: Defense Industry and the Energy Sector

. . . . . . 60

Appendix I: Arms Sales

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Acronyms

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

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Satellite view of the Korean Peninsula at night, 2020. Visible light emis-

sions from North Korea continue to be extremely sparse, reflecting limited

availability of electricity to most of the country outside the capital, Pyong-

yang, and the leadership’s fundamental decision to invest a large portion

of North Korea’s resources into building military power.

Image Source: NASA

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Introduction/Historical Overview

he evolution of the Korean People’s

Army (KPA) from a regional military

to an aspiring nuclear force with inter-

continental strike capabilities is the result of

decades of commitment to two consistent mis-

sions given to the military by the Kim family

regime: preserve the North Korean state’s

independent existence against any external

power, and provide the means for North Korea

to dominate the Korean Peninsula. Over the

course of its existence, the KPA has seen both

the decline of some core strengths and the evo-

lution of new capabilities, but it has retained

these central roles. Although expanded in

scope, the new capabilities North Korea’s

military is developing are consistent with its

founding objectives. They are intended to hold

the United States at bay while preserving the

capacity to inict sufcient damage on the

South, such that both countries have no choice

but to respect the North’s sovereignty and

treat it as an equal.

North Korea’s military poses two direct, over-

lapping challenges to the United States and its

allies: a conventional force consisting mostly

of artillery and infantry that can attack South

Korea with little advance warning, and a ballis-

Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader. Kim founded the Korean People's Army in 1948 with support and

equipment from the Soviet Union.

Image Source: AFP

tic missile arsenal, intended to be armed with

nuclear weapons, that is capable of reaching

bases and cities in South Korea and Japan, and

the U.S. homeland.

Although the conventional

threat to the South has evolved slowly over

several decades, the rapid pace of development

and testing in the nuclear and missile programs

between 2012 and 2017 has brought this sec-

ond possibility closer to reality faster than most

international observers had anticipated. These

capabilities create growing risk of a military

ashpoint in Northeast Asia that could quickly

escalate off the Korean Peninsula, possibly

across the Pacic Ocean to U.S. soil.

Origins and Combat History

of the KPA, 1948–1953

The KPA was founded in 1948 as an infantry-cen-

tric force established to provide Kim Il Sung—the

Soviet-backed North Korean leader who rose to

power after the peninsula was divided in 1945—a

means to defend his new regime, provide a plat-

form to indoctrinate his people, and allow him to

achieve dominance over the entire Korean Penin-

sula. Most of the KPA’s original equipment, sup-

port infrastructure, and training was provided

by the Soviet Union. Kim founded the KPA on a

mix of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical inu-

ences, deriving doctrine and military thought

from Marxism-Leninism and interpreting it for a

Korean audience.

In 1950, Kim launched a general invasion of

South Korea with the intention of reunifying

the peninsula under Pyongyang’s rule. The

KPA drove South Korean and U.S. forces to

the southern tip of the peninsula in a matter of

weeks. Operating under a United Nations Com-

mand (UNC) established by Security Council

Resolution 84, forces and support personnel

from over a dozen countries reversed the KPA’s

advance and drove it back to the Yalu River,

which divides North Korea from China. Chi-

nese forces then intervened on North Korea’s

behalf, leading to an eventual stalemate at

the 38th parallel—today’s Demilitarized Zone

(DMZ). The Korean War remains the only sus-

tained conict in which the KPA participated

as a major belligerent. North Korea suffered

an estimated 1.5 million soldiers and civil-

ians killed in the war and endured devastat-

ing damage from aerial bombing and ground

assault.

These losses deeply inuenced North

Korean strategic thinking and military and

defense planning, resonating into the present

day. Although hostilities were suspended with

an Armistice Agreement in 1953, no peace

treaty was signed, and the peninsula techni-

cally remains in a state of war.

U.S. aerial bombing over Wonsan Harbor during

the Korean War. North Korea suffered massive

industrial damage in combat with United Nations

Command forces from 1950 to 1953.

Image Source: Shutterstock

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Post–Korean War KPA,

1953–1991

Rebuilding after the Korean War, North Korea

had shifted its military strategy by the 1960s to

a Maoist-style war of attrition, hoping to under-

mine the government in Seoul through covert

inltration, assassinations, and attempts to

foster Communist insurgencies.

6,7

During this

period, Kim embarked on a program to modern-

ize the KPA and posture it to defend in depth

against any foreign aggressor. In December

1962, Kim Il Sung espoused the Four Military

Guidelines: arm the entire population, fortify

the entire country, train the entire army as a

"Cadre Force" (meaning all soldiers capable

of establishing and training military units),

and modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics

under the principle of self-reliance in national

defense.

8,9

Early North Korean interest in

nuclear technology, which dates to the 1950s,

reached a practical stage during this period; a

Soviet-supplied research reactor went online

in 1967, and a domestically-designed reactor

began operating in 1986.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the North Korean

regime accelerated and redirected KPA mod-

ernization initiatives toward reestablishing

offensive conventional warfare capabilities.

In an August 1976 Korean Workers' Party

journal, an article entitled "Scientic Fea-

tures of Modern War and Factors of Victory"

kicked off a rare internal debate on military

doctrine by stressing the importance of eco-

nomic development and the impact of new

weapons on military strategy. The author

argued that the quality of arms and the level

of military technology dene the character-

istics of war. The primacy of conventional

warfare again became doctrine. This article

laid down several concepts that continued to

inuence North Korean operational doctrine

through the 1990s and into the 21st century;

particularly inuential was an emphasis on

operational and tactical mobility, deep-strike

capabilities, and use of the subterranean

domain throughout the depth of the battle-

eld.

Although these tenets remain central

to North Korean military doctrine, the abil-

ity of the state to sustain forcewide modern-

ization began to decline in the late 1980s.

Kim Jong Il, right, became leader in 1994 after the

death of Kim Il Sung, left. The younger Kim set

North Korea on course to further its nuclear and

missile programs.

Image Source: AFP

Shift to Asymmetric

Capabilities, 1991–Present

With the loss of direct Soviet and Chinese mil-

itary-to-military support in the early 1990s,

the beginning of a major economic decline,

and the famine in the late 1990s, accompa-

nied by advances in U.S. and South Korean

military capabilities, North Korea became

less and less likely to prevail in a conven-

tional war on the peninsula. Under new

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the KPA

emphasized asymmetric capabilities, such

as special operations forces, chemical and

biological weapons, and long-range artillery

postured against the predominantly civilian

population in Seoul, and renewed its empha-

sis on developing a nuclear strike capability.

Also during this period, Kim publicized the

Songun ideology—“Military First” politics —a

public reafrmation of the KPA’s centrality to

the regime. Under this philosophy, the mili-

tary became one of the dominant institutions

in North Korean society.

By the 1990s, North Korea was making strides

in ballistic missile development. In 1993 the

North ight-tested a new, Scud-derived medi-

um-range ballistic missile, the No Dong, and

in 1998 North Korea attempted to launch a

satellite using a prototype multistage rocket

that could support the development of lon-

ger-range ballistic missiles.

12,13

North Korea

continued to operate a nuclear reactor at

Yongbyon during this period, fueling concerns

that Pyongyang could extract plutonium for

use in nuclear weapons.

These developments

spurred international efforts to constrain the

growth of the North Korean nuclear and bal-

listic missile programs, rst through a bilat-

eral Agreed Framework between North Korea

and the United States and later through a

multilateral Six-Party Talks process also

involving South Korea, Japan, China, and

Russia. For a time, Kim Jong Il cooperated

with some of these initiatives, temporarily

suspending missile testing and nuclear activ-

ities and submitting to some degree of inter-

national monitoring in exchange for economic

incentives and security assurances.

“Military First” Politics

North Korea’s “Military First,” or Songun, philosophy established the military as the most

important North Korean institution and a means to solve social, economic, and political

problems.

16,17

Although some North Korean accounts date its origins to the 1930s, when Kim

Il Sung led an anti-Japanese guerrilla movement, Songun was not formally introduced until

after Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994. Kim Jong Il established the ideology in part because the

military served as a better power base for him than the Korean Workers' Party did.

Mili-

tary First has resulted in a larger role for the KPA in social and economic projects, includ-

ing large-scale infrastructure development and agriculture.

Although the ideology persists,

Kim Jong Un has reinvigorated the status of the Korean Workers' Party during his rule.

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By the mid-2000s, Kim Jong Il had decided

to put the North on a path to a nuclear

breakout. His primary motivations were

apprehension about U.S. military inten-

tions after the 9/11 attacks and major oper-

ations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a continu-

ally worsening military imbalance on the

peninsula, and failure to obtain anticipated

energy assistance and other economic con-

cessions from international negotiations. In

2006, he resumed ballistic missile testing,

renewed satellite launch attempts using

larger multistage rockets, and carried out

North Korea’s first nuclear test.

Addi-

tional ballistic missile flight tests and a

second nuclear test followed in 2009.

Since

then, despite intense international pres-

sure and daunting technological challenges,

North Korea has unambiguously linked its

national security strategy, interests, and

identity to becoming a nuclear power with

intercontinental reach. These concepts are

now enshrined in North Korea's law, doc-

trine, and constitution.

Kim Jong Un has rapidly accelerated development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles since

assuming power in 2011.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

Kim Jong Il died in 2011. His youngest son,

Kim Jong Un, succeeded to leadership at age

27 and accelerated the pace of development of

both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

By mid-2017, the new leader had overseen four

underground nuclear tests (for a total of six

since 2006) with higher yields than previous

tests and had debuted and ight-tested more

than half a dozen new ballistic missiles of vary-

ing ranges, including a submarine-launched

ballistic missile, two types of mobile intermedi-

ate-range ballistic missiles, and the rst tested

North Korean intercontinental ballistic mis-

siles capable of reaching the United States.

23,24,25

Kim Jong Un has also focused his attention

on the KPA’s conventional capabilities. From

2011-2017 Kim kept up a steady pace of pub-

lic engagements with military units to empha-

size the KPA’s centrality to the North Korean

regime, and has directed improvements in the

realism and complexity of military training. To

that end, Kim presided over high-prole artillery

repower exercises, Air Force pilot competitions,

and special forces raid training on mock-ups of

the South Korean presidential residence.

26, 27

In April 2018, Kim began prioritizing dip-

lomatic engagement likely in an effort to

encourage sanctions relief. At the same time,

North Korea introduced new weapons sys-

tems in a September 2018 military parade

featuring conventional forces.

During the rst half of 2019, Kim gradually

resumed efforts to highlight military capabil-

ities, likely signaling his frustration over the

lack of progress on diplomatic initiatives. He has

resumed publicizing military visits and weapons

launches, and in October 2020 and January 2021

military parades displayed multiple new mis-

siles, including a larger ICBM.

Since Kim Jong Un took power, North Korea

has introduced a few new conventional sys-

tems and equipment sets across all its military

services, including new tanks, artillery rock-

ets, and unmanned aerial vehicles, most of

which have been displayed in military parades

linked to important North Korean holidays

and observances.

The extent to which some

new equipment has been integrated into the

force is unclear, but these observations suggest

a continuing KPA emphasis on modernizing

strike weaponry, improving surveillance and

reconnaissance capabilities, and broadening

the regime’s options for raids or other special

forces operations in South Korea.

The North Korean military, once considered a

threat that would be conned to the 20th cen-

tury, has never abandoned its ambition of domi-

nating the peninsula and, if possible, reunifying

it under Pyongyang’s rule. The KPA currently

lacks the operational capability to forcibly

reunify the Korean Peninsula, as attempted in

1950, but Kim’s forces are developing capabil-

ities that will provide a wider range of asym-

metric options to menace and deter his regional

adversaries, quickly escalate any conict off the

peninsula, and severely complicate the environ-

ment for military operations in the region.

North Korean soldiers stand atop armored vehicles

during September 2018 military parade.

Image Source: AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Korean People’s Army at a Glance

Services: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, Strategic Force (ballistic missiles)

Personnel: Over 1.3 million (plus approximately 7 million paramilitary, reservists and body-

guard command personnel)

Recruit base: Universal conscription

Equipment prole: Primarily Soviet-era systems; some newer systems in each service

Core strength: Massed artillery threat to South Korea, Special Operations, underground

facilities, defensive fortications

Developing strengths: Strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons

Key vulnerabilities: Logistics for sustained combat operations

National Military Overview

North Korean military event in Pyongyang. The North remains one of the world’s most militarized societies.

Image Source: AFP

Threat Perceptions

North Korea's perception that the outside world

is inherently hostile drives the North's security

strategy and pursuit of specic military develop-

ments. This perception is informed by a history

of invasion and subjugation by stronger powers

stretching back centuries and, in the 20th cen-

tury, by the 1910–45 Japanese occupation and

the externally enforced division of the Korean

Peninsula at the end of World War II.

The Kim

family dynasty has exploited this history to craft

a totalitarian political culture that is dened by

resistance to outside powers and that invests

the Kim family with unique, unquestionable

authority to protect the Korean people from

external threats. To respond to this existential

threat, North Korea’s leaders believe they must

develop the military capabilities to hold exter-

nal aggressors at bay and preserve the North’s

sovereignty and independence. These essential

themes have been constant across all three Kim

dynasty leaders, with the North’s capabilities

evolving over time to meet different manifesta-

tions of the perceived threat.

The North views the United States as its primary

and immediate external security threat. This per-

ception is strongly rooted in the U.S. role during

the Korean War, the U.S. military presence on the

peninsula since the armistice, and the leading role

Washington has played in attempting to modify

Pyongyang’s behavior and constrain its nuclear

ambitions. South Korea and Japan are treated

as extensions of U.S. aggression. The North also

perceives a strong and longer-term ideological

threat from South Korea because Seoul’s different

economic and political systems represent an alter-

native—and, to Pyongyang, unacceptable—way

of life for the historically unied Korean people.

Advances in South Korean and Japanese military

capabilities over the last two decades have also

claried a major and growing gap between the

North's military power and that of its neighbors.

China and Russia have historically been allies,

partners, and patrons of the North Korean

state, but, despite broader diplomatic out-

reach since 2018, Pyongyang tends to show

little trust in either country. The North fears

absorption or preemption by a much more pow-

erful China and probably wants to preserve its

political independence from Beijing even at the

risk of alienating Chinese leadership. Pyong-

yang probably sees Russia as a relatively less

important partner in the region.

The Kim regime is driven by fears of threats to

its power from internal sources as well. Kim Il

Sung endured a period of factionalism before

consolidating absolute rule over the North in

the late 1950s; this experience taught him to

place a priority on eradicating all political, eco-

nomic, and social inuences that might threaten

his ideological control of the population. Over

decades, this manifested as a series of overlap-

ping internal security measures and societal

controls designed to ensure absolute loyalty to

the leader. Political control over the military

was particularly critical, and it remains a major

priority for the Kim Jong Un regime.

One of the greatest perceived threats to North

Korea’s ideological control and internal stabil-

ity is the growing inuence of what the regime

sees as politically corrosive outside information,

including through foreign media exposure and

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

the importing of entertainment programming

that depicts daily life in South Korea.

This

trend has grown as the regime’s capability to pro-

vide basic goods and services to the population

in the provinces outside Pyongyang has steeply

declined, driving an increase in market activity

that has coincided with broader availability of

cell phones. Since the 2000s, North Korea has

attempted various military and security efforts

to monitor and deal with unsanctioned activity

but has been forced to accept a degree of risk

posed by the inux of outside media.

National Security Strategy

North Korea’s national security strategy has

two main objectives: ensure the Kim regime’s

long-term security, which the leadership denes

as North Korea remaining a sovereign, inde-

pendent country ruled by the Kim family, and

retaining the capability to exercise dominant

inuence over the Korean Peninsula. Since the

mid-2000s, the North’s strategy to achieve these

goals has been to prioritize the development of

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver

nuclear weapons to increasingly distant ranges

while maintaining a conventional military capa-

ble of inicting enormous damage on South

Korea. Kim Jong Un expanded the nuclear and

missile programs in an effort to develop a sur-

vivable nuclear weapon delivery capability that

the regime could use, in theory, to respond to any

external attack. Pyongyang’s goal is to maintain

a credible nuclear capability, which it believes

will deter any external attack. It also seeks to

use its nuclear and conventional military capa-

bilities to compel South Korea and the United

States into policy decisions that are benecial to

North Korea. As part of his strategy, Kim Jong

Un has publicly emphasized the ability of North

Korean nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to strike

the United States and regional U.S. allies in an

attempt to intimidate international audiences.

Kim Jong Un takes personal interest in developing

KPA capabilities and is often portrayed in state media

directing exercises and observing training.

Image Source: AFP/KCNA VIA KNS

From North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un's Remarks at 5th Party Plenary

Session, Released 1 January 2020

“This is a great victory… strategic weapon systems planned by the party are coming into our

grasp one by one… Such leaps in cutting-edge national defense science make our military and

technological advantage irreversible, accelerate the increase of our national strengths to the max-

imum, heighten our ability to control surrounding political situations, and give our enemies an

immense and overwhelming strike of anxiety and fear.”

The North also has traditionally used periodic,

limited-scope military actions to pressure South

Korea and to underscore the fragility of the armi-

stice, which it seeks to replace with a peace treaty

on its terms. During the 1960s and 1970s, these

actions took the form of aggressive skirmishes

along the DMZ and overt attempts to assassi-

nate South Korean leaders, including the South

Korean president, with special forces raids and

terrorist tactics.

In recent years the North has

conned aggression against the South to targeted

engagements in the disputed Northwest Islands

area. Confrontations between patrol craft and

other incidents along the Northern Limit Line

have claimed more than 50 South Korean lives

since 1999.

In 2010, North Korea attacked and

sank a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, kill-

ing 46 sailors, and bombarded a South Korean

Marine Corps installation on Yeonpyeong Island,

resulting in 2 military and 2 civilian deaths.

36,37

No comparable attack on the South has yet

occurred under Kim Jong Un’s rule, but North

Korea’s willingness to strike South Korea with

lethal force endures. In August 2015 a land-

mine detonated in the DMZ and wounded two

South Korean soldiers, kicking off a monthlong

Targeting U.S. Forces

Historically, North Korea used military action against both South Korean and U.S. targets

after the 1953 Armistice Agreement halted the Korean War. Pyongyang targeted U.S. forces

in several high-prole incidents, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo in international

waters in 1968 and the shootdown of a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international airspace

in 1969. Pyongyang has largely avoided the deliberate targeting of U.S. personnel since the

late 1970s and has concentrated its limited-objective attacks on South Korean personnel,

except in a 1994 incident when a U.S. Army helicopter was shot down, killing one crewmem-

ber, after it accidentally strayed into North Korean airspace.

South Korean corvette Cheonan, which was sunk

by a North Korean torpedo in March 2010, pictured

here on a salvage barge.

Image Source: AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

confrontation with the South that ultimately led

to artillery re along the border. Escalation to a

wider conict was possible although averted in

this instance.

Political Stability

Kim Jong Un views political stability as essential

to safeguarding his rule, a perception inherited

from his father and grandfather. No North Korean

leader has tolerated the emergence of a competing

political system or a lack of loyalty among regime

elites. To maintain stability and control, the state

retains a pervasive internal security apparatus

consisting of multiple agencies and departments

with overlapping areas of responsibility and

broad powers to monitor all North Korean citizens

for criminal and subversive behavior. North Kore-

ans are also encouraged to report on one another

at the local level through a “neighborhood watch”

system called inminban. Citizens found to have

transgressed can be interned in a massive system

of state-run prison camps, where they are sub-

jected to abusive conditions.

Kim has used purges and executions to eliminate

perceived threats to his authority and compel loy-

alty from subordinates. His perception of a threat

may be driven in part by sensitivity to questions

about whether the young Kim was capable of

taking full leadership of North Korea after his

father’s death, and it also seems intended to

invoke memories of Kim Il Sung, whose image

and methods Kim Jong Un has sought to emu-

late. Most prominently, Kim publicly removed

his uncle, Chang Song-taek, from the position of

vice chairman of the National Defense Commis-

sion in December 2013 and had him executed for

alleged crimes against the state.

In the military,

Kim has repeatedly reshufed personnel in key

defense positions and demoted senior ofcers in

rank. The result is a system that appears largely

stable from the outside, with elites motivated by

fear and co-opted with privilege to preserve the

Kim regime.

Despite renewed emphasis on ideological indoc-

trination and strengthened border controls,

North Koreans continue to defect abroad. Most

escape into China and, if they are able to elude

authorities and nd work, eventually make their

way to South Korea by way of Southeast Asia.

In 2020, 229 North Korean defectors arrived in

South Korea, a notable drop from 1,047 in 2019,

which is probably because North Korea closed its

borders to prevent COVID-19 transmission. The

defection rate has declined from a high of 2,914

people in 2009, probably owing to strengthened

security along the North Korea-China border.

A small number of higher-prole North Koreans

defect—notably, in 2016, including the deputy

chief of mission to the embassy in London—but

In 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island

along the northwestern maritime border with South

Korea, the first kinetic strike on South Korean–occu-

pied territory in decades.

Image Source: AFP

this trend does not yet seem to have broadened to

the point where Kim considers it a major threat.

External Relations

North Korea’s external relationships do not appear

to signicantly contribute to its defense establish-

ment or boost military readiness. International

sanctions against North Korea contribute to poten-

tial partners’ lack of interest in expanding ties.

In the rst years of his rule, Kim Jong Un made

few efforts to engage foreign counterparts. How-

ever, starting in 2018 he began an international

outreach effort, travelling abroad for the rst

time as leader of North Korea to meet the lead-

ers of China, South Korea, the United States,

and Russia. He likely believes these efforts are

necessary to obtain sanctions relief.

Pyongyang’s only formal defense agreement is

with China: the 1961 Sino–North Korean Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

This agreement obliges each signatory to render

military assistance in defense of the other if one is

attacked,

but direct military-to-military engage-

ment between Pyongyang and Beijing has been

suspended for years. Diplomatic relations between

both countries worsened after North Korea’s

nuclear and missile tests accelerated. In 2017,

China instituted new import restrictions intended

to affect the North Korean economy and contin-

ued to call for North Korea to cease its nuclear

and ballistic missile test activities. Kim Jong Un

visited China and met with President Xi Jinping

in March, May, and June of 2018, and in January

2019, indicating a desire to nurture relations. Xi

made his rst visit to North Korea in June 2019.

Russia, which provided substantial military

assistance and equipment to North Korea during

the Soviet era, has largely curtailed its defense

relationship with North Korea. Since UNSC

sanctions in August 2017, however, some eco-

nomic and diplomatic engagement with Russia

has taken place. In October 2017, a state-owned

Russian company began to provide a second inter-

net connection to North Korea, reducing Pyong-

yang’s dependence on China.

Kim Jong Un met

with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the

rst time in April 2019 as part of Kim’s effort to

diversify diplomatic and economic ties and fur-

ther reduce economic dependence on China. The

two discussed diplomatic and commercial oppor-

tunities, although no ofcial agreements were

announced.

Thus far, these overtures have

led to minimal improvements in relations given

North Korea’s perception of Russia’s pressure to

denuclearize and failure to provide signicant

economic and military concessions.

North Korea views Japan and South Korea as

adversaries but maintains lines of communi-

cation with both countries. North Korea met

with a Japanese delegation in 2016 to discuss

Kim Jong Un meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping

in Beijing on 8 January 2019.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

an ongoing dispute over the disposition of Japa-

nese nationals abducted by North Korea during

the late 1970s and early 1980s. The North and

South held two summits in 2018, and have inter-

mittently held high-level talks at Panmunjom

in the DMZ to tamp down tensions in inter-Ko-

rean relations. In September 2018, the Koreas

signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement,

which calls on both sides to take measures to

prevent accidental military clashes. After an

initial push to carry out the agreement, prog-

ress stalled and in June 2020 North Korea

demolished a liaison ofce and threatened to

reverse military actions taken thus far.

49,50,51

Defense Budget

Although the regime does not publish exact eco-

nomic gures, estimates are based on trends

in observed economic activity. As such, North

Korea’s economy shrank by about 4 percent

in 2018 because of UNSC sanctions. In 2019,

North Korea’s economy grew slightly, but likely

contracted in 2020 because of trade disruptions

due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Coal, other

minerals, and clothing account for almost 70

percent of Pyongyang’s nonmilitary foreign

trade, according to the International Trade Cen-

tre, but are currently banned as North Korean

exports by UNSC sanctions imposed in 2017.

Defense spending is a regime priority. Spending

estimates range from $7 billion to $11 billion;

20–30 percent of North Korea’s GDP is allocated

to the military.

This level of commitment makes

North Korea the highest spending nation in the

world for defense as a percentage of GDP. Pyong-

yang has probably increased defense spending

during the past decade and likely will continue

devoting a large portion of its GDP to national

defense through at least 2021.

A detailed

breakdown of North Korean military spending

by categories such as personnel, procurement,

or operations and maintenance is unavailable.

Pyongyang has mustered sufcient funds, most

likely by shifting priorities, to nance foreign

procurement and domestic development and pro-

duction for testing missile systems and nuclear

weapons. Nonmonetary resources, including raw

materials and electrical power, are also priori-

tized for use in military projects.

National Defense Burden Comparison, 2020 Global Baseline

1707-13888

<1% <1-1.9% 2-9.9% 10-19.9% 20-30 %

NORTH

KOREA

Percentage of GDP Spent on Defense Number of Countries

Military Doctrine and Strategy

Perceptions of Modern Conflict

North Korea understands that the character of

war has changed since its last sustained com-

bat experience in 1953 and sees its military as

largely unprepared to engage in modern war-

fare. Pyongyang probably assesses its force as

a whole cannot prevail in combat against the

United States, given U.S. forces’ overwhelm-

ing advantages in power projection, strategic

air superiority, and precision-guided stand-

off strike capability. This perception has been

informed by North Korea’s monitoring of U.S.

operations in the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999

Kosovo air campaign, campaigns in Afghan-

istan and Iraq, and U.S.-led air operations in

Libya in 2011 and Syria since 2014. The North

also is a keen observer of South Korean military

capabilities and probably judges it is at a qual-

itative disadvantage against its neighbor.

57,58,59

North Korean defense planning, therefore, has

adapted to deter direct U.S. military interven-

tion by signaling that the cost of such interven-

tion would be unacceptably high to the United

States even if North Korea ultimately lost the

engagement. In the last few years, this effort

to shape adversary deterrence calculations has

centered on developing and publicizing a sur-

vivable nuclear-armed ballistic missile force.

Should deterrence fail, North Korea would

seek to maximize its defensive advantages—

including inhospitable terrain, widespread

use of underground facilities, and a population

conditioned from birth to resist foreign invad-

ers—to raise the cost of taking and holding

North Korean territory.

Some investments in specic North Korean

military capabilities are intended to improve

the odds of North Korean success in a mod-

ern conict. However, these efforts are gener-

ally isolated to a few areas and would not, in

Pyongyang’s estimation, confer overwhelming

advantage on the KPA in a modern conict

against the United States and South Korea.

Military and Security Leadership

Kim Jong Un is the supreme commander of

the KPA, in addition to his position as head of

all governmental, political, and security insti-

tutions in the country. He holds the rank of

marshal in the KPA and was appointed a four-

star general before his succession, although

he is not known to have any actual military

experience. In North Korea’s unitary leader-

ship structure, Kim is the ultimate authority

for all defense and national security decisions,

including operational planning and execu-

tion, procurement and acquisition, and strat-

egy and doctrine. As the rst secretary of the

Korean Workers' Party, he establishes policy

and guidance for North Korea’s military and

implements party policy through key nation-

al-level organizations.

60,61

As the party's Cen-

tral Military Commission chairman and the

State Affairs Commission chairman, Kim con-

trols all military and defense-related policy,

with broad authority to consolidate political,

military, and state powers during both war-

time and peacetime.

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Kim Jong Un at a military parade, April 2017. Kim has directed improvements to each KPA service’s capabilities.

Image Source: AFP/KCNA VIA KNS

Kim Jong Un's Leadership Priorities

Born in 1983, Kim Jong Un was the youngest of Kim Jong Il’s three sons. Kim Jong Il formally

introduced Kim Jong Un as his successor in 2009, bypassing his older sons, Kim Jong Nam and

Kim Jong Chol. Little is known about Kim’s life before his succession to leadership in 2011.

Kim’s priorities as leader of North Korea have been to solidify the state's nuclear capability and

make rapid strides toward achieving a ballistic missile arsenal capable of threatening the United

States while attempting to modernize the economy – a “dual line” policy called Byungjin in the

North. Although economic development is a priority, Kim is willing to endure nancial losses in

order to advance other goals; North Korean nuclear and missile tests continue to result in UN

sanctions, and, in 2016, a rocket launch prompted South Korea to close the Kaesong Industrial

Complex, which provided the regime about $100 million a year through cash remittances.

In relations with the United States, Kim initially responded to Washington’s demands that he

abandon his nuclear aspirations by accelerating the program’s development and by issuing spe-

cic threats to attack the United States. In 2018, Kim demonstrated a willingness to participate

in talks on denuclearization. However, since 2019 he has demonstrated his intent to continue bol-

stering North Korea’s military deterrent by developing and testing new missiles and developing

new military equipment for the conventional force.

Through the General Political Bureau, North

Korea maintains a separate political command

and control apparatus to ensure military loy-

alty to the Kim regime and implementation of

party guidance. The bureau leads all political

and ideological training, monitors morale and

personal lives, guides servicemen’s political

lives, and disseminates propaganda for the

military in order to maintain military loyalty

to the regime. The director of the General Polit-

ical Bureau usually serves as a key adviser to

Kim Jong Un.

Vice Marshall Kwon Yong-chin

was appointed head of the General Political

Bureau in January 2021.

63,64,65

Operational control of North Korea’s armed

forces resides in the General Staff Department,

which reports directly to Kim Jong Un.

The

department as a whole aggregates and opera-

tionally commands all military service head-

quarters, functional and combat commands,

and military communications, and it evaluates

the overall training and readiness of the North

Korean military. Vice Marshal Pak Chong-chon

was appointed as the General Staff Department

head in September 2019, and is one of Kim’s

principal military advisers.

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is

responsible for administrative control of the

military and external relations with foreign

militaries. MND manages the manpower and

resource needs of North Korea’s conventional

armed forces and special operations forces.

In the past MND-controlled companies were

involved in earning foreign currency through

exports and domestic distribution, though this

activity has probably been reduced by interna-

tional sanctions.

As of July 2021, Colonel Gen-

eral Kim Chong-kwan has been removed from

his position as MND chief and his replacement

was not announced. The MND minister is posi-

tioned primarily to manage defense acquisi-

tions, resourcing and nancing allocations for

all North Korean armed forces.

General Staff Department Chief Vice Marshal Pak

Chong-chon with Kim Jong Un.

Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

Vice Marshall Kwon Yong-chin, General Political Bureau .

Image Source: Uriminjokkkiri

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

National Military Command

and Control

As the KPA supreme commander and central

decisionmaker in North Korea, Kim Jong Un

is the linchpin of KPA command and control.

Kim exercises command and control over all

corps-level military organizations, includ-

ing ground, air, naval, and ballistic missile

forces.

The General Staff Department main-

tains overall control of all North Korean mil-

itary forces and is charged with turning the

supreme commander’s directives into opera-

tional military orders.

North Korean Military Command and Control

1707-13888

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un operates as the absolute decisionmaker of North Korea’s armed

forces. The Supreme Command would disseminate any order from Kim to North Korea’s armed

forces, including its ballistic missile corps, the Strategic Force. As the Korean Workers’ Party Cen-

tral Military Commission (CMC) chairman and the State Affairs Commission (SAC) chairman, Kim

controls all military and defense-related policy.

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un

Korean Workers’ Party

Central Military Commission

Ministry of National Defense

Supreme Command

General Staff Department

State Affairs Commission

Ground Forces Air Force Navy Strategic Force

Wartime Procedure

Peacetime Consultation

During wartime, Kim Jong Un would exercise

overall control of preparations, mobilization, and

operations. The Supreme Command functions as

both the highest ranking advisory board to Kim

on all state and military affairs and as the organi-

zation charged with converting the supreme com-

mander’s strategies into actual wartime direc-

tives. The Supreme Command would comprise

senior ofcers from the General Staff Depart-

ment, Ministry of National Defense, and other

key national-level organizations.

Nuclear Command and Control

Kim Jong Un has established through public

policy statements and legislation that he is the

sole release authority for North Korean nuclear

weapons use against any adversary. In 2013,

North Korea revised its national constitution

and passed a law on nuclear use, which stated

that nuclear weapons could not be used with-

out an express order from the supreme com-

mander.

Kim has personally authorized North

Korea's nuclear tests, most recently in Septem-

ber 2017. North Korean state-sponsored media

published the order with his signature after

the test occurred.

Other North Korean public

media releases have emphasized Kim’s singular

role in authorizing missile force alerts and the

signing of a “repower strike plan,” ostensibly

for nuclear attack on the United States.

Kim Jong Un exercises personal command and control over North Korea’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and conven-

tional military forces. In this 2013 image released by North Korean state media, a map of notional missile strikes

on the United States is the backdrop to Kim signing a “firepower strike plan.”

Image Source: AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Core North Korean Military Capabilities

Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles

orth Korea has aspired to become a

nuclear weapons power for decades.

Although the nuclear program’s foun-

dation dates to the 1950s, Pyongyang started

making its most signicant progress toward

developing a nuclear weapons capability after

withdrawing from the Treaty on the Nonprolifer-

ation of Nuclear Weapons in 2002, citing increas-

ing alarm over U.S. military activities abroad

and dissatisfaction with the pace at which inter-

national economic aid, promised in past nuclear

negotiations, was arriving. The North began

testing nuclear devices underground in 2006.

North Korea discloses very few details about its

nuclear weapons inventory and force structure.

Program History and Pathway to

Weapon Development

North Korean nuclear research began in the

late 1950s through cooperation agreements

with the Soviet Union. The North’s rst

research reactor began operating in 1967,

and Pyongyang later built a nuclear reactor

at Yongbyon with an electrical power rating

of 5 megawatts electrical (MWe). This reactor

began operating in 1986 and was capable of

producing about 6 kilograms of plutonium per

year. Later that year, high-explosives testing

and a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium

from the reactor’s spent fuel were detected.

Construction of additional reactors—a 50-MWe

reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-MWe reactor at

Taechon—provided additional indications of a

larger-scale nuclear program.

North Korea joined the Nonproliferation

Treaty in 1985, but inspections only started

7 years later under the treaty's safeguards

regime, inviting questions about the North’s

Reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex.

North Korea has acknowledged both plutonium

reprocessing and uranium enrichment activities at

this installation. Activities at Yongbyon sites continue.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

North Korean Nuclear and Rocket Launch Facilities

1707-13887

North Korea’s launch installations have supported

ground test and launches of multi-stage rockets,

nominally for putting satellites in orbit. These ac-

tivities provided a test bed for long-range ballistic

missile technology, and support the development

of ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory. Recent

activities at the Pyongsan Uranium Concentration

Plant have also been reported.

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

plutonium production. In 1994, North Korea

pledged to freeze and eventually dismantle its

plutonium programs under the Agreed Frame-

work with the United States. At that time, a

number of sources estimated that Pyongyang

had separated enough plutonium for one or two

nuclear weapons. North Korea allowed the Inter-

national Atomic Energy Agency to place seals

on spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor and to

undertake remote monitoring and onsite inspec-

tions at its nuclear facilities.

In 2002, negotiators from the United States con-

fronted North Korea with evidence of a clandes-

tine uranium enrichment program, a claim that

North Korean ofcials publicly denied. Disagree-

ment over the North’s establishment of a uranium

enrichment program led to the breakdown of the

Agreed Framework. The United States reached

agreement with members of the Korean Economic

Development Organization and stopped shipment

of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, whose response

was removing the international monitors and

seals at the Yongbyon facility and restarting its

plutonium production infrastructure.

North Korea has demonstrated the capability

to produce kilogram quantities of plutonium for

nuclear weapons and has claimed to possess the

ability to produce enriched uranium for nuclear

weapons. The North disclosed a uranium enrich-

ment plant to an unofcial U.S. delegation in

late 2010 and claimed it was intended to produce

enriched uranium to fuel a light-water reactor.

The North began underground nuclear testing in

2006 and used early tests to both validate device

designs and to send a political signal that it was

advancing its nuclear capability. By September

2017 North Korea had conducted six nuclear

tests: one each in 2006, 2009, and 2013; two in

2016; and one in September 2017, according to

seismic detections and public claims by North

Korean media.

81,82

Successive tests have demon-

strated generally higher explosive yields, accord-

ing to seismic data.

The September 2017 test

generated a much larger seismic signature than

had previous events, and North Korea claimed

this was a test of a “hydrogen bomb” intended

for use on an intercontinental ballistic missile

(ICBM).

North Korea has exclusively used the

underground nuclear test facility in the vicinity

of Punggye for its nuclear tests. In May 2018,

North Korea disabled some parts of the Punggye

test site, announcing that it no longer needed

to conduct nuclear tests. However, Pyongyang

retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons minimiz-

ing the impact of this development.

Kim Jong Un examines a mock nuclear warhead dis-

played in front of a ballistic missile.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

Ballistic Missile Force

North Korea established a Strategic Force (pre-

viously known as the Strategic Rocket Forces)

in 2012 and has described this organization

as a nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. The

Strategic Force includes units operating short-

range (SRBM), medium-range (MRBM), inter-

mediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles, and

ICBMs, each of which North Korea has stated

represents a nuclear-capable system class. In

2016, the North claimed a Scud class SRBM

launch had tested nuclear weapon components

in a mock attack against a South Korean port.

Pyongyang has occasionally hinted at the

possibility of other nuclear-capable units, for

instance, by marching infantry troops carrying

backpacks emblazoned with the nuclear sym-

bol in a 2013 military parade.

The North’s ballistic missile force is structured

around multiple regional and intercontinental

target sets. The Strategic Force operates Scud

class missiles that can range South Korea, some

extended-range variants of the Scud that can

reach Japan, and the No Dong MRBM, which

can reach Japan. This force also is responsible for

the Hwasong-12 IRBM, which was designed to

range Guam; and the Hwasong-14 ICBM, capa-

ble of reaching the continental United States.

North Korea revealed its rst road mobile

ICBM in a 2012 military parade. In 2015, it

began ight-testing a submarine-launched bal-

listic missile (SLBM), the Pukguksong-1. Sub-

sequently, the North conducted an initial ight

of a new solid-propellant MRBM, the Pukguk-

song-2 and a new IRBM, the Hwasong-12, which

appears to be a replacement for the Musudan

IRBM. North Korea conducted multiple ight

tests of the Hwasong-12, including ight tests

in August and September 2017 over northern

Japan, ultimately reaching a range of approxi-

mately 3,700 kilometers, its longest-range direct

trajectory ballistic missile ight tests to date.

88,89

North Korea conducted an inaugural launch

of its ICBM class system, the Hwasong-14 on

4 July 2017 and again on 28 July 2017. It then

launched a second type of ICBM, the larger

Hwasong-15 on 28 November 2017.

Hwasong-14 ICBM on a road-mobile transporter-erec-

tor-launcher prior to launch, July 2017.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

Hwasong-15 ICBM on its mobile launcher, November 2017.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

North Korea conducted this second Hwasong-14 ICBM

flight test on 28 July 2017.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

A TD-2/Unha-3 space launch vehicle preparing for

launch, April 2012. Satellite launches contribute valu-

able data to the ballistic missile program.

Image Source: AFP

During an April 2017 parade, North Korea

showcased a modied ICBM launcher with

a launch canister, as well as a new mobile-

erector-launcher with a launch canister.

Road-mobile launch canisters are typically

associated with solid-propellant missiles.

Actual missiles for the launch canisters were

not displayed. The North also paraded a

new Scud variant with a modied warhead,

probably a maneuverable reentry vehicle.

North Korea’s February 2018 military parade

included one new short-range ballistic mis-

sile, which was arrayed in pairs on four-axle

trucks. North Korea began testing a version

of this solid-propellant missile in May 2019.

Between 2019-2021, North Korea launched a

total of four new types of SRBMs.

North Korea also possesses space launch vehi-

cles (SLV) which could reach the continental

United States if congured as ICBMs.

These

systems use ballistic missile technology, and

Ballistic Missile Inventory

1707-13888

Systems

Number of

Launchers

Propellant

Deployment

Mode

Maximum

Range (km)

SCUD B/C (SRBM) Fewer than 100 Liquid Road-Mobile 300–500

SCUD ER (SRBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 1,000

Unnamed SRBM variants

(Launched 2019)

Undetermined Solid Road-Mobile 380–600+

No Dong (MRBM) Fewer than 100 Liquid Road-Mobile 1,200+

Hwasong-10

(Musudan IRBM)

Fewer than 50 Liquid Road-Mobile 3,000+

Hwasong-12 (IRBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 4,500

Pukguksong-1 (SLBM)

At least 1

submarine

Solid Submarine 1,000+

Pukguksong-3 (SLBM) Undetermined Solid Submarine 1,000+

Pukguksong-4 (SLBM) Undetermined Solid Submarine Unknown

Pukguksong-5 (SLBM) Undetermined Solid Submarine Unknown

Pukguksong-2 (MRBM) Undetermined Solid Road-Mobile 1,000

Hwasong-14 (ICBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 10,000+

Hwasong-15 (ICBM) Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile 12,000+

Unnamed ICBM

(Paraded 2015)

Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile Intercontinental

Unnamed Larger ICBM

(Paraded In 2020)

Undetermined Liquid Road-Mobile Intercontinental

- Hwasong and Pukguksong designators are based on published North Korean names.

- All ranges are approximate.

space launches provide North Korea with valu-

able data applicable to the development of long-

range, multi-stage ballistic missiles.

North

Korea’s Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2), called Unha-3 in

the North, has been under development since at

least the early 2000s. Its rst ight test attempt,

in 2006, failed; subsequent launches in 2009 and

April 2012 also failed. In December 2012 and

February 2016, the North successfully launched

an object into low Earth orbit with the TD-2.

The 4 July 2017 Hwasong-14 launch was North

Korea’s rst ICBM ight test. The Hwasong-14

was launched almost straight up to an unusu-

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ally high altitude of approximately 2,800 kilo-

meters above the Earth before impacting into

the Sea of Japan.

On 28 July, North Korea

tested the Hwasong-14 to an even higher loft

than achieved on 4 July. The lofted-launch

technique enables the North to model how

far the missile could travel without overying

another country and without a full-range ight

test. In its tested conguration the Hwasong-14

ICBM is capable of reaching North America if

own on a direct trajectory based on the ver-

tical distance traveled by the missiles during

the July 2017 ight tests.

North Korea ight

tested another new ICBM – identied as the

Hwasong-15 - in a lofted trajectory at an apo-

gee of 4,475 kilometers on 28 November 2017.

These ICBM ight tests mark signicant mile-

stones in North Korea’s ballistic missile devel-

opment process—the rst ight tests of mis-

siles which can reach the United States.

99,100

North Korea's ICBM Flight-test Trajectories, 2017

1707-13887

By testing ICBMs to

extremely high altitudes,

North Korea can assess

how they would perform

at long distances while

keeping impact areas

within the region.

Nuclear Deterrence Strategy and Use Doctrine

The steady development of road-mobile ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs highlights Pyongyang’s

intention to build a survivable, reliable nuclear delivery capability.

101

This developing capa-

bility has been accompanied by high-level statements, the rst of which was issued in 2013,

in which North Korea stated it would use nuclear weapons to respond to an invasion and

may use them to prevent an attack. Together, these developments suggest the potential

for nuclear weapons to be used at any stage of conict when the North believes itself in

regime-ending danger.

102,103,104

The point at which North Korean leadership would perceive

this threat is unclear, as are specic regime plans for nuclear use.

North Korea Missile Launches and Nuclear Tests

105

1707-13888

Accounts for full flight tests only. Does not include partial tests of missile subsystems, such as static engine firings or

cold-launch ejection tests, tests of air defense systems, close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range rockets,

or artillery firings. Updated as of September 2021.

MRBM

(1,000–3,000 km)

SLBM

(1,000–3,000 km)

ICBM

(5,500+ km)

SRBM

(300–1,000 km)

Space Launch

Cruise Missile

Unknown Missile

Nuclear Test

IRBM

(3,000–5,500 km)

1984

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1998

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2012

2013

2014

201 5

2016

2017

2018

Number of Events

2019

2020

2021

KIM Il SUNG KIM JONG IL KIM JONG UN

1984-1994 1994-2011 2011-present

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

North Korean Ballistic Missile Ranges

1707-13887

Biological and

Chemical Weapons

North Korea has a longstanding biological

warfare (BW) capability; additionally its bio-

technology infrastructure could be redirected

to support a BW program.

106

The North is a

signatory to the Biological and Toxins Weap-

ons Convention (BWC) but has yet to declare

any relevant developments and has failed to

provide a BWC condence-building measure

declaration since 1990.

107,108,109

Pyongyang may

consider the use of biological weapons during

wartime or as a clandestine attack option.

North Korea has a chemical warfare (CW) pro-

gram that could comprise up to several thou-

sand metric tons of chemical warfare agents,

and the capability to produce nerve, blister,

blood, and choking agents.

110

North Korea is

not a party to the Chemical Weapons Con-

vention. North Korea probably could employ

CW agents by modifying a variety of conven-

tional munitions, including artillery and bal-

listic missiles, along with unconventional,

targeted methods. For example, North Korea

was responsible for the assassination of Kim

Jong Un’s half-brother in Malaysia using the

nerve agent VX.

111

An Indonesian woman and

a Vietnamese woman were tried for the mur-

der; four North Koreans were charged but

ed the country before arrest.

Offensive

Conventional Systems

North Korea’s conventional military consists of

the ground, air, naval, and special operations

forces. Each is limited to operations on or around

the Korean Peninsula and poses a direct threat

to South Korea and to U.S. forces based in South

Korea. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy can

operate at long distances off-peninsula or project

power outside the region. North Korea’s conven-

tional strike capability is concentrated primarily

in massed re from KPA artillery forces, Special

Operations Forces (SOF), and, less effective,

xed-wing attack by ghters and bombers.

KPA Ground Forces operate thousands of long-

range artillery and rocket systems along the

entire length of the DMZ. These weapons include

close-range mortars, guns, and multiple rocket

launcher systems (MRLs) trained on South

Korean military forces deployed north of Seoul,

and longer-range self-propelled guns, rockets,

and CRBMs that can reach Seoul and some points

Long-range artillery guns in mass firing position for

training exercise.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

North Korean Artillery and Rocket Threat to South Korea

1707-13887

south of the capital. Collectively, this capability

holds South Korean citizens and a large number

of U.S. and South Korean military installations

at risk.

112

The North could use this capability to

inict severe damage and heavy casualties on the

South with little warning.

North Korean SOF are designed for rapid offen-

sive operations, inltration, and limited attack

against vulnerable targets in South Korea.

Operating in specialized units, SOF person-

nel are among the most highly trained, well-

equipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces

in the KPA. Recently, North Korea has empha-

sized SOF unit training with particular focus on

improving their capability to raid key govern-

ment installations in the South.

The North Korean Air Force can y strike mis-

sions against targets in South Korea with ght-

ers and bombers; its most capable platforms are

the MiG-29 Fulcrum ghter and the MiG-23

Flogger ghter, although these would have con-

siderable difculty overcoming South Korea’s

more modern air forces and air defenses. Sev-

eral North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs) have been sighted over South Korea

since 2014; models that crashed and were exam-

ined by the South Korean government had been

congured for surveillance and reconnaissance,

but the North could arm future UAVs.

113

National Defense

Defending the North Korean homeland against

external attack is a foundational KPA mission,

constituting a major share of effort for KPA

ground, air and air defense, and naval units.

The criticality of homeland defense as a KPA

mission was demonstrated during the Korean

War. Although North Korea enjoys consid-

erable geographic advantages for defense—

including mountainous terrain, coastal mud-

ats, and long seasons of poor weather—aerial

bombardment by the United States and other

nations in the UN Command force devastated

all of North Korea’s major cities and urban

areas during the Korean War. The North

responded by constructing dense fortications

and multilayered air and coastal defense sys-

tems, embracing new electronic warfare tech-

nologies as they became available in order to

foil U.S. precision-guided weapon systems, and

burying most of its key military command and

control nodes and critical equipment in deep,

hardened underground facilities (UGFs).

Underground Facilities

North Korea’s UGF program is the largest and

most fortied in the world, estimated to consist

of thousands of UGFs and bunkers designed

to withstand U.S. bunker-buster bombs.

114,115

The UGF program’s primary function is to

protect and conceal regime leaders, weapons

of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, warf-

ighting stores, and elements of military forces

and defense industries. In 1963, Kim Il Sung

publicly announced, “The entire nation must

be made into a fortress. We must dig into the

ground to protect ourselves.”

116

The size and

sophistication of these facilities range from

small tunnels, only large enough to accom-

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

modate personnel or a few vehicles, to large,

complex UGFs for command and control, mis-

siles, and other strategic assets. North Korea

maintains a road network under Pyongyang to

protect and conceal Kim Jong Un and senior

leaders during a crisis, which improves condi-

tions for sustainment of the regime and may

embolden Kim to take more belligerent action

if he perceives he is safe from counterattack.

117

North Korea has adapted the use of deception

in its defenses after observing U.S. conicts in

the Vietnam War, Kosovo, and both Iraq Wars.

North Korea could use UGFs and mountainous

topography to fortify its military installations

and for concealment and defense during a con-

ict, probably hoping to strain U.S. resources

and raise the cost of combat operations on

the peninsula. North Korea will continue to

improve and construct hardened bunkers and

underground facilities to protect its forces.

118

Air Defense

North Korea maintains a dense network of inte-

grated air defense systems (IADS), providing

overlapping, redundant coverage of Pyongyang,

the DMZ, both coasts, and its strategic infra-

structure. North Korean air defenses comprise

primarily xed, but transportable strategic sur-

face-to-air missile (SAM) sites, some mobile tac-

tical SAM systems, antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

positions, and man-portable air defense systems

(MANPADS). North Korea’s IADS make good

use of camouage, concealment, and deception

procedures and underground facilities to pro-

tect against attack. North Korea occasionally

conducts eld deployment training of air and

air defense assets to improve wartime surviv-

ability. North Korean ghter aircraft are also

capable of basic air defense operations.

North Korean airspace is divided into four air

divisions, and each air division headquarters is

responsible for the defense of its assigned region.

119

Although Air Force Headquarters remains the

nal authority on engaging hostile forces, during

wartime the various air defense divisions probably

will operate autonomously within their assigned

regions. North Korea has a large number of aging

early warning and intercept radars that provide

basic detection of large aircraft at long distances

to support the defense of its airspace.

Entryway to a South Korean tunnel dug to inter-

dict a secret North Korean infiltration tunnel under

the DMZ. In addition to constructing sophisticated

underground facilities for military use, North Korea

may have built more than twenty infiltration tunnels

for surreptitious KPA entry into South Korea, four of

which were discovered between 1974 and 1990.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

Coastal Defense

North Korean coastal defense is maintained by

the North Korean Navy, which operates radars,

defense artillery and missile sites, and command

and control nodes complemented by smaller

patrol craft, mines, and attack, coastal, and

midget-type submarines; and Air Force-oper-

ated aircraft. Defense radars and underground

facilities on both coasts support coastal defense

artillery and coastal defense cruise missile sites.

The Navy is divided into East and West Coast

Fleets, each operating a variety of patrol craft,

torpedo boats, and guided-missile patrol vessels

that carry a variety of antiship cruise missiles,

torpedoes, and guns. North Korean Navy patrol

craft mostly operate in immediate coastal waters.

The North Koreans have a credible minelay-

ing capability. Numerous small surface ships

are capable of delivering mines to impede mil-

itary and civilian shipping. Mines would be

used to defend against amphibious assaults,

provide seaward ank protection for land

forces, and defend strategic ports. Defensive

mines would be monitored by coastal obser-

vation teams and radar, and they would be

supported by well-emplaced artillery and mis-

sile batteries, making approaching and mine

clearing operations extremely hazardous.

Electronic Warfare

North Korea views electronic warfare as an

essential tool in countering the threat posed by

advanced Western weapon systems and preci-

sion-guided munitions, and critical to denying

and disrupting enemy command and control,

targeting, and intelligence gathering efforts.

North Korea has operated GPS jammers near

the DMZ, at times interfering with navigation

systems onboard commercial aircraft ying in

the area.

120

Space/Counterspace

North Korea can be expected to try to deny an

adversary use of space during a conict; ample

evidence is available to Pyongyang in open

sources describing the general U.S. reliance on

space-based assets to support joint operations

and intelligence collection. The North’s nonki-

netic counterspace capabilities include GPS and

satellite communication jamming, which have

been tested on multiple occasions in the past

decade. Possession of ballistic missiles and space

launch vehicles that can reach orbit theoretically

suggests the North could attempt to disrupt

orbiting satellites in a conict.

North Korea’s space program is administered by a

state-run civilian agency, the National Aerospace

Development Administration.

121

The North main-

tains a space launch complex on the west coast,

the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, and asso-

ciated space tracking facilities in Pyongyang, both

of which supported satellite launch cycles in 2012

and 2016. An older space launch site on the east

coast has not been used for a launch since 2009.

Although North Korea has placed two satellites in

orbit and has articulated further space ambitions,

its program also enables it to test technology used

in ballistic missiles.

122

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cyberspace

North Korea views its offensive cyberspace capa-

bilities, including computer network attack,

as a cost-effective and deniable tool that it can

employ with little risk of reprisal. Pyongyang’s

cyberspace capabilities support military opera-

tions and national security goals by providing the

Kim regime a way to inuence and intimidate its

adversaries and collect information on them. In

light of the numerous sanctions targeting North

Korea, cyberspace capabilities also provide the

regime with a means to generate currency that

circumvents international controls.

123

Computer Network Attack

and Intimidation

North Korea was linked to a 2014 cyber-in-

trusion into Sony Pictures Entertainment net-

works undertaken by a group called Hidden

Cobra, previously referred to as Lazarus Group

and Guardians of the Peace.

124

The attack fol-

lowed North Korean demands that Sony cancel

the release of a lm depicting the assassination

of Kim Jong Un and resulted in data deletion

and shutdown of employee network access.

125

The FBI stated that there was sufcient evi-

dence to attribute the attack to North Korea.

In December 2017, the U.S. Government linked

North Korea to the May 2017 WannaCry com-

puter worm attack, which affected over 250,000

computers in over 150 countries. This attack

disrupted critical computer systems across

the world, including Great Britain’s National

Health Service.

126

Cyber-Enabled Propaganda

North Korea has also used its cyberspace

resources for political purposes and to spread

propaganda on South Korean networks. South

Korea has reported that the North hacked var-

ious websites to post pro-North opinions.

127

Select North Korean Cyberspace Units

1707-13888

Institution/Unit Mission and Activities

Central Party Investigative Group Technical education and training

Unification Bureau Operations

Department

Cyber-psychological warfare, organizational

espionage

204

Unit (Unification Bureau

Operations Department)

Psychological operations, incitement of disorder in

South Korea

Number 91 Office Offensive cyberspace operations

Intelligence Collection

North Korea has used the Internet since the

1990s to stay abreast of international develop-

ments, but with its growing cyberspace capabili-

ties Pyongyang is now gaining access to secured

information. In late 2016, South Korea’s Cyber

Command was reportedly hacked by North

Korean cyberactors. The intranet server of the

Cyber Command was contaminated with mal-

ware. The South also found that some military

documents, including condential information,

had been hacked, according to a South Korean

Ministry of National Defense ofcial. In a sub-

sequent cyberspace operation in 2017, the North

allegedly exltrated classied war plans, accord-

ing to a South Korean legislator.

128,129

In addi-

tion, North Korea is reportedly actively engaged

in cyberspace inltration into the United States

and European countries for the purpose of exl-

trating technical data important to solving tech-

nological problems with miniaturizing nuclear

weapons and perfecting its ballistic missiles.

130

Currency Generation

North Korea is broadly suspected of using

cyberspace means to steal money from nan-

cial institutions worldwide. North Korean

hackers use overseas infrastructure to achieve

their goals for the regime while also mask-

ing their attribution. The North's cyberactors

also operate from overseas locations to gener-

ate currency illegally while maintaining legal

means of revenue generation on the surface.

131

The 2016 theft of $80 million from the Bank

of Bangladesh has been attributed to North

Korea. Several international cybersecurity

rms have conducted research and docu-

mented similar North Korean cybercrime

operations resulting in thefts from more than

100 global banks using a combination of mal-

ware tools and harvested user credentials,

including in the Philippines, Vietnam, and

Poland and others.

132

In addition to cyber-enabled theft, North

Korean hackers engage in global fraud, black-

mail, online gambling, and other cyberactivi-

ties to create prots. These activities together

are estimated to generate an annual revenue

of $860 million, some portion of which prob-

ably supports military activities. Given the

increased sanctions against North Korea as a

result of nuclear and missile activities, Pyong-

yang will continue turning to cybercrime as a

means to generate currency to fund its weapon

programs while sidestepping international

efforts to freeze the regime’s funding.

133

Denial and Deception

Denial and deception (D&D) is fundamental

to North Korean military operations. The KPA

makes extensive use of D&D methods and

materials to conceal its readiness and enhance

survivability of its forces. North Korea probably

understands the United States' and its allies’

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

capabilities and is able to take measures to

counter collection activities, including sched-

uling activities to occur at night or under

cloud cover, using mountainous topography

for terrain masking, and hiding equipment in

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UGFs. The KPA also uses camouage netting

and paints, equipment decoys, false signals

emitters, and smoke and obscurants.

134,135,136

North Korea dedicates a substantial portion of

its D&D resources to concealing activities asso-

ciated with its nuclear and ballistic missile pro-

grams, conducting many activities in UGFs.

137

Logistics and Sustainment

Although doctrinal planning requires the

KPA to maintain 6 months of supply in all

resource categories to sustain defensive com-

bat operations, North Korea may have suf-

cient supplies for only 2 to 3 months.

138,139

Subsistence supplies could last up to 3

months, and ammunition could last slightly

longer.

140

Inadequate availability of fuel and

transportation assets, poor maintenance of

ground lines of communication, and insuf-

cient training all constrain North Korea’s

ability to sustain large-scale conventional

offensive operations.

141,142,143,144

North Korea’s transportation infrastructure

is in poor condition; it has damaged roads,

resource availability constraints, and difcult

terrain.

145,146

Many roads are unpaved gravel

or dirt surfaces and lack consistent mainte-

The Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge provides North Korea an important transportation link to China.

Image Source: Shutterstock

nance.

147

Although these features are a defen-

sive advantage in case of invasion, they also

hamper KPA mobility in the offense. North

Korea has fortied key maneuver corridors

along the coasts, the DMZ, areas surrounding

Pyongyang, and roads adjacent to the North

Korea–China border.

148,149,150,151

These roads

provide access and mobility to some of North

Korea’s supplies that are stockpiled in UGFs

bordering the DMZ.

152,153

Railroads also provide

critical links between major cities within the

country and connect to Chinese and Russian

rail lines despite having similar inconsistent

maintenance.

154

The military is likely to use the

railway network to reposition forces and sup-

plies to sustain operations.

155,156

Human Capital

Over 1.3 million people out of North Korea's

population of approximately 25 million serve

in the KPA, making North Korea's military the

fourth largest in the world. As many as 20 per-

Junior KPA soldier at attention during a military event in Pyongyang. The KPA is a platform for ideological

indoctrination and internal social control in addition to its offensive and defensive missions.

Image Source: Shutterstock

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

cent of North Korean males between the ages

of 16 and 54 are in the military at a given time

and possibly up to 30 percent of males between

the ages of 18 and 27, not counting the reserves

or paramilitary units. The active-duty forces

account for at least 6 percent of the population

and at least 12 percent of the male population.

With universal conscription and long-term

service, the KPA serves as a key socialization

mechanism for the state and a pathway to

Korean Workers' Party membership.

157

The bulk strength of the KPA is made up of

conscripts serving a 10-year enlistment period.

North Korea drafts women, although shorter

enlistments are available to females and to

personnel in specialty elds. Most KPA per-

sonnel spend their entire conscription period

with the same unit in the same location, often

using and training on the same equipment for

a full decade. Conscripts who are selected for

university-level education are eligible to serve

their enlistment after graduation and may

serve a shorter time in the military.

Historically, KPA servicemembers were

afforded better rations than the general popu-

lation, but this trend has declined precipitously

since the mid-1990s, and most KPA conscripts

now are subject to the same deprivation as the

general population outside Pyongyang.

158

For-

mer KPA servicemembers who have defected

to the South describe malnutrition and harsh

service conditions. Because of North Korea’s

chronic food insecurity, military personnel

are periodically diverted away from standard

duties to plant or harvest crops.

159

Over the next few decades, the effects of the

1994-97 famine will continue to affect the pop-

ulation that constitutes the majority of the

KPA reserve manpower pool. North Korean

children born in the 1990s suffered malnu-

trition, which resulted in declining physical

development, stunted growth, and mental

underdevelopment.

160

This trend suggests that

some number of KPA conscripts in the reserves

will function at lower levels of effectiveness

due to mental and physical impairments.

161,162

The COVID-19 pandemic probably is having

a disruptive impact on the North Korean pop-

ulation. North Korea has reported suspected

COVID-19 cases, but has not ofcially reported

any conrmed cases.

163

Nonetheless, COVID-19

has exacerbated North Korea’s already weak

economy and despite continued denials of any

domestic cases, Pyongyang has implemented

border closures, quarantines, lockdowns, and

steep reductions in trade to prevent the spread

of the virus. North Korea’s military has prob-

ably experienced some degradation in unit

prociency, but can conduct most functions if

ordered. How COVID-19 will ultimately affect

North Korean civilians, military personnel, or

leadership is unclear.

Outlook: Targeted Investments in

Select Military Capabilities

im Jong Un has set North Korea’s mili-

tary on a path to expand its capabilities

across multiple domains in the coming

years. Kim has placed a priority on the

development and demonstration of weapons that

provide North Korea the means to strike distant

adversaries—including the United States—with

nuclear weapons, improve the KPA’s capability

to strike key targets in South Korea at increas-

ing distances from the DMZ, and further fortify

North Korea against external attack or invasion.

These operational goals reect an overarching

security strategy focused on deterrence and coer-

cion; Kim appears to judge that he can prevent

the United States from taking action against

North Korea if he demonstrates a viable nuclear

weapon deliverable on a reliable long-range bal-

listic missile. Moreover, Kim will continue to

bolster his conventional military’s offensive and

defensive capabilities to raise the cost of a conict

if deterrence should fail and to expand his options

to threaten South Korea and locally based U.S.

forces. Even absent WMD capabilities, these con-

ventional capabilities continue to pose a constant

threat to South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in

the region.

Breaking from the fast pace of missile and

nuclear testing in 2016-2017, North Korea

pursued diplomatic outreach in 2018 and

early 2019, and declared its support for the

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

It has not conducted any nuclear tests since

2017, and has reversibly dismantled por-

tions of its WMD infrastructure. However,

we continue to observe activity, at Yongbyon

and elsewhere, inconsistent with full denu-

clearization. North Korea began ight test-

ing new SRBMs and an SLBM in mid-2019.

In an October 2020 military parade, North

Korea revealed a new larger ICBM, probably

designed to deliver multiple warheads. North

Korea retains its WMD capabilities, and it is

unlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles,

delivery systems, and production capabilities.

North Korean leaders view nuclear arms as

critical to regime survival.

Unless it agrees to, and follows through with,

full denuclearization, including the scrapping of

delivery systems, North Korea will likely grow

and advance all of the following military sectors:

Land Based Ballistic Missiles. In 2018,

North Korea stated that it would abide by a mis-

sile launch moratorium during dialogue with the

United States; however, it conducted multiple

launches of new solid-propellant SRBM variants

beginning in May 2019. Even if additional ight

tests of longer range systems do not occur in the

near term, Pyongyang will probably focus on

training and improving its missile forces which

are increasingly central to North Korea’s deter-

rence strategy. North Korea also will work to

improve its newer solid-propellant ballistic mis-

siles - solid fueled missiles can be made ready for

launch more quickly than liquid fueled missiles.

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

It is possible we could see a test of a long range

missile over the next year.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.

North Korea’s debut of an SLBM in 2015 opened

a new potential area of operations for the North

Korean Navy. It tested another new SLBM, the

Pukguksong-3, in October 2019 and paraded

a new Pukguksong-4 in 2020 and a Pukguk-

song-5 in 2021. This capability is likely to grow

slowly because constructing and deploying new

submarines requires a lengthy, resource-inten-

sive manufacturing process.

Nuclear Weapons. Integrating a nuclear

weapon with a ballistic missile and enabling

that nuclear-armed missile to function reliably

as a system is North Korea’s ultimate opera-

tional goal. Further underground nuclear tests

to validate weapon capabilities are possible if

North Korea reconstitutes its nuclear test site

or establishes a new one.

Long-Range Artillery. North Korea’s develop-

ment of longer range and precision-guided MRLs

will continue, and these systems will be deployed

with the Ground Forces to multiply the artillery

threat to Seoul and points south of Seoul.

Special Operations Forces. The North’s

efforts to train SOF for operations in South

Korea will continue and will be used for propa-

ganda purposes as well as practical unit train-

ing. The North may seek to build prociencies

in inltration techniques and raids against

South Korean government facilities.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. North Korea has

demonstrated a capacity to eld multiple classes

of UAVs and y them into South Korean airspace

undetected, although several of these UAVs have

malfunctioned and crashed. The North probably

sees future intelligence gathering roles for its

UAVs and may look into arming UAVs to supple-

ment the Air Force’s ground-attack capabilities.

Cyberspace Capabilities. North Korea will

continue to target U.S. and allied networks in the

government, military, and private sectors. Pyong-

yang will focus hacking efforts on targets that

offer opportunities to steal useful information and

deny or disrupt our use of computer networks.

Cyber-enabled theft and currency-generating

activities also will continue, and the North’s hack-

ing techniques may become more sophisticated.

Limited Resources Hamper Development

in Other Sectors. North Korea lacks the capac-

ity to invest signicant resources in new, more

capable systems across the entire force. Ele-

ments of North Korean military power that do

not receive this level of leadership attention,

such as the Air Force or the surface Navy, will

remain capable of executing their core missions,

but their readiness and capability will probably

remain static or erode over time. Critical decien-

cies and shortfalls in North Korea’s transporta-

tion infrastructure and military supply base are

likely to persist, limiting the KPA’s mobility on

the offensive and preventing it from sustaining a

major advance into South Korea.

Sanctions placed on North Korea have prob-

ably limited the amount of resources it has to

implement military modernization on its own.

North Korea will continue to use diplomatic

engagement, counterpressure against the sanc-

tions regime, and direct sanctions evasion to try

to mitigate some of the effects of the sanctions.

North Korea may calculate that China and Rus-

sia will eventually distance themselves from the

U.S. policy of strict sanctions enforcement as

each seeks to increase its leverage in the region.

APPENDIX A: Strategic Force

North Korea’s Strategic Force operates the

regime’s ballistic missiles. The service’s mis-

sion is nuclear and conventional ballistic mis-

sile strike against targets inside and outside

the region. Kim Jong Un has prioritized the

development of new Strategic Force-operated

missile systems and has directed more launches

of older missiles, suggesting this service could

become one of North Korea’s more capable mil-

itary arms if training and development are sus-

tained and pursued consistently forcewide.

The Strategic Force is a service-level entity on

par with the North Korean Air and Air Defense

Command or Navy; it is probably subordinated

directly to the General Staff Department and

is only one step removed from Kim's personal

command. The Strategic Force enjoys a high

public prole and is credited with numerous

key advances in North Korean ballistic mis-

sile capabilities. Kim has, according to North

Korean state media, issued orders to the Stra-

tegic Force on multiple occasions directing it

Kim Jong Un inspects a Hwasong-12 IRBM prior to flight-testing. Tests to improve the reliability of ballistic missiles

have been increased and publicized under Kim Jong Un.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

to increase its alert status and prepare for

missile strike operations against U.S. bases

in the Western Pacic and against the United

States directly.

164

North Korea’s ballistic missile units control

a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs,

and ICBMs.

165

It is unclear what operational

role, if any, the Strategic Force has with

respect to North Korea’s developmental subma-

rine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). North

Korean state media has shown testing of a bal-

listic missile with a precision-control guidance

system and has alluded to a possible antiship

role for North Korea's ballistic missile units.

166

The strength of the Strategic Force is estimated

at 10,000 personnel. The service controls over

200 road-mobile ballistic missile launchers.

167

a missile deployment or strike scenario, mobile

launchers permit North Korea to mobilize sys-

tems out of garrisons and conceal them while

launch preparations are under way. Since 2014,

the Strategic Force has undertaken multiple

mobilization and launch exercises apparently

designed to train on these tactics, techniques,

and procedures, and North Korean media has

described some missile launch events as testing

nuclear components.

168

Kim has personally over-

seen land- and sea-based ballistic missile testing

and publicized the achievements through photos

and video, reecting his personal interest in this

service’s development.

North Korea’s ballistic missile force is one of

the most rapidly modernizing elements of the

national military. Several new ballistic missile

systems and associated equipment were publicly

debuted in 2017 through ight testing and a mil-

itary parade; those systems that are deployed

operationally will almost certainly be operated

by the Strategic Force. Also in 2017, tracked

ballistic missile launchers were observed for

the rst time.

169

In 2018, North Korea paraded

a never before seen SRBM that appears similar

to the Russian solid-propellant Iskander mis-

sile system. It tested this and three other new

types of SRBMs multiple times since 2019.

170,171

The Strategic Force also continues to operate

several missiles that date to the 1980s–1990s,

including Scud class SRBMs and the No Dong

MRBMs. Continued ight tests on these sys-

tems from 2015-2017—as well as North Korean

press statements highlighting the role they

play in current nuclear attack plans—suggest

that North Korea remains interested in improv-

ing the performance of these older missiles and

validating the prociency of their launch crews.

Scud class SRBM on new tracked launcher, paraded in

Pyongyang in April 2017.

Image Source: 2017 DIBMAC Report

APPENDIX B: Ground Forces

KPA Ground Forces—armor, infantry, and

artillery—remain the core of North Korea’s mil-

itary power and the primary means by which

Pyongyang threatens Seoul. The KPA ground

units comprise 10 regular corps, 2 mechanized

corps, 1 armored division, 4 mechanized divi-

sions, and 1 artillery division plus numerous

combat, combat support, and combat service

support brigades and regiments. The Ground

Forces number about 1,000,000 active-duty

soldiers, and another 150,000 are assigned to

reserve units.

172,173,174,175,176

With a large artillery

and infantry force forward-deployed, the KPA

Ground Force can mount an attack on South

Korean and U.S. forces with little or no warn-

ing. Although the KPA may meet initial success,

its maneuver and sustainment problems, stem-

ming from resource shortages, probably would

limit its ability to maintain the momentum of

an attack, unless it receives outside support.

Ground Forces are subordinate to the Gen-

eral Staff Department. The force is infantry

heavy and is supported by signicant artillery

and armored/mechanized forces. The forward

corps and the armored, mechanized, and artil-

lery units operate the most modern ground

equipment in the KPA inventory. The rear

corps are a mix of regular and reserve forces

with older equipment. The KPA is oriented to

a conict along the DMZ, with over 70 percent

of the force deployed south of Pyongyang.

177

In addition to the regular and reserve forces,

the KPA has an extensive paramilitary orga-

nization that assists in providing rear-area

security and manpower to replace combat

losses. These forces are organized into the

Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG) and Red

Youth Guard (RYG).

178

These organizations

are present at all levels of government (prov-

ince, county, ward) and are under the control

of the Korean Workers' Party in peacetime

but revert to military control during crisis or

war. The WPRG and RYG have about 6 mil-

lion personnel (approximately 25 percent of

the North Korean population).

179

The KPA artillery and armored force mainly

comprises North Korean–produced copies of

Soviet-era equipment. It is largely based on old

technology but is reliable and easy to maintain.

The artillery force includes a large number of

conventional towed and self-propelled systems

and long-range 170-mm guns and 240-mm mul-

tiple rocket launchers.

180

New 300-mm MRL CRBM in live fire exercise, 2016.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

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Major Ground Units

181,182

1707-13887

KPA Ground Forces modernization is slow and

incremental, but Kim has dedicated some new

systems to ground units. North Korea debuted

a new main battle tank in a military parade

in 2010, and the KPA has conducted multiple

tests of the new 300-mm MRL CRBM since

2014. The 300-mm MRL CRBM is an advanced

MRL system congured to re up to eight 300-

mm guided, rocket-propelled munitions per

launcher. Presumably it will be deployed with

artillery units. The system will extend the

range of KPA repower well south of Seoul

and could be sufciently accurate for preci-

sion targeting against key South Korean and

U.S. military installations on the peninsula.

183

Additionally, in September 2018 North Korea

paraded a new self-propelled artillery system

and a new six-wheeled, eight canister tactical

guided missile system, most likely an anti-

tank guided or surface-to-air missile. North

Korea probably tested this new tactical guided

missile system in April 2019.

184,185

[For more

details on modernization, see Appendix H.]

North Korean strategy, doctrine, and tactics

for ground operations have remained fairly

consistent since the 1950s. In the event of a

massed attack against South Korea, the North

would use heavy concentrations of infantry

and armor supported by artillery to break

through and attempt to destroy forces defend-

ing along the DMZ, and advance rapidly down

the entire peninsula. These operations would

be coordinated closely with the opening of a

second front comprising special operations

forces (SOF) units conducting raids and dis-

ruptive attacks in the South Korean rear area.

The KPA Ground Forces are capable of defend-

ing against and deterring a land invasion

from the South. The KPA would initially focus

on infantry and light infantry operations sup-

ported by large volumes of artillery re sup-

port, but would default to guerrilla-style oper-

ations targeting rear areas and logistics if

invading forces progressed beyond the DMZ.

KPA doctrine puts great emphasis on ght-

ing under arduous conditions, at night, in the

mountains, and during inclement weather.

KPA tactics are heavily inuenced by Kim Il

Sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla activity, which

emphasized the value of small-unit ghting.

The modern KPA emphasizes small and large

units attacking an objective simultaneously,

such as SOF or light infantry attacking the

objective from the rear or ank while heavy

infantry supported with artillery assaults

from the front and anks.

186

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

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APPENDIX C: Air and Air Defense Forces

The North Korean Air Force is primarily respon-

sible for defending North Korea’s airspace and

territorial integrity. Its other missions include

tactical air support to KPA Ground Forces, inser-

tion of SOF, transportation and logistics sup-

port, wartime strikes against targets in South

Korea, and intelligence, surveillance, and recon-

naissance. The Air Force is capable of defending

North Korean airspace, with aircraft and ground-

based systems but would struggle to penetrate

South Korean air defenses in an attack role.

North Korean air and air defense forces are orga-

nized into four air divisions (each responsible for

a sector of the country) that control surface-to-

air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft artillery (AAA),

and air surveillance assets. The forces also con-

trol transport units and two airborne sniper bri-

gades as well as various support elements. The

air divisions control combat and transport air-

craft and helicopters that operate from a large

number of airelds.

The air and air defense forces have about 110,000

personnel and control over 900 combat aircraft,

over 300 transport aircraft, and 300 helicopters.

The more modern aircraft are concentrated in

and around Pyongyang, and the SAMs and AAA

provide perimeter security for the country and the

capital in particular. The capital has one of the

most dense concentrations of AAA in the world.

187

The Air Force’s most capable combat aircraft

are its few MiG-29 Fulcrum ghters procured

from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, its

MiG-23 Flogger interceptors, its Su-25 Frog-

foot ground-attack aircraft, and its Il-28 Beagle

bombers. The majority of its aircraft are much

older and less capable; the Air Force is one of

the only air forces in the world that still oper-

ates MiG-21s, MiG-19s, MiG-17s, and MiG-15s.

The Air Force also maintains a large eet of

An-2 Colt aircraft, rst produced in the 1940s,

which are single-engine 10-passenger biplanes

probably tasked with inserting SOF into South

Korea but are also capable of supporting simple

air-to-ground strike missions. The Air Force is

rounded out with other Soviet-era transport air-

craft, including helicopters that would be used

for troop transport and limited ground attack.

188

The most common North Korean ground-

based air defense artillery threat to air-

craft (helicopters and xed-wing aircraft)

and unmanned aerial systems is very likely

manually directed AAA and man-portable

air defense systems (MANPADS). Manually

directed systems will have limited ability

to engage smaller targets, such as UAVs, in

addition to poor ability to engage all targets

at night and in inclement weather.

Russian MiG-29C. The North Korean model of this

1980s-era fighter is the newest aircraft in the North

Korean Air Force inventory.

Image Source: AFP

Major Air Units

189

1707-13887

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

0 50 100 Kilometers

Fighter base

Transport base

Helicopter base

Other airfield

All locations are notional

AIR ORDER OF BATTLE (approx.)

Personnel strength

Combat aircraft

Helicopters

Transport aircraft

110,000

900

300

Manpo

Uiju

Sungam-ni

Kuktong

Orang (HQ)

Iwon

Hwangsuwon

Changjin-up

Toksan

Sondok

Kowon

Wonsan

Kuum-ni

Hyon-ni

Sonchon

Kaechon

Pukchang

Pakchon

Kangdong

Koksan

Nuchon-ni

Taetan

Hwangju (HQ)

Kanchon

Kwail

Onchon

Mirim

Panghyon

Taechon (HQ)

Kwaksan

Sunchon

Pyongyang

Chunghwa (HQ)

Pyongyang

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH KOREA

RUSSIA

CHINA

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

KPA ground-based AAA probably will rely

heavily on medium-caliber (30-mm to 57-mm)

AAA guns. Medium-caliber AAA guns max-

imize repower (a combination of rate of re

and kinetic energy) by offering some of the

highest rates of re while being large enough

to have sufcient terminal ballistics and

lethality characteristics. The KPA also elds

numerous 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns

and domestically produced MANPADS (SA-7,

SA-14, and SA-16). North Korea operates a

variety of SAMs, mostly Soviet-era systems,

including the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-13.

190

Flight time for North Korean pilots reportedly is

severely restricted to as few as 15–25 hours per

year. Flight hours this low probably stem from

fuel shortages and may reect concern over the

upkeep and maintenance of the North’s aging

aircraft.

191

Under these conditions, North Korean

pilots most likely focus their training on simple

pilot prociency and the maintenance of basic

aeronautical skills. The pilots of more advanced

ghter aircraft probably y more frequently,

maintaining a higher degree of prociency and

at times participating in aerobatic competitions

and demonstrations during public air shows. In

September 2016, North Korea hosted its rst

advertised International Friendship Air Festi-

val, at Kalma Aireld in Wonsan, where a vari-

ety of pilot drills were held and aircraft were dis-

played for the public.

192

North Korea has probably modernized select

older air defense systems in addition to intro-

ducing some newer systems. During a 2010

military parade, North Korea rst displayed a

new mobile SAM launcher and accompanying

radar that externally resembled the Russian

S-300 and Chinese HQ-9; this system was most

recently tested in 2017.

193

The North is also

developing or procuring a variety of UAVs, some

of which have been used for reconnaissance

missions over South Korea and which could

be equipped with rudimentary armaments.

194

North Korea is probably pursuing larger UAVs

for a variety of military missions.

North Korean reconnaissance drone, recovered after

crashing in South Korea. Several UAV models have

been sighted in South Korean airspace.

Image Source: AFP/SOUTH KOREAN DEFENCE MINISTRY

The SA-5 surface-to-air missile is North Korea's

longest-range SAM.

Image Source: Shutterstock

APPENDIX D: Navy

The North Korean Navy is the smallest of the

KPA’s three conventional force services, with

about 60,000 personnel. The Navy’s primary

mission is to defend North Korea’s coastline

and territorial waters from attack and to pro-

tect the approaches to North Korea’s main ports.

The Navy is also responsible for SOF insertion,

coastal surveillance, and the protection and con-

trol of sheries operations. In wartime, the Navy

will focus on antisurface warfare, mine warfare,

and interdicting sea lines of communication to

hinder the United States and UNC’s ability to

ow forces into the theater.

195

North Korea’s

Navy would be constrained to a largely defensive

role in a conict, and it would face signicant

challenges attempting to operate against South

Korea or the United States.

North Korean Navy Romeo-class diesel-electric attack submarine, 2014. Kim Jong Un is aboard for an inspection.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Major Naval Units

196

1707-13887

North Korea’s Navy is primarily a coastal

force. It maintains one of the world’s largest

submarine forces and operates a large eet

of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional

landing craft to support amphibious operations

and SOF insertion. The force is divided into

East and West Coast Fleets, with each oper-

ating a variety of patrol craft, guided-missile

patrol boats, submarines, and landing craft.

197

North Korea has about 70 diesel-electric

attack, coastal, and midget class submarines

in service divided between both coasts. Many

of the North’s submarines are of older design

and have limited endurance; however, they

are sufciently capable of using torpedoes

and mines to threaten merchant ships and

U.S. and allied navies operating near the

Korean Peninsula. Determined to expand its

undersea and deterrent capabilities, North

Korea launched a new ballistic missile sub-

marine with a single launch tube in 2015 and

began ight-testing SLBMs the same year.

North Korea is expected to continue SLBM

development and expand its naval deterrent

unless it proceeds with denuclearization.

Finally, North Korea is likely to introduce

other new submarines into its force.

198,199,200,201

The Navy’s surface ship order of battle com-

prises mostly small patrol craft that carry

a variety of antiship cruise missiles, torpe-

does, and naval guns. The Navy also oper-

ates a large eet of air-cushioned hovercraft

and conventional landing craft to support

amphibious operations and SOF insertion.

202

The Navy uses a variety of torpedoes, includ-

ing straight-running and wake-homing

torpedoes, that can be launched from sub-

marines and some surface ships. An inter-

national investigation concluded that North

Korea used a wake-homing torpedo known as

CHT-02D to sink the South Korean corvette

Cheonan in March 2010.

203,204

Pukguksong-1 SLBM launch, April 2016 (left). North Korea’s SLBM progressed rapidly from ejection tests to

short-range flight test, later followed by a launch of Pukguksong-3 in 2019 (right).

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP and AFP PHOTOS/KCNA

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

North Korea has a history of mine warfare

being instrumental to its coastal defense strat-

egy. During the Korean War, North Korea’s

naval forces were able to mine Wonsan Har-

bor and, as a result, successfully prevented

a U.S. amphibious landing from cutting off

retreating North Korean ground forces. There-

fore, mines probably remain a key element of

North Korea’s maritime defense strategy.

205

The Navy may also attempt offensive mining

of South Korean ports.

The most dramatic new development in the

North Korean naval force was the debut of

a ballistic missile–capable submarine and

its associated SLBM, the Pukguksong-1

(translated as Polaris-1). According to North

Korean press statements, the SLBM will be

cold-launched and solid-fueled, will carry

a nuclear warhead, and is intended to be

launched from ballistic missile submarines.

North Korea conducted multiple ight tests

of the developmental SLBM in 2016 and

displayed it in a military parade in 2017.

206

North Korea tested a second SLBM, called

Pukguksong-3, in October 2019. A ballistic

missile strike role would be wholly new for

the Navy, which may not yet have a nal

plan for how to incorporate this new mis-

sion into existing doctrine and plans. North

Korea’s Navy also tested antiship cruise mis-

siles in 2017.

207

North Korean Navy patrol boat on guard in waters

off the Mt. Kumgang international tourist zone, 2011.

Image Source: AFP

APPENDIX E: Special Operations Forces

North Korea's special operations forces (SOF)

are designed to inltrate South Korea and attack

targets in the rear area, and to defend against

foreign attacks on North Korea. SOF members

operate in specialized units, including recon-

naissance, airborne and seaborne insertion, and

commando squads.

208

Core SOF doctrine empha-

sizes speed of movement and surprise attack to

accomplish the mission. SOF personnel may be

airlifted by helicopters and xed-wing aircraft

(and possibly Civil Air Administration trans-

ports), moved by surface ships or submarines, or

travel on foot over land or via suspected cross-

DMZ tunnels to attack high-value targets, such

as command and control nodes, airbases, and

ports. North Korean SOF are highly trained and

well-equipped in comparison to other units, and,

if successfully inltrated into the South, would

be capable of disruptive attacks in the rear area.

SOF personnel are present at all echelons of

the KPA (from brigade and division to corps)

as well as the strategic-level 11th Corps, which

controls a number of SOF brigades for strategic

missions, including creating a “second front” in

the rear area that disrupts and distracts from

the main ght along the frontlines. SOF light

infantry, sniper, and reconnaissance elements

and air and naval SOF elements are present in

many infantry divisions and the forward corps.

The various SOF units comprise over 200,000

personnel organized into brigades of 3,000–

5,000 members and separate regiments and

battalions of varying strength (these personnel

are accounted for in KPA manpower gures).

North Korean SOF units are provided with the

best available equipment, including weapons,

explosives, incendiaries, chemical and biological

agents, parachutes, aircraft, and communica-

tions equipment. Compared with the equipment

of other worldwide SOF units, North Korea's

equipment is rudimentary, and North Korean

SOF probably lacks such sophisticated items

as burst communications equipment, advanced

signal-processing equipment, and specialized

explosives. State media photos from two train-

ing exercises revealed purported North Korean

SOF using newly identied equipment, includ-

ing helical magazines, improved ballistic hel-

mets, night-vision devices, and body armor, but

elding of this equipment to operational units

cannot be veried.

209

KPA special operations forces parade in Pyong-

yang, 2017. New optical equipment and firearms

are displayed.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Strategic SOF units support national objec-

tives with reconnaissance and raid missions.

Specifically, these units develop targeting

information, report South Korean civilian

and military actions, and conduct poststrike

assessments. Typical missions would involve

the location and sabotage or destruction of

national-level artillery; airfields; storage

facilities; air defense locations; and com-

mand, control, communications, and intel-

ligence (C3I) assets in South Korean rear

areas. In addition, strategic units also may

kidnap or assassinate key South Korean or

U.S. personnel.

Inltration of enemy territory—possibly

before a war begins—is a key KPA SOF

mission. SOF can be inltrated by air using

the An-2, which can support this operation

by paradrop or by landing on a highway to

debark personnel. Maritime inltration can

be accomplished by cushioned hovercraft,

which could deliver over 7,000 SOF person-

nel to each of South Korea's coastlines, and

by submarines, including Romeo class die-

sel-electric submarines and specially outtted

Sango class submarines, which are designed

solely for coastal inltration.

210,211

Operational SOF units support corps objec-

tives with light infantry and reconnaissance

missions. In wartime light infantry units will

target critical terrain and command-and-con-

trol assets, delay South Korean, U.S., and UNC

reserve forces, and attack division (and higher)

command posts. In addition, these units ascer-

tain enemy intentions, develop targeting infor-

mation for ballistic missiles and long-range

artillery, conduct poststrike assessments, and

determine locations of South Korean, U.S., and

UNC reserve forces. Tactical SOF units support

maneuver division and brigade objectives with

light infantry operations. Light infantry units

attack brigade and division command posts,

capture key terrain to assist in maneuver-

ing divisions and brigades, and destroy South

Korean, U.S., and UNC reserve forces. The

organic reconnaissance company of the maneu-

South Korean naval personnel recover a damaged

North Korean semisubmersible craft in the sea south

of Jinhae, South Korea, 1999. North Korean SOF

utilize such vessels to infiltrate agents into the South.

Image Source: AFP

ver unit performs tactical reconnaissance. The

reconnaissance company and light infantry

battalion develop targets for destruction. These

targets include air defense sites, force concen-

trations, artillery positions, and C3I assets.

Doctrinally, North Korean SOF units train in

unconventional warfare following the tenets

laid out by Kim Il Sung in various training

and doctrine manuals. Defensively, the North

Korean SOF serves as North Korea's primary

counter-SOF force, guarding key sites against

possible targeting by enemy SOF during war-

time. Because of the importance that the regime

places on North Korea's SOF capability, SOF

members often receive more frequent training

of a much higher quality than regular KPA

infantry receive.

212

Air-cushioned landing craft used for SOF infiltration, shown in training exercises publicized by North Korean

state media.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPENDIX F: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces

The KPA has an extensive reserve structure

built around numerous Reserve Military Train-

ing Units (RMTUs). These units primarily com-

prise infantry divisions and brigades and artil-

lery brigades and regiments. The RMTUs' role

is to maintain North Koreans' basic soldier skills

and prociencies should citizens need to aug-

ment the active-duty forces during a crisis. The

majority of the RMTUs are in the rear corps, but

some are also in the forward corps. In a conict

scenario, RMTUs and other paramilitary groups

are trained to function as insurgents and defend

their homeland against external attackers.

North Korea also has an extensive paramili-

tary structure that includes the Worker Peas-

ant Red Guard (WPRG) and Red Youth Guard

(RYG) under party/civilian control in peacetime

and organized into regiments and battalions.

These paramilitary units are usually mobilized

Soldiers in the Worker Peasant Red Guard paramilitary train for concealment and defense operations, 2013.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

for domestic projects, such as road building and

agricultural support. The corps-sized Body-

guard Command (with multiple brigade units)

provides regime protection forces outside the

KPA's control. Finally, engineering and logistic

units provide numerous services often associ-

ated with the private and government sectors

in other nations but that are under party and

government control in North Korea, including

agricultural support and road maintenance.

213

The RMTU elements comprise up to 600,000

personnel, but few are on active duty at any

one time. The WPRG and RYG comprise up to

5 million personnel and 1 million personnel,

respectively. They comprise about 25 percent

of the entire population but are seldom mobi-

lized in any signicant number. The Bodyguard

Command and other militarized elements add

an additional 300,000 personnel to the over-

all strength of the paramilitary force and are

actively engaged in their roles at all times.

RMTUs are routinely activated in small num-

bers during the KPA's summer and winter

training activities. RMTUs augment local

active-duty forces in force security, count-

er-SOF operations, movement of logistics, etc.

The RMTUs’ training during either training

cycle generally reects KPA training in basic

soldier skills and small-unit combat skills.

North Korean reserve military personnel are

issued uniforms for wartime use and for train-

ing with active units and are equipped with

individual weapons, including handgrenades

and rocket-propelled grenades. Reserve soldiers

are most likely to be armed with older variants

of Kalashnikov-model (Type 58/68) ries. Most

reserve units have wartime reserve caches of

weapons, food, and supplies near their wartime

areas of operation.

The WPRG is organized into elements that

vary in size and serve locally in each village,

town, factory, and enterprise. The WPRG and

the RYG conduct combat and political training

as preparation for an all-people resistance war

to defend their provinces, counties, and home-

towns as required to defend the North as part

of an impregnable fortress. Physically quali-

ed nonexempt North Koreans are assigned

to a reserve military unit upon release from

KPA active duty. Male reservists serve with an

assigned unit until they are 60 years old.

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPENDIX G: Intelligence Services

North Korea has four primary intelligence and

counterintelligence services: the Reconnaissance

General Bureau, the Ministry of State Security,

the United Front Department of the Korean

Workers’ Party, and the Cultural Exchange

Bureau, which was formerly known as the 225th

Department. North Korean intelligence and

security services collect political, military, eco-

nomic, and technical information through open

sources, human intelligence, cyberspace capa-

bilities, and signals intelligence capabilities.

North Korea’s primary intelligence collection

targets are South Korea, the United States, and

Japan.

214

The North’s intelligence services have

also conducted operations against these coun-

tries, including the abduction of Japanese citi-

zens in the 1970s and 1980s.

Reconnaissance General Bureau

The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)

is North Korea’s premier military intelligence

service, responsible for collection, analysis, and

clandestine operations.

215, 216

The RGB was estab-

lished in 2009 during a reorganization of North

Korea’s intelligence services, which transferred

three intelligence agencies from the Korean

Workers' Party and consolidated them under the

National Defense Commission (disestablished

and replaced by the State Affairs Commission

in 2016).

217

Administratively, the RGB is subor-

dinate to the KPA General Staff Department.

218

The RGB consists of six bureaus with compart-

mented functions, including operations, recon-

North Korean Intelligence Services

1707-13888

State Affairs Commission

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un

Korean Workers’ Party

United Front

Department

Cultural

Exchange

Bureau

Ministry of People’s

Armed Forces

General Staff Department

Reconnaissance General Bureau

Ministry of State Security

Operations Reconnaissance

Technology

and Cyber

Overseas

Intelligence

Inter-Korean

Talks

Service

Support

naissance, technology and cyberspace functions,

overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks, and

service support.

219

The RGB and its predeces-

sor organizations have been tied to a number of

foreign kidnappings, assassinations, state-spon-

sored terror attacks, cyberoperations, and inl-

tration operations.

220

The RGB also oversees

businesses in foreign countries, which are used

as fronts for espionage, currency generation,

cyberoperations, weapon sales, goods procure-

ment, and other illicit activities.

221, 222

RGB personnel are highly trained, attending an

intelligence academy where operatives receive

instruction in rearms and explosives, martial

arts, underwater diving, and other activities before

becoming operational.

223

The RGB also recruits

and co-opts foreign nationals to gather intelligence

and execute operations in foreign countries.

Ministry of State Security

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North

Korea’s primary counterintelligence organiza-

tion, tasked with operating North Korean prison

camps, investigating cases of domestic espionage,

repatriating defectors, and conducting overseas

counterespionage activities in North Korea’s

foreign missions.

224

The MSS is an autonomous

agency of the North Korean government, report-

ing directly to Kim Jong Un.

225

Jong Kyong-thaek

was appointed the Minister of State Security as

of October 2017.

226

The MSS executes its counterintelligence mis-

sion abroad as well as domestically and has been

implicated in widespread human rights viola-

tions.

227, 228

The MSS investigates political crimes

and manages North Korea’s political prison

camps, where prisoners are subject to extrajudi-

cial punishments, brutal treatment, poor condi-

tions, and summary executions.

229

The MSS also

enforces censorship laws related to foreign media

and monitors the populace and foreign citizens in

North Korea through technical surveillance, com-

munications monitoring, recruited citizens, and

random inspections.

230

The MSS deploys agents

globally—often under diplomatic cover in embas-

sies and UN posts—to monitor North Korean

personnel working overseas and to repatriate

North Koreans. The MSS has increased its pres-

ence abroad because of North Korean defections

in recent years.

231

United Front Department

The United Front Department (UFD) is North

Korea’s primary civilian intelligence agency,

propaganda ofce, and policymaking entity for

inter-Korean relations and dialogue.

232

The UFD

is directly subordinate to the Korean Workers'

Party.

233

The UFD overtly attempts to establish

pro-North Korean groups in South Korea, such as

the Korean Asia-Pacic Committee and the Eth-

nic Reconciliation Council.

234

Cultural Exchange Bureau

The Cultural Exchange Bureau (CEB) is respon-

sible for running agents in South Korea to

establish underground political parties focused

on fomenting unrest, revolution, or pro-DPRK

views. The CEB also conducts clandestine inu-

ence operations.

235, 236

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

North Korean Intelligence Services’ Covert and Clandestine Operations

1707-13888

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

May - WannaCry ransomware attacks.

Feb - Murder of Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, in Malaysia.

Conducted cyber espionage against United States and other foreign government entities.

Nov - Hack of world banking system; $81 million stolen from Bangladeshi bank reserves through SWIFT.

3 Nov -

Hack of Sony Pictures; destroyed 70 percent of firm’s computers, compromised employee PII and internal emails, resulted in

delay of movie release.

20 Apr - DarkSeoul cyberattack executed by North Korea; malware rendered tens of thousands of computers in South Korea’s financial

and media sectors inoperable.

Sep - Attempted assassination of defector Park Sang-hak by North Korean agent.

Jun - Denial-of-service attacks against U.S. and South Korean government telecommunications services led by RGB’s Lab 110 unit.

Attempted assassination of North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop.

North Korea hacking of South Korean and U.S. Defense Department networks.

Jun -

North Korean midget submarine captured by South Korea on probable spy mission; all four

North Korean agents onboard committed suicide after killing five sailors from the sub’s crew.

Feb - Defector from extended Kim family, Lee Han-yong, assassinated outside his apartment building in Bundang, South Korea.

Sep -

North Korean submarine on espionage mission infiltrated South Korean territory; 24 North Koreans killed, 13 South

Koreans killed, 1 North Korean missing, 1 North Korean captured.

Assassination of South Korean diplomat Choi Duk-keun in Vladivostok, Russia, by poison.

29 Nov - Bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 between Baghdad and Seoul by two North Korean agents; all 115 people onboard killed.

9 Oct - Attempted assassination of South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan in mausoleum bombing in Rangoon; 21 killed including

18 South Koreans.

Jan &

June - Kidnapping of South Korean actress Choi Eun-hee and producer Shin Sang-ok from Hong Kong.

15 Aug -

Second assassination attempt on South Korean President Park Chung-hee in South Korea. Park’s wife, Yuk Young-soo, was

inadvertently killed in the attack.

11 Dec - North Korean agent hijacks domestic Korean Airlines Flight YS-11; holds passengers and crew hostage; 39 passengers

later released, 11 kept in North Korea.

21 Jan - Failed raid on South Korea’s Blue House in an attempt to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee; South Korean

and U.S. military personnel killed in the incident.

APPENDIX H: Defense Industry and the Energy Sector

North Korea places a high priority on its

defense-industrial base because it produces

the military hardware that Pyongyang views

as essential to maintaining national secu-

rity.

237

North Korean government support for

the defense industry comes at the expense

of the country's civilian economy; while por-

tions of the nonmilitary industrial base have

become outdated and fallen into disrepair, key

defense industries have continued to oper-

ate and modernize.

238

North Korean defense

factories produce a diverse array of military

hardware, including small arms, a full range

of munitions, light armored vehicles, tanks,

naval ships and submarines, and advanced

missile systems.

239

Production priorities have

shifted over the decades from a focus on large

quantities of ground forces equipment in the

1960s–1990s to the development of more

capable missile systems.

240

Although North Korea continues to pursue

the ideal of self-reliance in weapon system

development and production, it still requires

materials and technology purchased on the

open market abroad to improve domestic pro-

duction capabilities and weapon system effec-

tiveness. Pyongyang is attempting to upgrade

select elements of its large arsenal of mostly

outdated weapons and will continue to focus

its limited production resources on force mod-

ernization, emphasizing strategic deterrence

and defensive and asymmetric attack capabil-

ities to counter the technological superiority of

South Korean and U.S. forces.

241

North Korea

will produce limited amounts of improved

equipment in the naval, aviation, and ground

arms sectors, based on regime prioritization

and resource availability.

Ballistic Missile Sector

In support of the growing regime-directed

requirements to develop a nuclear-armed

ballistic missile force capable of threatening

the United States and the region, Pyong-

yang developed multiple longer-range liq-

uid-propellant systems.

242,243

North Korea is

also testing new solid-propellant systems, an

MRBM, an SLBM, and multiple SRBMs.

244,245

In addition, the country probably has several

hundred SRBMs and MRBMs in its inven-

tory, based on 1950s legacy Scud liquid-pro-

pellant technology.

246

ICBMs

In July 2017, North Korea conducted its rst

two launches of an ICBM class system, test-

ing the liquid-propellant Hwasong-14, which

is capable of reaching the United States.

247,248

A follow-on ight-test of another new ICBM,

Hwasong-15, occurred in November 2017.

North Korea has displayed two other devel-

opmental liquid-propellant ICBMs that have

yet to be ight-tested. In April 2012 and July

2013, North Korea paraded six three-stage

Hwasong-13 ICBMs on eight-axle transport-

er-erector-launchers (TELs). In October 2015,

Pyongyang paraded four previously unseen

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

two-stage liquid-propellant ICBMs on the

same eight-axle TELs used in 2012 and 2013;

North Korea has not announced a name for

this system.

249,250,251,252,253

Then, in October

2020, North Korea paraded 4 new larger

ICBMs on 11-axle TELs; these missiles have

not yet been tested.

SLBMs

North Korea has developed and produced its

rst SLBM system and a submarine launch

platform, the single-launch-tube Gorae ballis-

tic missile submarine and the Pukguksong-1

missile, which was originally a liquid-propel-

lant–fueled system but was replaced with a

solid-fueled missile system. Solid fuel has a

number of benets, including being more sta-

ble and easier to handle, store, and transport.

The medium-range Pukguksong-1 has been

ejection-tested numerous times from both a

land-based ejection stand and a seagoing ejec-

tion test barge. These tests culminated in an

August 2016 launch in which the missile ew

about 500 kilometers. North Korea reached

this milestone after only 3 years of ejection

tests and ight tests, which demonstrates a

fast-paced missile development program.

254,255

North Korea tested a second medium-range

SLBM, Pukguksong-3 in 2019. Since then

North Korea paraded 2 new SLBMs, the Puk-

guksong-4 in October 2020 and the Pukguk-

song-5 in January 2021. Pyongyang has not

tested these new missiles or indicated which

submarine will employ them. Improvements

and expansion at Sinpo Shipyard indicate that

North Korea may produce a larger submarine

with the capability to carry and re more than

one missile at a time.

256, 257

IRBMs

North Korea has two developmental liq-

uid-propellant IRBM systems, the Musu-

dan and the Hwasong-12. The Musudan

was first displayed in a 2010 parade but

was not flight-tested until 2016; seven of

the eight tests ended in failure because mis-

siles exploded on takeoff or early in flight.

258

The Hwasong-12 was first displayed in an

April 2017 military parade and flight-tested

New untested SLBM, October 2020.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA

North Korea featured a new ICBM in its October 2020

military parade.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA

in mid-May 2017.

259

The Hwasong-12 has a

demonstrated range of over 3,700 kilome-

ters, sufficient to reach Guam.

260,261

SRBMs and MRBMs

North Korea’s SRBMs are the foundation of

Pyongyang’s ballistic missile program. SRBMs

are a proven capability that provides Pyongyang

a reliable platform for testing and developing

longer-range systems while holding at risk the

United States and its allies on the Korean Pen-

insula and in Japan. North Korea probably has

hundreds of Scud-based SRBMs and Scud-de-

rived No Dong MRBMs that were developed

and initially deployed during the mid-1980s to

early 1990s.

North Korea continues to develop

new SRBM systems, including a liquid pro-

pellant SRBM on a new tracked TEL paraded

in April 2017 and a SRBM similar to the Rus-

sian solid-propellant Iskander missile system

paraded in 2018. North Korea tested a version

of this missile and two other new SRBMs mul-

tiple times since May 2019.

262,263,264,265

In October

2020, North Korea paraded 52 solid propellant

SRBMs on 6 different wheeled and tracked TEL

chassis. North Korea introduced yet another

SRBM at its January 2021 parade. It conducted

the rst test of this missile in March 2021.

Additionally, in September 2021 North Korea

tested a new rail-based launcher for an SRBM .

Pyongyang is developing a solid-propellant

MRBM known as the Pukguksong-2, a land-

based version of the developmental Puk-

guksong-1 SLBM. This is the largest known

solid-propellant system produced by North

Korea. The Pukguksong-2 was ight-tested in

February and May of 2017 and is carried on a

tracked TEL.

266

Other Missile Developments

In its October 2020 military parade, Pyongyang

displayed a new missile system mounting four

previously unseen canisters on towed two-axle

trailer launchers pulled by a three-axle cab-

over-engine truck. This system is likely a cruise

missile, possibly a land-attack variant of North

Korea’s anti-ship cruise missile. In September

2021, North Korea tested LACMs from a 5 can-

Hwasong-12 IRBM.

Image Source: AFP

North Korea launching a new type of SRBM; July 2019.

Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Kim Jong Un tours submarine construction hall; July 2019.

Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

ister TEL that had carried probable SRBMs in

the October and January parades.

In an April 2017 military parade, Pyongyang

displayed two previously unseen contain-

erized ballistic missile systems, although

actual airframes were not observed. The rst

system consisted of a capped launch tube

mounted on an eight-axle TEL. The second

system also had a capped launch tube, though

slightly shorter than the rst, mounted on a

four-axle trailer pulled by a three-axle cab-

over-engine truck.

267

Naval Sector

North Korea’s naval industry can produce

vessels to support a coastal force which today

comprises primarily aging patrol craft (that

carry a variety of antiship cruise missiles,

torpedoes, and guns) and a few large cor-

vette-sized vessels. In addition, Pyongyang

has built a large eet of air-cushioned hover-

craft and conventional landing craft to sup-

port amphibious operations and SOF inser-

tion. Construction of surface ships during

the past 5 years has concentrated on a small

number of modern, higher speed designs

for patrol boats and corvettes with minimal

surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile

capability. Naval shipyards are on both the

east and west coasts, but because of insuf-

cient resources they usually produce infre-

quently. The naval industry is able to main-

tain a portion of the North Korean Navy eet

with regular repair and maintenance capabil-

ities, but many vessels remain pierside or in

nonoperational condition.

268

Submarine pro-

duction efforts are focused at the Sinpo Ship-

yard on the east coast.

Aviation and Air Defense Sector

North Korea’s aviation industry is capable

of assembling light, single-engine airplanes,

such as the Cessna 172, and small-to-medium

UAVs. In the 1980s and 1990s, the industry

was able to assemble xed-wing aircraft and

helicopters from partially completed kits sup-

plied by Russia, China, and other countries,

but that capability has since waned. North

Korea is unable to produce modern jet ghters

and engines, instead relying on cannibaliza-

tion and the purchase of spare parts from over-

seas markets to maintain its dated forces.

269

North Korea has recently been ying small-to-

medium–sized photoreconnaissance UAVs with

autonomous GPS-waypoint navigation capabil-

ities over the DMZ into South Korean territory.

These UAVs are based on commercial Chinese

designs; some systems are produced in China

and purchased on the open market, and others

are produced in North Korea using imported

components. North Korea has built larger

UAVs, including target drones and training

simulators and probably attack drones. Most of

these larger systems are based on older mod-

els procured from Russia and China, with the

exception of a jet-powered UAV based on the

U.S. MQM-107D Streaker system that probably

was acquired from Middle Eastern sources.

270

Ground Arms Sector

The majority of North Korean ground forces

are equipped with 1950s–1970s Russian and

Chinese light and medium tanks, armored per-

sonnel carriers, and towed and self-propelled

artillery, or North Korean–developed versions

of this legacy equipment. Since at least 2010,

North Korea has produced only limited quan-

tities of improved ground forces equipment,

including an upgraded main battle tank, and

the 300-mm MRL CRBM. In development since

at least 2013, this CRBM system is equipped

with two rocket pods carrying a total of eight

guided rounds; the pods are mounted on a

three-axle Chinese-origin truck chassis.

271, 272

Long-range self-propelled artillery piece, one of thou-

sands of such guns capable of striking Seoul.

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

In August 2010, North Korean news media

aired video footage of the regime’s new main

battle tank. The tank has features similar

to the Russian T-72, which would provide

improved performance over Pyongyang’s Chon-

ma-ho family of tanks that is based on the Rus-

sian T-62. The tank probably is in service with

only one armored unit in the Army.

273

In a September 2018 military parade, Pyong-

yang displayed a new tracked, self-propelled

artillery gun and a tactical guided missile sys-

tem, most likely an anti-tank guided or sur-

face-to-air missile, mounted on a six-wheeled

armored chassis. It is unknown if either of these

systems is currently deployed with the KPA.

274

In October 2020, North Korea paraded several

new systems that showcased North Korea’s

continued defense industrial activity to diver-

sify and modernize its military force, in spite

of strict sanctions. These included a new tank

design that had at armor panels around the

turret and seven road-wheels; previous tanks

only had six. It also paraded never-before-seen

light armored vehicles with gun turrets and

anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. These new

systems are not yet elded.

The Energy Sector

North Korea’s oil and gas sector remains in a

state of disrepair because of sanctions and years

of neglect. The country has no oil and natural gas

production and relies on crude oil imports from

China to meet demand.

275

Pyongyang ofcially

imports a small amount of rened petroleum

products from China and Russia.

276

Although

North Korea reportedly has some oil and gas

reserves offshore as well as on land, the country

does not have the technical expertise to explore

or develop these resources.

277,278

China exports

about 10,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil by

pipeline to North Korea’s only operating ren-

ery, in Paengma Ri (29,000-b/d capacity).

North Korea’s other renery, in Sonbong

(45,000-b/d capacity), was constructed to pro-

cess Russian and Middle Eastern crude oil

imports. It has been shut down since the late

1990s because of the breakdown in the Six-Party

Talks on nuclear disarmament and because of

payment issues.

279

North Korea gives priority to the military over

the civilian population when it comes to provid-

ing access to rened petroleum products. Since

2018, the United States and its allies observed

North Korean maritime vessels using illicit

at-sea, ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum from

third-country tankers to acquire additional

rened petroleum as a way to mitigate the

New main battle tank, paraded in 2020.

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA

effects of UNSC sanctions.

280

These ship-to-ship

transfers stabilized North Korea’s fuel supplies

and prices, though acute shortages still affect

civilian industry and military operations.

281

North Korea’s electric power sector cannot

meet the country’s demand for electricity due

to decades of overuse, poor maintenance, and

equipment shortages. Since the early 1990s,

North Korea has experienced frequent black-

outs and has the third-lowest electric power

consumption per capita among East Asian and

Pacic countries.

282,283

In his 2019 New Year

Address Kim Jong Un identied increasing

electricity generation as one of the most import-

ant goals for improving the North Korean econ-

omy.

284

North Korea is exploring ways to use

wind and solar energy for electricity generation

to reduce its reliance on oil imports and vulner-

ability to international sanctions. North Korea

and China jointly operate four hydroelectric

power plants on the Yalu River that accounted

for 16 to 17 percent of North Korea’s total elec-

tricity production in 2013.

285

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPENDIX I: Arms Sales

North Korea has exported conventional arms

and ballistic missiles for several decades.

Despite the implementation of UN Secu-

rity Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718,

286

1874,

287

2087,

288

2094,

289

2270,

290

2321,

291

and

2356,

292

which prohibit North Korea from sell-

ing weapons and providing related technical

training, Pyongyang continues to market, sell,

and deliver weapons-related goods and ser-

vices. Weapon sales are an important source

of foreign currency for North Korea’s weapons

programs, and thus, Pyongyang is unlikely

to cease export activity despite UN Security

Council sanctions,

293

increased international

efforts to interdict North Korea's weapons-re-

lated exports, and the implementation of Exec-

utive Order 13382, under which designated

WMD proliferators’ access to the United States

and global nancial systems is targeted.

Global concern about North Korea’s prolifer-

ation activities continues to mount, leading

some countries, such as Namibia, to halt new

purchases from Pyongyang and leading other

nations to take action to prevent arms-related

deliveries.

294,295

Although some of its weapons

transfer attempts have been interdicted by the

international community, North Korea very

likely will continue to attempt arms shipments

via new and increasingly complex routes.

North Korea uses a worldwide network to

facilitate arms sales activities and has had a

core, but now dwindling, group of customers

that include Iran, Syria, and Uganda. Other

customers, such as Sudan, have recently

agreed to end arms cooperation with Pyong-

yang.

296,297

North Korea has transferred ballis-

tic missile–related equipment, components,

materials, and technical assistance to coun-

tries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Conventional weapons sales have included

ammunition, small arms, radars, and SAMs

as well as related repairs, technical support

services, and military equipment production

facilities.

298,299

In late 2009, North Korea was

implicated in the attempted sale of rock-

et-propelled grenades and other weapons to

Iran or possibly to Hizballah when Thailand

interdicted and seized a cargo plane laden

with arms.

300

In 2013, a North Korean ship,

the Chong Chon Gang, was held by Pana-

manian authorities as it attempted to tran-

sit the Panama Canal laden with 240 tons

of military equipment, including a MiG-21

ghter aircraft, concealed under a licit cargo

shipment of sugar. North Korea claimed that

it was repairing the equipment for Cuba.

301

In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients for

North Korea’s ballistic missiles and associated

technology have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya,

Pakistan, and Yemen.

302

Burma has begun dis-

tancing itself from North Korea, but concerns

remain regarding lingering arms trade ties

between the two countries.

303

North Korea uses various methods to circum-

vent UNSCRs,

304

including falsifying end-user

certicates,

305

mislabeling crates,

306

sending

cargo through multiple front companies and

intermediaries,

307

and using air cargo for deliv-

eries of high-value and sensitive arms exports.

308

North Korea has demonstrated a willingness

to proliferate nuclear technology.

309

Using the

proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear

scientist A.Q. Khan,

310

in early 2001, North

Korea provided Muamar Qada’s Libya with

North Korea’s Conventional Weapons and Missile-Related

Customers, 2002-2020 1707-13887

North Korea is a viable alternative for those countries that cannot obtain military equipment from other

suppliers because of sanctions or severe budgetary constraints. North Korean military sales to Iraq predate

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

uranium hexauoride

311

– the form of uranium

used in the uranium enrichment process to

produce fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear

weapons. This material was removed in 2004

by the United States and United Kingdom

under the terms of an agreement to eliminate

Libya’s nuclear weapons program.

312,313

North

Korea also provided Syria with nuclear reactor

technology until 2007.

314, 315

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

AAA Anti-aircraft artillery

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

BW Biological weapons

CMC Central Military Commission

CRBM Close-range ballistic missile

CW Chemical weapons

C3I

Command, control, communications,

and intelligence

D&D Denial and deception

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GPS Global Positioning System

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile

IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile

KPA Korean People’s Army

MANPADS Man-portable air defense system

MND Ministry of National Defense

MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile

MRLS Multiple rocket launcher system

MSS Ministry of State Security

MWe Megawatts electrical

RGB Reconnaissance General Bureau

RMTU Reserve Military Training Unit

RYG Red Youth Guard

SAC State Affairs Commission

SAM Surface-to-air missile

SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLV Space launch vehicle

SOF Special Operations Forces

SRBM Short-range ballistic missile

TEL Transporter-erector-launcher

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle

UGF Underground facility

UN United Nations

UNSCR

United Nations Security Council

Resolution

WPRG Worker Peasant Red Guard

ACRONYMS

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

NORTH KOREA MILITARY POWER

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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