South Korean Efforts to Counter North Korean Aggression

CSDS Trinity Site Papers

August 2018

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Recent North Korean nuclear aggression has raised debates

about how the United States should secure its interests in North-

east Asia. However, any action on the peninsula should consid-

er the security preferences of American allies, especially the

Republic of Korea (ROK). With militaristic rhetoric coming

from the Trump administration, the question arises of how im-

portant U.S. policy is to the actions of our Korean allies in

countering North Korean (DPRK) nuclear aggression. Thus, it

is important to review nuclear crises of the past and the align-

ment of U.S. and ROK policy toward Pyongyang. This paper

reviews three periods of nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula

and argues that U.S. military policy is not the sole factor deter-

mining South Korean response to DPRK nuclear provocation.

South Korea’s strategic culture of self-reliance drives non-

nuclear diplomatic and military responses while allowing Seoul

to depend on the U.S. alliance for its nuclear deterrent.

— Background —

In July 1953, North Korea agreed to the Korean Armistice

that initiated a formal cessation of hostilities between North and

South Korea. Three months later, the United States and the Re-

public of Korea signed their own bilateral agreement. The Mu-

tual Defense Treaty (MDT) created a defense alliance that has

lasted more than 60 years. In the treaty, the United States and

South Korea pledged to consult each other when the security of

either state is threatened (Art. II). Specifically, the two countries

are to “maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed

attack,” (Art. II), and act together to meet dangers to lawfully

recognized territories (Art. III).

Furthermore, in Article IV of

the treaty, South Korea granted the United States “the right to

dispose U.S. land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of

the Republic of Korea.”

While the MDT does not directly address extended nuclear

deterrence, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has been an accepted part

of the alliance nearly since its inception. Since 1953, consecu-

tive American presidents have maintained the policy of a strong

U.S.-ROK alliance backed by U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.

Prior to the armistice, President Dwight Eisenhower signaled

his willingness to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean Con-

flict. He then reiterated his resolve should China and North Ko-

rea reinitiate hostilities.

From 1958 to 1991, the United States

stationed nuclear artillery, bombs, and missiles in South Korea

to counter a North Korean invasion.

Further, in 1975 the Ford

administration affirmed that the United States would consider

the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict “likely to result in de-

feat in any area of great importance to the United States in Asia

… including Korea.”

It was not until 1978 at the 11th Security Consultative

Mechanism (SCM) that extended nuclear deterrence was for-

mally included in the alliance where a joint communique en-

dorsed the continued role of “the nuclear umbrella.”

More than

three decades later, the 2009 SCM continued to reaffirm this

stance promising, “To provide extended deterrence for the

ROK, using the full range of military capabilities, to include the

U.S. nuclear umbrella.”

The 2016 establishment of the Extend-

ed Deterrence and Strategy Consultation Group, which

“provides a forum for comprehensive discussions on strategic

and policy issues regarding extended deterrence against North

Korea” also demonstrates the growing importance of extended

deterrence in the alliance.

Hence, while not initially a formal

part of the mutual defense treaty, both the action and words of

the alliance have confirmed America’s extended nuclear com-

mitment to South Korea.

Within the last 25 years, North Korea’s nuclear actions

have tested the resolve of the MDT and America’s nuclear um-

brella. Three crises have demonstrated the ROK’s approach to

dealing with a nuclear Pyongyang. The First Nuclear Crisis

began in 1992 when North Korea threatened to pull out of the

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop its own

nuclear weapons. This period was highlighted by eventual dip-

lomatic alignment between the United States and South Korea,

resulting in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework to dismantle

North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for alternative en-

ergy sources. The Second Nuclear Crisis, from 2003 to 2007,

was characterized by increased hostility between the George W.

South Korean Efforts to Counter North

Korean Aggression

By Major Aaron C. Baum, USAF

http://www.au.af.mil/au/csds/

The

Trinity Site

Papers

Major Aaron C. Baum is a student at the Air Command and Staff College at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

CSDS Trinity Site Papers

August 2018

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Bush administration and North Korea. Pyongyang launched

several ballistic missiles and tested its first nuclear bomb during

this period. Finally, starting in 2008, there has been growing

apprehension over North Korean nuclear weaponization in what

I call the Third Nuclear Crisis. This period includes overt mis-

sile and nuclear weapons testing by North Korea countered by

continued South Korean engagement and a modernized conven-

tional deterrent.

— Research Framework —

The U.S.-ROK alliance has been the center of increasing

debate since the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT.

Experts have stressed that Pyongyang’s nuclear program expan-

sion presents a serious challenge to the United States and South

Korea.

Accordingly, U.S. defense officials have asked what a

redesigned security posture in the Pacific today should look

like. To answer this question, we must first understand what has

worked for U.S. policy in South Korea. How has U.S. policy

affected how the Republic of Korea feels about security vis-a-

vis North Korea? How much influence does U.S. policy have on

South Korean responses to DPRK nuclear aggression? Seeing

that the Korean peninsula has a history of seeking independence

in security, U.S. influence may not be what some American

policymakers believe. South Korea’s strategic culture of inde-

pendence and pragmatism allows for both great power reliance

as well as independence through indigenous security force de-

velopment. So where does the South Korean strategic culture of

self-reliance play into its response? Taking into account strate-

gic culture, what effect has U.S. military policy had on ROK

efforts to counter a North Korean nuclear threat?

I seek to understand how military policy regarding U.S.

extended deterrence and the alliance affect this balance of au-

tonomy and reliance. I argue that U.S. policy is not the sole

factor determining South Korea’s response to North Korean

nuclear aggression. The hypotheses tested are as follow:

(H1) South Korean strategic culture of self-reliance drives

diplomacy in response to North Korean nuclear aggression.

(H2) South Korean strategic culture drives non-nuclear

military responses to North Korean nuclear aggression.

(H3) South Korean strategic culture allows for continued

dependence on the U.S. alliance for nuclear deterrence.

Based on these hypotheses, I show that U.S. military policy

has taken less of a determinant role in influencing South Ko-

rea’s responses to a nuclear DPRK. I analyze ROK diplomatic

and military actions compared with U.S. responses during three

periods of North Korean nuclear hostility. I use artifacts of stra-

tegic culture tied to the decisions the ROK makes during these

periods. Because strategic culture manifests itself through lan-

guage and statements, my research is based on polls, news arti-

cles, press releases, and government reports.

First, I review ROK responses, diplomatic and militarily,

from the First Nuclear Crisis of 1992 to 2003. During this peri-

od, South Korean diplomatic responses both shaped and fol-

lowed U.S. policy. Its military responses took a defensive pos-

ture, though weapons development and policy suggests regional

aims beyond North Korea. Secondly, I cover the period of

Pyongyang’s nuclear threat in what is known as the Second

Nuclear Crisis. While U.S.-ROK diplomatic approaches to the

crisis were at odds during this period, South Korea maintained

its military modernization in support of the alliance, taking into

consideration the North Korean threat as well as regional inde-

pendence. Finally, I review the growing Third Nuclear Crisis

from 2008 to 2017 as North Korea actively sought to weaponize

its nuclear program. During this period, South Korea openly

developed a modern three-tiered conventional deterrent against

North Korea.

Through all three crises, South Korea maintained a prefer-

ence for engagement with North Korea, though its military de-

velopment was not always focused solely on the DPRK. Aside

from the diplomatic and conventional military responses, I seek

to understand why the ROK has not developed a nuclear pro-

gram, though it has the capability to do so. In the 1970s, Seoul

sought an indigenous nuclear weapons program, but in 1975, it

abandoned its designs and signed the NPT. Since then, it has

relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, though some argue that

Seoul has the potential technical capability to quickly produce

its own nuclear weapons.

— Strategic Culture Theory —

My research develops through the lens of strategic culture

theory. A state’s strategic culture is based on its fundamental

beliefs about war and its preferences for security planning and

conflict resolution.

A state’s history, geography, resources,

military, religion, and values all play into its decisions regard-

ing security. Alastair Johnston defines strategic culture as a

system of arguments, language, analogies, metaphors, and

symbols that establish preferences for security by conceptualiz-

ing the role of the military in political affairs.

Strategic culture

is what reifies the role of the military in politics for a group.

Johnston measures it as a group’s view on the role of war in

human affairs, the nature of the threat, and the efficacy of the

use of force.

Artifacts to measure strategic culture include

debates, policies, speeches, media, weapon decisions, and cere-

monies. The theory is not exclusive of realism’s rational actor

behavior, but argues that state utility calculations are influenced

by culture.

As Victor Cha explains, “As a predictive tool, strategic

culture does not predetermine behavior, but shapes it, offering

ideas on where the grooves are deepest and most well-trodden

with regard to future behavior.”

The implications are clear: by

following the grooves of South Korean strategic culture, U.S.

policy can maximize the efforts of the alliance, and build a uni-

fied response to the DPRK nuclear threat.

South Korean strategic culture is one of independence and

self-reliance. The entire Korean peninsula has a history of con-

quest and colonization. Geographically located between two

Asian powers – Japan to its east and China to its north and west

– Korea has been a victim of 5,000 years of power competition

with more than 900 invasions.

In the 20th century alone, Ko-

rea had several upheavals. It lost its sovereignty as a protec-

torate of Japan in 1905. By 1910, Japan had fully colonized the

peninsula. When Japan was defeated in World War II, Soviet

and American occupation divided Korea at the 38th parallel.

Within five years, the Korean Conflict broke out backed by the

Chinese in the North and the United States in the South. As Cha

points out, the ROK’s “push for more self-reliant defense capa-

bilities, autonomy, and alternative military suppliers found in

Korean force improvement plans are a perfectly natural re-

sponse to the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era.”

Con-

stantly caught up between battling powers due to its geographic

significance, South Korea has developed a culture that looks

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inwards for its own security.

Notwithstanding this independent attitude, South Korea

recognizes the pragmatic value of alliances and diplomacy. Cha

points out that historically, order in the region is kept through

great power competition or cooperation, both of which tend to

exploit or exclude smaller powers like Korea.

So in order to

survive and provide for its own security, Korea has historically

looked to diplomacy and military alignments with great powers.

Bilateral alliances with great powers was the only way to sur-

vive. Historically, China was the guarantor of that protection,

though Korea’s relationship with China during these periods

was one of vassal or protectorate and not the alliance between

two sovereign nations. Today, the United States is the great

power of choice for South Korea, even though some South Ko-

reans have manifested anti-Americanism at different times. Shin

and Izatt argue, though, that anti-Americanism does not neces-

sarily cause anti-alliance sentiments.

Similarly, Haesook Chae

concludes that regardless of anti-Americanism, most South Ko-

reans prefer maintaining or even strengthening the U.S. alliance

to secure against and eventually denuclearize North Korea.

Andrew O’Neil argues that faced with a security environment

with possible threats from China, Japan, and especially North

Korea, the ROK wants to maintain its alliance with the United

States to benefit from its extended nuclear deterrent policy.

Thus, while independence is central to South Korean culture,

practicality plays a role as well. This balance of independence

and reliance shows that strategic culture does not negate a

state’s realistic tendency toward rational preference, but it does

shape it.

Clearly, the South Korean strategic culture of self-reliance

does not completely exclude space for alliances. Cha describes

this balance of autonomy and great power dependence as

“assertive bilateralism,” in which South Korea seeks to develop

its own security under the protection of U.S. defense.

Howev-

er, independent development does not go unchecked. Cha reiter-

ated, “If one employs a cultural interpretation, ROK behavior,

while different and unsettling for the alliance, will be bounded

at the extreme by its own constraints on strategic choice.”

other words, ROK pragmatism may constrain its preferences

for self-reliance on the far edges of the spectrum. Indigenous

nuclear weapons may be considered an extreme that is con-

strained by the republic’s practical dependence on U.S. extend-

ed deterrence.

— 1992-2003: The First Nuclear Crisis —

The First Nuclear Crisis began in 1992 when North Korea

refused International Atomic Energy Agency special inspec-

tions and threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Then ROK

President Kim Young-Sam’s diplomatic response was criticized

for its inconsistency.

Seeing an opening with the possible re-

gime collapse after Kim Il-Sung’s death, President Kim Young-

Sam felt a hardline stance would better position the ROK for

negotiations. Thus, he held that the United States and South

Korea should show resolve against the DPRK and await its col-

lapse. In response to the U.S. proposal to exchange light water

reactors for North Korea’s commitment to abandon its nuclear

bomb program in the Basic Agreement, President Kim Young-

Sam strongly opposed the negotiations as a “half-baked com-

promise” that “might prolong the life of the North Korean gov-

ernment,” “send the wrong signal to its leaders” and “bring

more danger and peril.”

Coming to power in 1998, President Kim Dae-jung’s

“sunshine policy” broke with the previous administration’s

hardline approach to counter Pyongyang’s nuclear development

and aligned more with U.S. President Bill Clinton’s diplomatic

approach of negotiations without prior DPRK concessions. This

sunshine policy of engaging North Korea and encouraging re-

gional reconciliation sought to expand South Korea’s regional

leadership role and resulted in the inter-Korean summit in 2000.

It also guided the greater regional vision promoted by Seoul’s

next president, Roh Moo-hyun to create South Korea as the

center of regional economic and security cooperation. Both Kim

and Roh carried the vision that North Korea was a key partner

for regional integration and independence “rather than the main

enemy to fight.”

Throughout this period, South Korean diplomatic efforts,

even the hardline policies, demonstrate that ROK leadership did

not see the North’s nuclear program as an immediate threat to

South Korean security. Andrew Pollack pointed to the lack of

any spikes in noodle sales in 1994 despite North Korea’s threats

of war as evidence that South Koreans did not see the North’s

atomic threats as dangerous. Historically, “even a hint of war

sent consumers rushing to stock up on dried noodles.

In the

hardline Kim Young-Sam presidency, as well as the more pro-

gressive tenures of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, South

Korean diplomatic responses revealed ROK voices in the alli-

ance’s approach to North Korea. Though at times this voice

differed from the United States, South Korea likely followed

along with U.S. diplomacy. The fear of nuclear war with

Pyongyang was not high enough to risk threatening the alliance

with Washington.

A large volume of literature addresses the diplomacy car-

ried out with North Korea during the first crisis. However, less

work has been done to analyze Seoul’s defense activities.

As the

nuclear threat was benign in the eyes of the ROK, its military

policy was one of defense. From a military perspective, South

Korea’s security initiatives demonstrated redundancy in defense

systems evident of its strategic culture of self-reliance. While

South Korea did not seek its own nuclear weapons, it did ex-

pand its conventional military capabilities – some directed at

North Korea and others directed at establishing an autonomous

defense force. On the surface, ROK policy could be seen as

following U.S. policy. However, upon closer examination, there

is evidence these South Korean efforts were actually stemming

from a preference for self-reliance.

Seoul demonstrated independence in its military response

toward the DPRK during this period. At the beginning of the

crisis, the 1993-1994 ROK Defense White Paper, principally

focused on North Korea. It stated, “Our most important tasks

today are to prepare for the existing threat from the North and to

strengthen our self-reliant defense capabilities.”

Further, it

explained, “Faced with a North Korean military threat, our

armed forces are making their utmost effort to establish a solid

military deterrence posture. At the same time, in preparation for

the strategic environment that will come in the 21st century, we

are carrying out future oriented defense policies aimed at solidi-

fying our self-reliant defense capability to protect our national

interests.”

Thus, during the Kim Young-Sam years, the ROK

military policy was one of defense against the DPRK, while

moving toward greater defense autonomy in the future.

The ROK’s focus on a defensive posture was exemplified

in its response to U.S. plans for a limited surgical strike on

North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility in 1994. President

Kim argued against such an attack calling President Clinton to

say that an airstrike would “immediately prompt North Korea to

open fire against major South Korean cities from the border.”

Further, in March 1994, South Korea announced it would

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introduce Patriot anti-ballistic missile batteries as defense

against North Korean missiles.

These examples demonstrate a

military policy that opposed offensive actions and favored a

defensive posture with respect to North Korea. Such a policy

was likely a combination of the ROK not seeing the North Ko-

rean nuclear program as an immediate threat and fear of escala-

tion from limited offensive strikes to full-scale war. Moreover,

the response shows that U.S. policy did not drive a military re-

sponse. Instead, South Korea’s military response was deter-

mined by Seoul.

ROK military policy during the crisis gradually expanded

beyond North Korea to regional military independence. The

1997-1998 ROK Defense White Paper provided nuanced

changes to its 1993-1994 version. Its objectives were updated to

defend the nation “not only from the military threats of North

Korea, but also from all kinds of external military threats.”

Additionally, while it identified the ROK-U.S. alliance as the

“mainstay of Korea’s defense system,” it also set an objective to

achieve a regional advanced defense force built on the

“realization of a self-reliant defense posture” and modern weap-

ons systems.

Its air force and navy modernization during the

1990s exemplifies this desire for an autonomous capability.

Korea’s plans to modernize its air force during this period

demonstrate a preference for autonomy in defense. In Novem-

ber 1997, Seoul announced its F-X program to create an indige-

nous air superiority and deep strike capable aircraft. While deep

strike ability could act as a deterrent to a North Korean nuclear

strike, the program could also “turn the Republic of Korea into

a regional power within 20 years, with a view to holding its

own on the geopolitical scene after any reunification.”

Addi-

tionally, the ROK Air Force identified strategic intelligence

systems, airborne early warning and control systems, tanker

aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft and anti-tactical ballistic

missiles as systems that will follow the F-X program.

These

systems could detect a DPRK threat, warn South Korea, and

demonstrate the ability to strike the North, should it act aggres-

sively. Finally, in 1999, Korea initiated development on an in-

digenous stealth material program that “satisfied about 70 per-

cent of operational requirements of the country’s military.”

Each of these developments would increase South Korea’s abil-

ity to strike the North, and also serve to establish the ROK as a

modern independent regional force.

As Jong Kun Choi and Jon-Yun Bae explained, “Since

1994, South Korea’s military has focused on enhancing its con-

ventional deterrence capacity in addition to securing the extend-

ed deterrence from the United States. The various governments

of South Korea, regardless of their ideological orientation, have

exerted enormous efforts to modernize and upgrade South Ko-

rea’s military capabilities.”

While the United States certainly

already had the most advanced air forces in the world, South

Korea continued its path of conventional military modernization

to not only counter the DPRK nuclear threat, but to establish its

own autonomous defense force in Northeast Asia.

Conventional air modernization was not the only develop-

ment that demonstrated the South Korean strategic culture of

self-reliance. Naval modernization showed a desire for self-

reliant forces. However, unlike air development, naval moderni-

zation during the period was not focused on countering North

Korean nuclear aggression. The republic’s efforts toward a self-

reliant navy aimed at expanding South Korean military power

in the region. Through the 1990s, the ROK Navy primarily fo-

cused on protecting South Korean territorial waters and islands.

In June 1993, it commissioned the Changbogoham, a 1,200-ton

imported submarine. A year later, the ROK deployed its first

domestically built submarine.

By the end of the century, South

Korea had begun a naval expansion for protection beyond its

regional waters. In 1999, the Ministry of National Defense

announced the ROK Navy would procure three Aegis-class

destroyers in addition to its small fleet of landing craft to sup-

port its ROK Marine Corps operations. Additionally, it began

planning for Korean versions of a destroyer, a heavy landing

ship, and mine-laying and mine-hunting ships.

Andrew O’Neil

suggested these naval modernizations were less focused on

North Korea, and more to establish the ROK as a regional pow-

er capable of independent blue-water operations.

Thus, alt-

hough South Korean strategic culture still drove efforts toward

an autonomous navy, maritime modernization was not aimed at

countering DPRK nuclear aggression.

As opposed to conventional developments, Seoul did not

seek to develop indigenous nuclear weapons. While Seoul had

secretly procured a weapons programs in the 1970s and 1980s,

it did not see its own nuclear program as necessary for autono-

mous defense during the First Nuclear Crisis. Surveys of South

Korean society provide some reasons. A poll by Gi Wook Shin

highlighted that even college students – the most anti-American

group – acknowledged the American alliance contribution to

Korean national security.

His survey showed a majority of

students supportive of American military forces remaining on

the Korean peninsula rather than withdrawing immediately (55

percent to 36 percent).

Additionally, Choi and Bae explained,

“South Korea is constrained by formidable anti-nuclear social

norms as well as an alliance structure that has discouraged their

development.”

In 1991, President Roh Tae-woo announced ROK’s unwill-

ingness to “manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear

weapons.”

Similarly, in 1993 when President Kim Young-Sam

was asked if he would categorically rule out development of

South Korea’s own nuclear weapons, he responded,

“Absolutely. That would disrupt peace in Northeast Asia and

peace in the world at large.”

Etel Solingen summarized,

“Despite a North Korean threat to turn Seoul into a ‘sea of fire,’

there seems to be little popular and governmental support for a

South Korean nuclear deterrent.”

North Korean nuclear pro-

grams were not seen as grave enough to merit South Korean

nuclear weapons. An indigenous nuclear program was not only

contrary to what the South Korea’s populace and government

felt they needed, but it would also add little to the alliance’s

existing deterrent structure and would likely only lead to more

instability in Northeast Asia.

Thus, the republic sought to balance the U.S. nuclear deter-

rent with a modern conventional aerial deterrent. This balance

of dependence and autonomy is best summarized in the joint

communique from the 28th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative

Meeting in November 1996 between U.S. Defense Secretary

William Perry and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim

Dong Jin. In it, “Secretary Perry reaffirmed the U.S. commit-

ment to render prompt and effective assistance to repel any

armed attack against the ROK … and to provide a nuclear um-

brella for the ROK. Minister Kim reaffirmed that the ROK will

continue to modernize its armed forced and to assume increased

responsibility for its own defense.”

The U.S. nuclear umbrella

along with ROK’s conventional weapons development filled

requirements that addressed not only North Korea’s threat, but

also Seoul’s desire to establish a self-reliant force.

The First Nuclear Crisis provides evidence that U.S. policy

has not been the sole factor determining South Korea’s respons-

es to North Korea’s nuclear aggression. Although the United

States had the military capability to protect South Korea, Seoul

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sought an independent military. Seoul envisioned this self-

reliant force as being able to respond to North Korea’s nuclear

threats. While Seoul did not reinitiate a nuclear weapons pro-

gram from decades past in the face of the First Nuclear Crisis, it

followed its own policy regarding conventional weapons as

demonstrated by its air modernization programs. South Korean

polls and leadership statements show that the country saw an

indigenous nuclear program as unnecessary and destabilizing.

While U.S. extended deterrence seems to have satisfied Seoul at

one end of the spectrum, conventionally, South Korea sought

conventional deterrence through an air force capable of striking

anywhere in North Korea. Conflicts arising between South

Korea’s preference for diplomatic engagement and the Bush

administration’s handling of the Second Nuclear Crisis demon-

strate even greater autonomy in Seoul’s efforts to counter North

Korea’s nuclear aggression.

— 2003-2007: The Second Nuclear Crisis —

The Second Nuclear Crisis began in late 2002 when North

Korea allegedly admitted that it had a secret nuclear weapons

program based on highly enriched uranium, in violation of the

soon to be defunct Agreed Framework. Through the next five

years, North Korea announced it had nuclear weapons, launched

seven ballistic missiles, and tested its first nuclear weapon.

However, major factors affecting this crisis trace back to 2001

and the George W. Bush administration’s hardline policy to-

ward North Korea.

Contrary to the Clinton administration’s ultimate policy of

engaging Pyongyang diplomatically in order to denuclearize,

President Bush’s policy sought to coerce Pyongyang by refus-

ing direct engagement until Pyongyang stood down its nuclear

program. This was particularly alarming to North Korea in the

face of the administration’s preemptive attack policy and re-

gime change threats. President Bush specifically called out

North Korea in his first State of the Union address saying,

“North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of

mass destruction … States like these, and their terrorist allies,

constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the

world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes

pose a grave and growing danger.”

Additionally, soon after

Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime fell, Bush announced,

“Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with

weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on mis-

siles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot put

our faith in the words of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-

proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them.”

Consequently, President Bush’s policy was at odds with

South Korea in countering the North Korean nuclear issue. Poll-

ing in 2004 showed that while 80 percent of South Koreans

would approve of a U.S.-led preemptive attack on North Korea

if the United Nations, South Korean government, and other al-

lies agreed, the numbers dropped precipitously if any of those

conditions were not reached.

If the United Nations and South

Korea approved and allies did not, the approval dropped to 38

percent while any combination without United Nations or South

Korean approval ranged from nine percent to 27 percent ap-

proval.

According to another report in May 2002, only 56

percent of the respondents wanted to maintain the alliance –

down significantly from 89 percent in 1999.

Korean nationalism and a desire for South Korea to play an

independent regional role “was on a collision course with the

Bush administration’s hardline approach.”

This played out in

the Roh administration statements that increasingly countered

President Bush’s policy. President Roh was sympathetic to

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons pursuit as a tool to deter external

aggression. He stated, “North Korea’s nuclear weapons pursuit

cannot be viewed as an instrument to attack ... or to assist ter-

rorist groups”

and ‘taking too tough a stance against North

Korea could cause friction and disagreement between South

Korea and the United States.”

Additionally, in 2003, President

Roh’s envoy to Washington revealed that Seoul “would rather

have a nuclear North Korea than a chaotic collapse of the gov-

ernment there.”

Thus, while the Bush administration took on a more hostile

approach, Seoul maintained its course of engagement. To build

relations with Pyongyang, the Roh government encouraged

other regional countries to interact with North Korea and en-

gaged in the joint Kaesong industrial park as part of his Peace

and Prosperity policy.

His Unification Minister Chung Dong-

young also announced that Seoul would “play a leadership role

in managing the North Korean issue, rather than meekly em-

bracing the U.S. approach.”

Despite even North Korea’s first

underground nuclear test in 2006, Seoul maintained this path of

diplomatic independence. In response to the test, along with

Russia and China, South Korea remained opposed to the use of

force for fear of escalating the situation out of control.

South

Korean Prime Minister Han Myung Sook said Seoul would sup-

port U.N. sanctions, but “not military action that could spread

into a war on the divided, densely armed Korean Peninsula.”

Because the paths of diplomatic policy and military action

were at odds between the two countries, South Korea had to

strike a balance to maintain the U.S. alliance while still demon-

strating its culture of independence in regional security. In his

U.N. General Assembly speech in 2004, South Korean Foreign

Minister Ban Ki-Moon called for Pyongyang to cease its nucle-

ar activities, while also declaring that inter-Korean exchanges

and cooperation would continue.

Similarly, in 2006, President

Roh stated, “There is no difference in views between Korea and

the United States … but the Korean government does not agree

to the opinions of some in Washington who wish for a collapse

of the North Korean regime or their attempts to pressure it.”

Throughout the period, South Korea sought to establish its inde-

pendence in security matters by maintaining its policy of en-

gagement without alienating the military alliance.

One way South Korea maintained the U.S. military alliance

throughout the period without resorting to force was to continue

development of a conventional force capable of countering

North Korea. Historically, the United States has strengthened

the bilateral alliance by actively supporting the improvement of

ROK armed forces. Thus, announced in 2005, South Korea’s

Defense Reform 2020 Plan aligned military modernization with

U.S. support, while also creating an independent regional force.

Further, the 2008 ROK Defense White Paper highlighted, “We

will continue to build an all-directional military readiness and

defense capabilities that enable us to protect our nation against

not only North Korea’s military threats, but against all threats

across the spectrum. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will evolve into a

future-oriented strategic alliance.”

Again, naval and aerial modernization demonstrate the

South Korean preference for security independence while bal-

ancing the U.S. military alliance against North Korea. President

Roh carried on President Kim Dae-jung’s vision for a blue-

water navy as part of the plan that would, by 2020, become a

navy with 70 ships to include destroyers, submarines and Aegis

cruisers, and double the aircraft.

To highlight Seoul’s desire

for an autonomous navy, South Korea developed six DDH-II

destroyers, one of which was commissioned each year from

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2003 to 2008. Not only were these stealth ships heavily armed,

but they were developed to be independent command ships in a

combat task force able to provide command and control during

battle for alliance forces.

Seoul’s naval modernization, as

President Lee Myung Bak stated in 2008, was part of Seoul’s

vision to “build a state-of-the-art force that can protect our mar-

itime sovereignty.”

As during the first crisis, a South Korean

blue-water navy would do little to counter DPRK nuclear ag-

gression, but it was to project ROK power within and beyond

the region.

Similarly, South Korea continued its major modernization

in its air force. In 2004, 40 F-X jets were to begin filling ROK

Air Force inventories as well as replacing older existing heli-

copters with Korea’s next-generation attack helicopter.

Addi-

tionally, ROK defense planned to acquire four Airborne Warn-

ing and Control System (AWACS) by 2008.

Finally, during

this period the ROK decided to pursue missile defense, creating

a command and budget for Patriot missile defense systems.

However, South Korea sought to build it independently out of

concern that U.S. cooperation would affect its relations with

China.

Under Defense Reform 2020, the ROK Air Force vi-

sion was to have an organizational structure for air superiority

and precision strikes capable of constant vigilance and immedi-

ate response, to include retaliatory strikes during peacetime.

Once again, the ROK Air Force modernization focused on the

ability to strike and punish North Korea in order to bolster its

conventional deterrent.

While South Korea continued its modernization of conven-

tional weapons, it restrained from developing nuclear weapons

during the years of the Second Nuclear Crisis. Polling of South

Korean perceptions provides insight into ROK nuclear opinions.

In 2004, while 59 percent of South Koreans rated a nuclear

North Korea as a “critical threat” to South Korea’s strategic

interests,

most South Koreans (60 percent) opposed U.S. em-

ployment of nuclear weapons under any circumstance.

Yet

despite this strong opposition, a slight majority (51 percent)

agreed that South Korea should have nuclear weapons.

This

number increased dramatically following the DPRK’s first nu-

clear test when 65 percent of South Korean respondents held

that an indigenous nuclear capability was necessary.

However, statements from ROK leadership demonstrated

Seoul’s confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent muting pro-

posals for an indigenous nuclear program. President Moo-hyun

said, “The United States has promised to guarantee deterrence

against North Korea’s nuclear weapons and we’re maintaining

our relations with the United States in that direction.”

Similar-

ly, the U.S.-South Korea joint communique following North

Korea’s first nuclear test, included “assurances of firm U.S.

commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including con-

tinuation of the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear

umbrella.”

Thus, despite growing interest in a nuclear pro-

gram, South Korea’s military efforts remained concentrated on

conventional deterring North Korea and establishing a self-

reliant force capable of projecting regional power. This force

would continue to remain dependent on the assurances of U.S.

extended nuclear deterrence.

— 2008 to Present: A Growing Third Nuclear

Crisis —

The current growing nuclear crisis is directly linked to

North Korea’s intense weaponization programs. At the end of

2007, as part of the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang promised to

provide a “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear

programs” and to disable its nuclear facilities.

However, North

Korea’s continued aggression escalated tensions once again on

the peninsula. Along with Pyongyang’s continued ballistic mis-

sile tests, North Korea sank the ROK ship Cheonan and shelled

Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. It also carried out its second, third,

and fourth nuclear tests in in 2009, 2013, and 2016 respectively.

This growing crisis revealed that even with a conservative party

leadership, South Korea’s preference for diplomacy and defense

independence remained, while demonstrating an increasingly

popular support for indigenous nuclear weapons.

Even with the election of the ROK’s first conservative

president in a decade, Lee Myung-bak, South Korea continued

to show its preference for diplomacy, though now it was re-

vealed as more coercive than the “carrot” methods of his prede-

cessors. Diplomacy during this period mirrored the President

George W. Bush administration’s policy of requiring progress

toward denuclearization, prior to compromises by Seoul. How-

ever, in 2009, following Pyongyang’s second nuclear test, polls

still showed more than 73 percent of South Koreans still sup-

ported an engagement policy with North Korea giving credence

to the idea that diplomacy remains South Korea’s preference

even with eventual North Korean weaponization.

In 2010,

following the sinking of the Cheonan and the North’s provoca-

tions on Yeonpyeong, South Korea ceased diplomatic engage-

ment, cut almost all trade with the North, and rallied interna-

tional support for sanctions against Pyongyang.

Further, alt-

hough recognizing diplomacy was needed, South Korea refused

to return to Six-Party Talks until Pyongyang showed commit-

ment to denuclearization and accepted responsibility for the two

incidents.

In 2011, President Lee Myung-bak proposed an invitation

for Pyongyang to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit to restart

talks, yet maintained the North “must acknowledge its wrong-

doings [for the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong]” and “allow back

nuclear inspectors and halt its uranium enrichment program.”

In the years that followed from 2012 to 2017, North Korea’s

two nuclear tests and multiple ballistic missile launches were

met with South Korean support for sanctions. Finally, in 2017

the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure and engage-

ment” policy met with the ROK’s new Moon administration’s

efforts to engage North Korea and include China in a diplomatic

solution. Thus, throughout this period, South Korea tended to-

ward coercive diplomacy as opposed to appeasement to address

North Korean denuclearization, but still opposed military force

for conflict resolution.

During this period, polling showed a change in perception

regarding both Pyongyang and the United States from previous

periods. A 2011 survey revealed that South Koreans increasing-

ly saw North Koreans as the “enemy” rather than “one of us”

and nearly 68 percent thought North Korean nuclear weapons

were for nuclear blackmail not defense.

Additionally, a large

majority saw North Korea to blame for poor inter-Korean rela-

tions and the failure of progress in finding a resolution to the

nuclear crisis.

Finally, polling showed the United States as

most favorable nation and North Korea scoring the least favora-

ble.

These reports showed a shift of enmity and blame from

the United States to Pyongyang and high regard for the U.S.

military alliance.

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In addition to showing a continued preference for diploma-

cy, the newest crisis again demonstrated South Korea’s culture

for military independence. With a conservative government, the

republic remained focused on military modernization to create

an independent conventional force, but also countered North

Korea with small-scale military responses. For example, the day

after North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, Seoul an-

nounced it would participate in the Proliferation Security Initia-

tive, a U.S. policy, which allows states “to search and interdict

North Korean ships and aircraft for contraband items (the weap-

ons of mass destruction, missiles, and illegal weapons) on and

over the high seas.”

Despite pressure from the Bush admin-

istration, Seoul had previously refused to participate in the initi-

ative during the Second Nuclear Crisis. Additionally, in 2014

following North Korea’s announcement of a new form of nucle-

ar testing, the North and South exchanged fire of hundreds of

artillery shells, though the artillery fell harmlessly into the

Western Sea.

In 2016, South Korea announced a new modernization pro-

gram to develop a conventional deterrent response alongside the

U.S. nuclear deterrent. A key area of South Korea’s convention-

al response was through a three-pillar system to be fully opera-

tional in the 2020s. Though different parts of the system have

been in the works for years, this was the first formal declaration

of the three-pillared plan.

The first pillar, Kill Chain is a system of satellites and mis-

siles to detect and pre-emptively strike DPRK missiles. Korean

Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) is the second pillar and is an

anti-ballistic missile system that complements the United States

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to intercept

North Korean ballistic missiles. Korea Massive Punishment and

Retaliation (KMPR), the third pillar, is a plan to retaliate and

punish North Korea with missiles in case of a North Korean

strike.

South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo told the

ROK National Assembly, “The military is developing the three-

pillar system that will provide tailored measures to deter threats

from the North’s weapons of mass destruction.”

Similarly,

President Moon reiterated the “needs to develop our military

capabilities in the face of North Korea’s nuclear advance-

ment.”

Through developing precise retaliatory capabilities and

robust missile defense, Seoul demonstrated its independence in

creating a punitive and denial-focused deterrent force aimed at

North Korea.

While creating an independent conventional deterrent,

Seoul has maintained its reliance on the U.S. alliance for nucle-

ar deterrence. However, growing calls for nuclear weapons in

South Korea demonstrate the country’s preference for inde-

pendent defense. O’Neil highlights that the Cheonan and

Yeonpyeong provocations in 2010 reduced the credibility of

U.S. extended deterrence. As a result, the Extended Deterrence

Policy Committee (EDPC) was created “to develop a tailored

bilateral deterrence strategy … to enhance effective deterrence

options against the nuclear and WMD threats from North Ko-

rea.”

One of the EDPC’s first actions was to review the possi-

bility of redeploying American tactical nuclear weapons to

South Korea.

Polling the following year showed almost 63

percent of South Korean respondents supported an indigenous

nuclear weapons program.

While public support for nuclear

weapons subsided since the 2010 provocations, it resurfaced in

the face of Pyongyang’s further nuclear aggression in 2017

when polling showed nearly 70 percent of South Koreans want-

ed the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons

and 60 percent approved of an indigenous ROK nuclear weap-

ons program

– up from 54 percent in 2016.

Nuclear weapons acquisition also became an increasingly

acceptable political platform. Former presidential secretary for

security strategy, Cheon Seong-whun, said, “If we don’t re-

spond with our own nuclear deterrence of some kind, our peo-

ple will live like nuclear hostages of North Korea.”

Addition-

ally, opposition party leader Won Yoo-chul implied there was a

growing need for the ROK to have its own nuclear weapons: “If

the U.N. Security Council can’t rein in North Korea with its

sanctions, we will have no option, but to withdraw from the

Nonproliferation Treaty.”

Even President Moon Jae-in’s defense minister broached

the idea of accepting U.S. tactical nuclear weapons saying that

“the redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons would

be the surest way” to deter North Korea.

However, in the face

of growing support for nuclear weapons, President Moon reiter-

ated Seoul’s stance on nuclear weapons, stating, “I do not agree

that South Korea needs to develop our own nuclear weapons or

relocate tactical nuclear weapons in the face of North Korea’s

nuclear threat.”

100

Moon sees nuclear weapons on South Korean

soil as adding little to the combination of ROK’s conventional

deterrent and U.S. extended deterrent. Further nuclear weapons,

in his eyes, would lead to instability in Northeast Asia.

101

— Analysis —

While all three nuclear crises developed under separate

circumstances, certain trends emerge showing South Korean

strategic culture in its responses to North Korean nuclear ag-

gression. First, in support of Hypothesis 1, South Korea has

maintained a preference for diplomacy and an aversion to war

with regards to a nuclear North Korea. Based on polling and

South Korean leadership statements, during years of both con-

servative and progressive party power, Seoul has not sought an

offensive military response to North Korea. Either North Kore-

an nuclear programs are not viewed as a large enough threat to

risk offensive military aggression or South Korea fears escalat-

ing a war that would disrupt South Korea’s regional progress.

This preference for diplomacy, and even the type of engage-

ments sought, have at times conflicted with American responses

throughout the crises. Yet interestingly, it was U.S. policy that

changed to fall in line with ROK after President Clinton’s plans

for surgical military strikes.

Supporting Hypothesis 2, the ROK has consistently pos-

tured for defense and deterrence in its conventional military

responses to a nuclear DPRK. This approach was contrary to

early U.S. plans to strike the Yongbyon nuclear facility and is

manifested in its weapons development. Through all three peri-

ods, South Korea has balanced its autonomy with the alliance

by military modernization. ROK Air Force modernizations

tended to focus on deterring North Korea through deep preci-

sion strikes, air superiority, and ballistic missile defense. These

same weapons would prove less useful against a greater threat,

such as the Chinese, but they could be used in both denial and

retaliatory deterrent functions. At the same time, the ROK has

modernized its navy. However, maritime development is less

focused on deterring North Korean nuclear aggression, and in-

stead on its goals of regional autonomy while still supporting

the alliance.

Finally, in support of Hypothesis 3, while creating its own

conventional deterrent, Seoul has remained supportive of U.S.

extended nuclear deterrence. South Korea’s stance did not

change throughout the crises, even when the Korean public and

government officials heavily favored indigenous nuclear weap-

ons. Once again, this could be the ROK’s way of balancing a

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self-reliant force without alienating or denigrating the nuclear

capabilities that the United States brings to the alliance. Howev-

er, growing support for nuclear weapons deployed on South

Korea showed that the future constraints against nuclear weap-

ons might weaken as the ROK continues its path toward a com-

pletely self-reliant force. In all, analysis of the three periods

refutes the idea that U.S. policy is the sole driving force behind

South Korean responses to North Korea. Instead, the ROK’s

strategic culture of independence and self-reliance manifests

itself in the diplomatic and conventional military responses

while still leaving room for a pragmatic reliance on the U.S.

nuclear umbrella.

— Conclusion —

Debates will continue over the way forward on the Korean

Peninsula with Washington and Seoul likely not always seeing

eye to eye. By looking at the three periods, some general impli-

cations are revealed concerning diplomatic, conventional mili-

tary and nuclear response options. Throughout all three periods,

South Korea has supported diplomacy, though at times the en-

gagement approach has differed. This clear preference for di-

plomacy contradicts some of the rhetoric of the Donald Trump

administration, and Washington should be cautious not to iso-

late its South Korean allies when touting military options. The

United States and South Korea will need to continue to adjust

their engagement approaches to demonstrate a firm alliance. At

times, each country may need to compromise in drawing the

line of aggressive engagement with Pyongyang. Currently, both

Washington and Seoul support engagement with North Korea

backed by firm sanctions, but the compromised stance has yet

to approach the military options suggested by the current Amer-

ican administration.

Other implications emerge from the ROK’s military mod-

ernization. South Korea maintained its objective for independ-

ent defense on the conventional side through modernization of

its military. Although the United States traditionally encourages

its allies to build strong defense forces, South Korea has taken

its own path in producing a conventional three-pillared deterrent

against the DPRK, seemingly redundant to the U.S. nuclear

deterrent. The United States should seek to understand the

“why” behind the conventional deterrent. Is it a signal of re-

duced assurance of the nuclear umbrella, expanding flexible

options, or a sign of the ROK’s independence?

Military modernization provides insights into policy impli-

cations as well. The ROK Air Force modernization has particu-

larly been aimed at North Korea through deep strike fighters

and anti-ballistic missile systems postured for defense and retal-

iation. Thus, by pushing strong support for ROK air moderniza-

tion in defense responses, the United States could support a

denial and punishment deterrence strategy against North Korea,

which may appear less antagonistic to Pyongyang than pre-

emptive strikes. Additionally, Seoul’s air modernization began

in the 1990s, yet was not formally announced as part of its con-

ventional deterrence until the Third Nuclear Crisis period. The

United States should look at allied weapons acquisitions over

the long term so as not to be surprised when a formal strategy or

plan emerges based on years of weapons modernization.

Additionally, the current American administration has

shown wariness of allies being too dependent on the United

States, even suggesting free-riding. South Korea’s naval devel-

opments suggest that Seoul does not present a free-riding prob-

lem. While not aimed at countering a nuclear North Korea,

Seoul’s navy demonstrates a desire for taking responsibility for

regional security and supporting global operations. Instead of

suggesting free-riding, the United States needs to be increasing-

ly aware of the potential for South Korea to develop more ag-

gressive, independent offensive capabilities. Moreover, seeing

that regional power projection seems to be the focus of ROK

naval modernization, the United States should consider how a

growing ROK Navy might affect other U.S. alliances in the

region, in particular Japan.

Finally, from a nuclear response perspective, South Korean

public and political opinion showed an increasing favorability

for nuclear weapons. Though South Korea has been content to

rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, South Korean strategic cul-

ture of independence may eventually outweigh the pragmatic

benefits of American extended deterrence. If Seoul were to see

the DPRK nuclear program as critical to ROK national survival,

the United States should be prepared to offer nuclear options

that strengthen the alliance and still support the NPT. This may

mean redeploying nuclear weapons in the region to convince

Seoul not to seek its own independent nuclear weapons. How-

ever, given Seoul’s stance through the three periods, anything

beyond studies of possible United States reintroduction of nu-

clear weapons would be premature.

The U.S.-ROK alliance has been a solid partnership over

the last 60-plus years, with the United States providing both

conventional and nuclear forces to defend the region from

North Korean aggression. South Korea has shown in the last

two decades that in the face of increasing DPRK nuclear ag-

gression, it will not sit back and rely on U.S. military power.

North Korea is a threat to the United States. However, when

dealing with Pyongyang, the United States cannot forget that

North Korea is a threat to Seoul as well. Seoul may not always

see the threat the same way as Washington though. According-

ly, South Korean strategic culture has and will continue to play

a major role in determining its efforts to counter North Korean

nuclear provocation.

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— Notes — 
 
1. Department of State Publications, Mutual Defense Trea-
ty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, Oct. 1, 
1953 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957) 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp#1. 
 
2. Ibid. 
 
3. Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean 
War” 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988-1989): 50, 53, www3.nccu.edu.tw/
~lorenzo/Dingman%20Atomic%20Diplomacy.pdf. 
 
4. Kyle Mizokami, “Everything You Need to Know: The 
History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea,” The Nation-
al Interest, Sept. 9, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/everything-you-need-know-the-history-us-nuclear-
weapons-22224. At its highest, U.S. extended deterrence in 
South Korea numbered about 950 different nuclear weapons. 
 
5. Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the U.S. and Extended Nuclear  
Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the Twenty-First Century, 
(N.Y.: Routledge, 2013), 61. 
 
6. Ibid., 62. 
 
7. Ibid., 66. 
 
8. U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-ROK Hold Second 
Meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation 
Group,” U.S. Embassy and Consulate in in Korea, Jan. 18, 
2018, https://kr.usembassy.gov/united-states-rok-hold-second-
meeting-extended-deterrence-strategy-consultation-group/. 
 
9. Joel S. Wit and Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear 
Futures: Technology and Strategy,” North Korea’s Nuclear 
Futures Series, US-Korea Institute as School of Advanced In-
ternational Studies, (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins, 2015), 
7, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-
Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf. 
 
10. Nuclear Threat Initiative, South Korea Overview, Au-
gust 2017, www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea. 
 
11. Victor Cha, “Strategic Culture and the Military Mod-
ernization of South Korea, “Armed Forces and Society 28, no. 1 
(Fall 2001): 115. 
 
12. Alastair Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 
International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 46, 
www.jstor.org/stable/2539119. 
 
13. Ibid., 46. 
 
14. Cha, “Strategic Culture and the Military,” 114. 
 
15. Ibid., 115. 
 
16. Ibid., 116. 
 
17. Ibid., 118. 
 
18. Ibid., 117. 
 
19. Gi-Wook Shin and Hilary Jan Izatt, “Anti-American 
and Anti-Alliance Sentiments in South Korea,” Asian Survey 
51, no. 6 (November/December 2011): 1115, www.jstor.org/
stable/10.1525/as.2011.51.6.1113. 
 
20. Haesook Chae, “South Korean Attitudes toward the 
ROK-U.S. Alliance: Group Analysis,” PS: Political Science 
and Politics 43, no. 3 (July 2010): 500, www.jstor.org/
stable/25699357. 
 
21. Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear  
Deterrence, 68. 
 
22. Cha, “Strategic Culture and the Military,” 118. 
 
23. Ibid., 118. 
 
24. Jeong Woo Kil, “South Korea’s Policy Making Process 
on North Korea’s Nuclear Issue: A Random Note,” Global 
Problem Solving, Dec. 31, 1994, https://nautilus.org/global-
problem-solving/south-koreas-policy-making-process-on-north-
koreas-nuclear-issue-a-random-note/. 
 
25. James Sterngold, “South Korea President Lashes Out at 
U.S.,” The New York Times, Oct. 8, 1994, 
www.nytimes.com/1994/10/08/world/south-korea-president-
lashes-out-at-us.html. 
 
26. Il Hyun Cho, Global Rogues and Regional Orders: The 
Multidimensional Challenge of North Korea and Iran, (N.Y: 
Oxford University Press, 2016) 12. 
 
27. Andrew Pollack, “Seoul Journal; Nuclear Fears? Ko-
rea’s Noodle Sales Say No,” The New York Times, May 9, 1994, 
www.nytimes.com/1994/05/09/world/seoul-journal-nuclear-
fears-korea-s-noodle-sales-say-no.html. 
 
28. Ministry of National Defense, Defense W hite Paper 
1993-1994, (Republic of Korea: Korea Institute for Defense 
Analyses, 1994), 17. 
 
29. Ibid., 5. 
 
30. Kil, “South Korea’s Policy Making Process.” 
 
31. Son Key-young, South Korean Engagement Policies 
and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy, 
(N.Y.: Routledge, 2006), 143. 
 
32. Ministry of National Defense, Defense W hite Paper 
1997-1998, (Republic of Korea: Korea Institute for Defense 
Analyses, 1998), 17. 
 
33. Ibid., 65-66.  
 
34. Myeong-Chin Cho, “Restructuring of Korea’s Defense 
Aerospace Industry: Challenges and Opportunities,” (Bonn: 
Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003), 51, 
www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/paper28.pdf.  
 
 

CSDS Trinity Site Papers 
August 2018 
10 
 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/csds/ 
35. Maj. Gen. Jin-Hak Lee, Aiming High: Korea’s Air 
Force Towards the 21st Century, presented at the International 
Conference on Airpower in 21st Century Korea, Seoul, Korea, 
May 22-23, 1998, as cited in “Restructuring of Korea’s Defense 
Aerospace Industry” by Myeong-Chin Cho. 
 
36. Jung Sung-ki, “Korea Develops Homemade Stealth 
Technology,” The Korea Times, March 24, 2009, 
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2009/03/116_41896.html. 
 
37. Jong Kun Choi and Jong-yun Bae, “The Implications 
for Seoul of an Operationally Nuclear North Korea,” in North 
Korean Nuclear Operationality: Regional Security and Nonpro-
liferation, ed. by Gregory J. Moore (John Hopkins University 
Press: Baltimore, MD, 2014), 57. 
 
38. John Pike, “South Korean Naval Modernization,” Glob-
al Security (Feb. 2, 2016), www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/rok/navy-modernization.htm. 
 
39. Ibid. 
 
40. Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear  
Deterrence, 53. 
 
41. Shin and Izatt, “South Korean Anti-Americanism,” 799. 
 
42. Ibid., 799. 
 
43. Choi and Bae, “The Implications for Seoul of an Opera-
tionally Nuclear North Korea,” 65. 
 
44. Roh Tae Woo, “President Roh Tae Woo’s Declaration 
of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives,” Nov. 8, 
1991, www.fas.org. 
 
45. Sam Jameson, “No A-Arms for S. Korea, Leader Pledg-
es,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 14, 1993, arti-
cles.latimes.com/1993-11-14/news/mn-56949_1_nuclear-
weapons. 
 
46. Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Re-
straint,” International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall, 1994), 143, 
www.jstor.org/stable/2539198. 
 
47. Ministry of National Defense, Defense W hite Paper 
1997-1998, 226. 
 
48. Seung-Ho Choo, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis 
and Northeast Asian Security, ed. by Seung-ho Joo and Tae-
hwan Kwak, (Ashgate Publishing: Burlington, Vt. 2007), 1. 
 
49. Kwang Ho Chun, North Korea’s Nuclear Question: 
Sense of Vulnerability, Defensive Motivation, and Peaceful So-
lution, (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, Pa. 2010), 21. 
 
50. Cho, Global Rogues and Regional Orders, 36. 
 
51. Marshall M. Bouton et. al., “Global Views 2004: South 
Korean Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations, The East Asia Institute, (Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research: Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, February 2005), 21.  
52. Ibid., 22. 
 
53. Choong Nam Kim, “Changing Korean Perceptions of 
the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” AsiaPacif-
ic Issues no. 67 (April 2003), 3, schol-
arspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3774/1/api067.pdf. 
 
54. Cho, Global Rogues and Regional Orders, 56. 
 
55. K. Connie Kang, “Roh Cautions U.S. on North Korea,” 
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 13, 2004, articles.latimes.com/2004/
nov/13/local/me-roh13. 
 
56. Cho, Global Rogues and Regional Orders, 5. 
 
57. Ibid., 44. 
 
58. Ibid., 55. 
 
59 Ibid., 43. 
 
60. Seung-Ho Joo, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis, 
142. 
 
61. John O’Neil and Choe Sang-hun, “China Shows Will-
ingness to Punish North Korea for Test,” The New York Times, 
Oct. 10, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/world/
asia/11koreacnd.html. 
 
62. Cho, Global Rogues and Regional Orders, 53. 
 
63. “South Korean President Roh Cautions Washington 
Hawks,” The Korea Herald, Jan. 25, 2006, www.maravot.com/
Maravot_News01.31.06.html. 
 
64. Ministry of National Defense, Defense W hite Paper 
2007-2008, (Republic of Korea: Korea Institute for Defense 
Analyses, 2008), 5, www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/Document/
KoreaDefenceWhitePaper2008.pdf. 
 
65. Pike, “South Korean Naval Modernization.” 
 
66. Terence Roehrig, “South Korea’s Counterpiracy Opera-
tions in the Gulf of Aden,” in Global Korea: South Korea’s 
Contributions to International Security, by Scott Bruce et al., 
(Council on Foreign Relations Press, October 2012), 31, 
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
GlobalKorea_report_Roehrig.pdf 
 
67. Ibid., 31.  
 
68. Cho, “Restructuring of Korea’s Defense Aerospace 
Industry,” 12.  
 
69. Ibid., 12. 
 
70. Dong Sun Lee, “A Nuclear North Korea and the Stabil-
ity of East Asia: A Tsunami on the Horizon,” Australian Jour-
nal of International Affairs 61, no. 4 (2007), 437, 
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357710701684906 
 
71. John Pike, “ROK Air Force,” Global Security, July 7, 
2014, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/airforce.htm. 
 

CSDS Trinity Site Papers 
August 2018 
11 
 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/csds/ 
72. Bouton et al., “Global Views 2004,” 11. 
 
73. Ibid., 13. 
 
74. Ibid., 13. 
 
75. Lee, “A Nuclear North Korea,” 443.  
 
76. “Roh Denies Possession of U.S. Nuke Weapon,” Unit-
ed Press International, Dec. 8, 2006, www.upi.com/Roh-denies-
possession-of-US-nuke-weapon/71091165579643/. 
 
77. O’Neil, A sia, the U.S. and Extended Nuclear Deter-
rence, 66. 
 
78. Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean 
Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association 
(January 2018), www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
 
79. Choi and Bae, “The Implications for Seoul of an Opera-
tionally Nuclear North Korea,” 59. 
 
80. Choe Sang-hun,”South Korea Publicly Blames the 
North for Ship’s Sinking,” The New York Times, May 19, 2010, 
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/world/asia/20korea.html. 
 
81. “Lee Dangles Invite to Nuclear Summit Before Him 
Jong-il,” The Chosun Ilbo, May 11, 2011, http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2011/05/11/2011051100541.html. 
 
82. Ibid. 
 
83. Jiyoon Kim and Karl Friedhoff, “South Korean Public 
Opinion on North Korea and the Nations of the Six-Party 
Talks,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, (October 2011) 5-
6. 
 
84. Ibid., 6-7. 
 
85. Ibid., 8. 
 
86. Seung-Ho Joo, North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis, 
143. 
 
87. “North, South Korea Exchange Fire Across Disputed 
Western Sea Border,” March 31, 2014, Fox News, 
www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/31/north-korea-plans-live-
fire-drills-near-disputed-sea-boundary-south-korea-says.html. 
 
88. Jun Ji-hye, “3 Military Systems to Counter N. Korea: 
Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR,” The Korea Times, Nov. 1, 2016, 
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/ 
11/205_217259.html. 
 
89. Ibid. 
 
90. Paula Hancocks and James Griffiths, “No Nuclear 
Weapons in South Korea, Says President Moon,” CNN, Sept. 
14, 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/asia/south-korea-moon-
nuclear/index.html. 
 
91. O’Neil, A sia, the U.S. and Extended Nuclear Deter-
rence, 67. 
 
92. Ibid., 67. 
 
93. Kim and Friedhoff, “South Korean Public Opinion,” 6. 
 
94. David E. Sanger, Choe Sang-hun, and Motoko Rich, 
“North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weap-
ons,” The New York Times, Oct. 28, 2017, 
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-
weapons-japan-south-korea.html. 
 
95. Christine Kim, “Most South Koreans Doubt the North 
Will Start a War: Poll,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2017, 
www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-southkorea-
poll/most-south-koreans-doubt-the-north-will-start-a-war-poll-
idUSKCN1BJ0HF. 
 
96. Kang Seung-woo, “Calls for S. Korea’s Nuke Arma-
ment Gaining Ground,” The Korea Times, Aug. 1, 2016, 
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2016/08/116_210829.html. 
 
97. Sanger, Sang-hun, and Rich, “North Korea Rouses 
Neighbors.”  
 
98. Ibid. 
 
99. Ibid. 
 
101. Hancocks and Griffiths, “No Nuclear Weapons in 
South Korea.” 
 
102. Choi and Bae, “Implications for Seoul,” 65. 
 
 
 
The  Trinity  Site  Papers  present  key  discussions,  ideas,  and 
conclusions  that  are  directly  relevant  to  developing  defense 
policy  and  strategy  relating  to  countering  weapons  of  mass 
destruction and developing the nuclear enterprise. 
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or 
implied in this article are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily  reflect  the  views  of  the  Air  University,  the  U.S.  Air 
Force, or Department of Defense. 
The mission of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic   Deter-
rence Studies is to develop Air  For ce, DoD, and other USG 
leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practic-
es  within  strategic  defense  issues  involving  nuclear,  biologi-
cal, and chemical weapons. 