Hon.
William
J.
Baer
September
30,
2014
Page
11of20
(
suggests that IEEE-SA has not provided sufficient clarity
in
its
policy-
regardless
of
which party's valuation is in fact closer to a reasonable rate.
22
The burden
of
disputes over SEPs is borrie not just by implementers and
SEP owners, but by consumers and other users
of
products that implement IEEE
standards. For example, the National Retail Federation stated
in
a comment
submitted to the Standards Board:
[S]ome
of
our retail members have recently become involved
in
disputes concerning
the
licensing
of
patents that are claimed to be
required to implement IEEE standards. Our members' networks are
important parts
of
their business infrastructures, so the issuance
of
an
injunction or exclusion order that limits their use
of
their networks
would have a serious impact on our members' businesses.
We
also welcome the effort to further define what licensing terms are
consistent with the requirement that owners
of
patents required to
implement IEEE standards grant licenses
on
reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms. Some
of
our members have received grossly
excessive licensing demands from patent trolls that have acquired
patents that they claim our members infringe by implementing IEEE
standards. The proposed revisions closely track the reasoning
of
judges in recent court cases and will help our members and their
suppliers
in
licensing negotiations by clarifying what RAND means.
$16.17 per tablet, and up to $36.90 per bar code scanner
or
other inventory tracking
device; implementer's valuation would have resulted
in
royalties of between . 72 cents
and 3.09 cents per chip); Microsoft Corp.
v.
Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013
WL
2111217, at *87, *99 (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013) (patent holder's proposed valuation
would have resulted
in
royalties
of
between $6.00 and $8.00 per unit; implementer's
valuation would have resulted in royalties of between 3 cents and 6.5 cents per unit);
see also Ericsson Inc.
v.
D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013
WL
4046225, at *18
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (patent holder proposed a $0.50 per unit royalty; implementer
argued that a proper RAND rate would be "pennies
or
fractions thereof' per unit (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Apple Inc.
v.
Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-
CV-178-bbc, 2012
WL
7989412, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Nov.
8,
2012) (patent holder proposed
a royalty rate of 2.25% per unit; implementer responded that it would be willing to pay a
rate of no more than
$1
for each Apple device).
22
See, e.g., Ericsson, 2013
WL
4046225, at *25 ("The paradox of RAND licensing is
that it requires a patent holder to offer licenses
on
reasonable terms, but it offers no
guidance over what is reasonable."); Microsoft Corp., 2013
WL
2111217, at *10 (noting
that IEEE's 2007 patent policy does not clarify "what constitutes a reasonable royalty
rate or what other terms and conditions are reasonable or nondiscriminatory for any
license between interested parties").
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP