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that it is illogical to conclude that Congress, who was seeking
to ensure that Black Americans could vote, intended to enact
legislation that only allowed Black Americans to register to
vote but gave no regard to whether those same individuals
could actually have their votes counted once registered. See,
e.g., 1963 House Report at 2393 (explaining “H.R. 7152, as
amended, . . . would reduce discriminatory obstacles to the
exercise of the right to vote[,]” not just the right to register to
vote).
Ultimately, “the provisions of the 1957, 1960, and 1964
Civil Rights Acts to eliminate discriminatory voting practices
[proved] to be clearly inadequate,” 111 Cong. Rec. 15,645
(1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler), and “[p]rogress”
remained “painfully slow,” H.R. Rep. No. 89-439 (1965), as
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441. The CCR
expressed concerns that Congress’s prior efforts had “failed to
produce any significant increase in [Black] registration and
voting.” U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Voting in Mississippi,
at 49 (1965). Even the Supreme Court observed that when
Congress banned specific discriminatory practices, “some of
the States affected . . . merely switched to discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees,” “enacted difficult
new tests,” “defied and evaded court orders,” or “simply closed
their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.”
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314. Consequently, Congress passed
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which expanded the Materiality
Provision to cover all elections, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437, 445 (1965), thereby ensuring that, even in State and local
elections, voters were not denied the right to cast a ballot based
on inconsequential paperwork mistakes that had no impact on
determining whether the voter was qualified to vote. A
fulsome consideration of the legislative history surrounding the